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ABSTRACT
Online social networks (OSNs) have gained soaring popularity and are among 
the most popular sites on the Web. With OSNs, users around the world establish 
and strengthen connections by sharing thoughts, activities, photos, locations, 
and other personal information. However, the immense popularity of OSNs also 
raises significant security and privacy concerns. Storing millions of users' private 
information and their social connections, OSNs are susceptible to becoming the 
target of various attacks. In addition, user privacy will be compromised if the 
private data collected by OSNs are abused, inadvertently leaked, or under the 
control of adversaries. As a result, the tension between the value of joining 
OSNs and the security and privacy risks is rising.
To make OSNs more secure and privacy-preserving, our work follow a 
bottom-up approach. OSNs are composed of three components, the 
infrastructure layer, the function layer, and the user data stored on OSNs. For 
each component of OSNs, in this dissertation, we analyze and address a 
representative security/privacy issue. Starting from the infrastructure layer of 
OSNs, we first consider how to improve the reliability of OSN infrastructures, and 
we propose Fast Mencius, a crash-fault tolerant state machine replication 
protocol that has low latency and high throughput in wide-area networks. For the 
function layer of OSNs, we investigate how to prevent the functioning of OSNs 
from being disturbed by adversaries, and we propose SybilDefender, a 
centralized sybil defense scheme that can effectively detect sybil nodes by 
analyzing social network topologies. Finally, we study how to protect user 
privacy on OSNs, and we propose two schemes. MobiShare is a 
privacy-preserving location-sharing scheme designed for location-based OSNs 
(LBSNs), which supports sharing locations between both friends and strangers. 
LBSNSim is a trace-driven LBSN model that can generate synthetic LBSN 
datasets used in place of real datasets. Combining our work contributes to 
improving security and privacy in OSNs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the past few years, online social networks (OSNs) have gained soaring pop­
ularity and are among the most frequently visited sites on the Web [7], For 
instance, Facebook alone has around 1.1 billion active users as of March 2013, 
60% of which log on Facebook everyday [6]. OSNs provide social connection, 
communication, and storage applications for users. Through the services pro­
vided by OSNs, users establish and strengthen relations with each other by 
sharing thoughts, activities, photos, locations, and other personal information.
However, the worldwide adoption of OSNs also raises significant security 
and privacy concerns. First, the proper functioning of large-scale online ser­
vices like OSNs requires consensus among servers, which may be compro­
mised when some servers fail by crashing for unexpected reasons, such as 
power outages, physical damage, and online attacks. Second, because of the 
soaring popularity of OSNs and the vast amount of private and possibly sensitive 
data they collect, they are the ideal target of various attacks, such as sybil at­
tack [35], fishing attack [55], de-anonymization attack [105], and spam. Through 
these attacks, attackers profit by compromising the operation of OSNs, polluting
1
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Figure 1.1: OSN components and the security and privacy threats
OSNs with fake information, and cheating legal users. Third, OSNs concentrate 
data from millions of users under a single administrative domain. This central­
ization introduces the possibility of large-scale privacy breaches from intentional 
or unintentional data disclosures. As a result, users' private information may be 
leaked and abused, such as sexual preferences, political and religious views, 
phone numbers, occupations, identities of friends, and photos. The privacy 
threats are more serious with regard to location-based online social networks 
(LBSNs), a category of OSNs where users share whereabouts with their friend- 
s, because on LBSNs users' profile information is correlated with their physical 
locations.
With OSNs central to so many peoples's lives, it is critical to address the 
rising tension between the value of participation and the security and privacy 
threats to OSN users. Users would like to continue using OSNs, but they also 
want to protect their privacy and avoid becoming attack victims [68]. In this dis­
sertation, we study the security and privacy issues of OSNs following a bottom- 
up approach. The building of OSNs involves using the underlying servers as the 
infrastructure, implementing OSN functionalities, and collecting/managing user
2
data. Starting from the bottom of OSNs, to host millions of users, OSNs are typ­
ically running on a large number of servers, which may crash unexpectedly and 
may be compromised by adversaries. These servers compose the infrastruc­
ture of OSNs, whose reliability decides the availability of the OSN services. Built 
on the infrastructure, the OSN services implement the functionalities provided 
by OSNs, such as friendship creation, user communication, profile updates, and 
information sharing. These functionalities are the core value of OSNs, through 
which OSNs attract millions of users. However, these functionalities also tend 
to be disturbed by various malicious behaviors on OSNs, in which case the 
adversaries gain an illegitimate advantage. Finally, during the use of the func­
tionalities provided by OSNs, users have generated a tremendous amount of 
data, some of which are highly sensitive and private. These data are collected 
by OSNs, and user privacy will be compromised if their data are leaked and 
abused. Therefore, in terms of security and privacy, OSNs can be generally di­
vided into three components, the infrastructure layer, the function layer, and the 
user data, as shown in Figure 1.1. The infrastructure layer includes the servers 
on which OSNs are deployed, the function layer stands for the functionalities 
provided by OSNs, and the user data refer to the large amount of data gener­
ated by users during their use of OSNs. In this dissertation, to improve security 
and privacy in OSNs, for each component we analyze and address a represen­
tative security/privacy issue. Combining our work contributes to building more 
secure and privacy-preserving OSNs. The details of our work are presented 
below.
The infrastructure reliability is critical to the running of OSNs, which are typ­
ically running on a large number of servers concurrently. How to reach con­
sensus among those servers is non-trivial, especially considering that those
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servers may be compromised by adversaries and fail by crashing. A technique 
that is widely used to tolerate faults in such an environment is state machine 
replication, in which a deterministic service is replicated across multiple failure- 
independent servers. To improve the infrastructure reliability of OSNs, in this 
dissertation, we analyze the state of the art state machine replication solution- 
s, and propose Fast Mencius, a crash-fault tolerant state machine replication 
protocol that has high performance in wide-area networks.
A reliable infrastructure is necessary but not sufficient to guarantee the safe­
ty of OSNs, as the functioning of OSNs may be disturbed by adversaries who 
behave maliciously. Adversaries can spam OSNs, cheat legal users, and ma­
nipulate social connections. All these malicious behaviors, however, require 
that the adversaries control a large number of bogus accounts. Because of the 
lack of verification methods currently on OSNs, it is easy for an adversary to cre­
ate many fake accounts without being detected. Using these fake accounts the 
adversary can compromise the operation of OSNs or pollute OSNs with false 
information. This is called the sybil attack, a fundamental form of attack threat­
ening the security of OSNs. To address this issue we present SybilDefender, 
a sybil defense mechanism that can effectively detect sybil nodes by analyzing 
the topology of social graphs.
Our first two work improve the security of the infrastructure layer and the 
function layer of OSNs, respectively. However, one problem that still wait- 
s to be solved is how to protect user privacy on OSNs. OSNs collect a vast 
amount of private data about users over time, and user privacy may be com­
promised even when OSNs are functioning appropriately. Among the various 
types of user information stored by OSNs, the most sensitive is users' physi­
cal locations. Once leaked, adversaries can extract users’ activities, interests,
4
habits, and even health conditions from their location traces. By analyzing the 
functionalities of OSNs we find that the reason why OSNs record users' loca­
tion information is to provide the location-sharing features, which allow user- 
s to share their whereabouts with one another. This, nevertheless, is at the 
cost of sacrificing user privacy. To address this issue we present MobiShare, a 
privacy-preserving location-sharing scheme for location-based OSNs (LBSNs). 
Through this scheme we show that locations can be shared between both friend- 
s and strangers on LBSNs without compromising user privacy. Additionally, we 
also consider protecting user privacy on LBSNs from another perspective. It is 
known that LBSNs intentionally or unintentionally release their datasets, e.g., for 
commercial purposes or research purposes, which compose a source of priva­
cy leakage. Even if the datasets are anonymized before being published, user 
identities can still be recovered from the anonymized location traces and social 
graphs. To fundamentally solve this problem, we present LBSNSim, a trace- 
driven model for generating synthetic LBSN datasets that capture the charac­
teristics of the real datasets. The synthetic LBSN datasets can be used as re­
placements of original datasets, so as to eliminate the privacy risks associated 
with releasing the real LBSN datasets.
1.1 Improving Infrastructure Reliability of Online 
Social Networks
The most general approach to implementing a highly reliable service is state ma­
chine replication [50], where a deterministic service is replicated across a set 
of failure-independent servers (replicas), and the replicas consistently change
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states by applying commands from an agreed sequence. State machine repli­
cation has been extensively explored by previous research [23,64,71] and used 
in real systems [20,52]. Mencius [71] is the state of the art state machine replica­
tion protocol that tolerates crash failures, which has high performance in wide- 
area networks with its rotating-leader design. However, Mencius has its own 
weakness. As it is stated by the authors: "Mencius's commit latency is limited 
by the slowest replica" [71]. In wide-area networks where link delays are typi­
cally large and unpredictable, it is with high probability that some slow replicas 
exist in the stage machine replication system. With Mencius, the commits of 
commands at the fast replicas are all delayed by the slowest replica.
To address the weakness of Mencius, we present Fast Mencius, a multi­
leader state machine replication protocol. Fast Mencius enhances Mencius with 
two mechanisms, Active Prepare and Multi-instance Propose. Active Prepare 
ensures that a fast replica does not need to wait for the slow ones to skip or to 
propose commands, and Multi-instance Propose gives the slow replicas oppor­
tunities to propose their own commands. Our simulation results demonstrate 
that in presence of slow replicas, the commit latency of Fast Mencius is signifi­
cantly lower than that of Mencius.
1.2 Defending Against Sybil Attacks in Online So­
cial Networks
OSNs are vulnerable to sybil attacks [35], in which an adversary creates many 
bogus identities called sybils, and compromises the running of the system or 
pollutes the system with fake information. Sybil attack is not only a hot research
6
topic, but also a realistic threat to existing systems. A recent attack to Apple 
Store shows that sybil attacks can be effectively launched in practice [3].
To prevent the adversary from creating many sybil identities, the previous 
sybil defense schemes [33,98,106,111,112] are built upon the assumption that 
all the relationships in social networks are trusted and they reflect the trust re­
lationships among those users in the real world, and thus an adversary cannot 
establish many relationships with the honest users. However, it has been shown 
that this assumption does not hold in OSNs [17]. In addition, the large sizes of 
OSNs require that any scheme aiming to defend against sybil attacks in OSNs 
should be efficient and scalable. Some previous schemes are computationally 
intensive, which cannot scale to networks with millions of nodes [33,106], while 
other schemes suffer from high false rates [98,111,112].
To address the weaknesses of previous work, we present SybilDefender, a 
centralized sybil defense mechanism that leverages the network topologies to 
defend against sybil attacks in OSNs. Based on performing a limited number of 
random walks within the social graph, SybilDefender is efficient and scalable to 
large social networks. Our evaluation on two 3,000,000 node real-world social 
topologies shows that SybilDefender outperforms the state of the art by one to 
two orders of magnitude in both accuracy and running time. It can effectively 
identify sybil nodes and detect the sybil community surrounding a sybil node, 
even when the number of sybil nodes introduced by each attack edge is close 
to the theoretically detectable lower bound.
7
1.3 Privacy-Preserving Location Sharing in Location-
based Online Social Networks
Compared with traditional OSNs, LBSNs take a step further in that they provide 
the location-based features, which are a missing link between the real world 
and OSNs. Instead of letting users explicitly enter their locations, the recen- 
t smartphone platforms that support various localization technologies make it 
much easier for users to access and share their locations with each other.
Although location sharing is a fundamental component of LBSNs, it also 
raises significant privacy concerns. LBSNs collect a large amount of location 
information over time, and users' privacy is compromised if their location infor­
mation is abused by adversaries controlling the LBSNs. Without a guarantee of 
privacy, users may be hesitant to share locations through LBSNs [14,68]. To 
address this issue, we present MobiShare, a privacy management system that 
supports privacy-preserving location sharing in LBSNs. MobiShare is flexible 
to support a variety of location-based applications. It enables sharing locations 
between both trusted social relations and untrusted strangers, and it supports 
range query and user-defined access control. In MobiShare, neither the social 
network server nor the location server has complete knowledge of the users' 
identities and locations. Users' location privacy is protected even if one of the 
entities colludes with malicious users. Our evaluation results show that Mo­
biShare consumes a very limited amount of system resources on the mobile 
devices, and it only incurs a small overhead on cellular infrastructure.
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1.4 Modeling Location-based Online Social Networks
The soaring adoption of LBSNs makes it possible to analyze human socio- 
spatial behaviors based on large-scale realistic data, which is important to both 
the research community and the design of new location-based social applica­
tions. Users of LBSNs check-in at different venues (e.g., airports, restaurants) 
and these check-ins are broadcasted to their friends. In this way users share 
with friends information about the places they visited. These check-ins, com­
bined with the online friendship connections revealed through the LBSNs, pro­
vide an unprecedented opportunity to study human socio-spatial behaviors.
However, performing direct measurements on LBSNs is impractical, be­
cause of the security mechanisms of existing LBSNs and the high time and 
resource costs. The problem is exacerbated by the scarcity of available LBSN 
datasets, which is mainly due to the privacy concerns. The LBSN datasets re­
veal users' sensitive private information, such as interests, habits, and health 
conditions, even if these datasets are anonymized before being published. As 
a result, only a very few number of LBSN datasets are publicly released. To 
address this issue, we analyze the characteristics of original LBSN dataset- 
s, and present LBSNSim, a trace-driven model for generating synthetic LBSN 
datasets that capture the properties of the real datasets. Our findings reveal 
that LBSNs share many universal social and spatial features, and our evalua­
tion demonstrates that the proposed model provides an accurate representation 
of the target LBSNs
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1.5 Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present the re­
lated work. In Chapter 3, we present Fast Mencius, a crash-fault tolerant s- 
tate machine replication protocol. In Chapter 4, we present SybilDefender, a 
security mechanism to defend against sybil attacks in OSNs. In Chapter 5, 
we present MobiShare, a privacy management system that supports flexible 
privacy-preserving location sharing in LBSNs. In Chapter 6, we present LB- 
SNSim, a trace-driven LBSN model that can be used to generate synthetic LB- 
SN datasets, and in Chapter 7 we conclude the dissertation.
10
Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter, we present the related work. Following the organization of this 
dissertation, we first present the work related to the security problems we study 
in this dissertation, and then we present the work related to the privacy issues 
we study. A survey of security and privacy issues in OSNs can be found at [82].
2.1 Improving Security of Online Social Networks
For the infrastructure of OSNs, the most general approach to implementing a 
highly reliable service is state machine replication [50], which has been widely 
explored by previous research [23,64,71] and used in real systems [20,52]. In 
this dissertation, we consider the problem of how to build state machine replica­
tion systems that can tolerate crash failures, whose related work are presented 
in Section 2.1.1.
OSNs are venerable to various attacks, such as sybil attack [35], fishing 
attack [55], de-anonymization attack [105], and spam. Among those attacks 
sybil attack is the most widely explored by previous research [33,98,106,111,
11
112]. In this dissertation we propose our own sybil defense scheme that can 
effectively detect sybil nodes in OSNs, whose related work are presented in 
Section 2.1.2.
2.1.1 Improving Infrastructure Reliability of Online Social Net 
works
The well known Paxos protocol [64] was proposed to build replicated state ma­
chines that tolerate crash failures in an asynchronous environment. However, 
its performance is limited by the single leader, which leads to low throughput 
and high latency. To address this problem, Mao et al. proposed Mencius [71], 
a multi-leader state machine replication protocol. Derived from Paxos, Mencius 
is designed to achieve high performance in wide-area networks.
Fast Paxos [67] is an extension of Paxos that admits two execution modes. 
The classic mode is similar to Paxos, while the fast mode allows clients to di­
rectly send their commands to the acceptors. Fast Paxos suffers from collision- 
s, which happens when acceptors receive the commands in different orders. 
When the number of commands is large, the possibility of collisions is high, and 
Fast Paxos will have a higher average latency than Paxos, as collisions need 
to be resolved with a time-consuming recovery procedure. It has also been 
shown that in wide-area networks, Fast Paxos has a significant probability of 
having a higher latency than Paxos even in runs without collisions [56]. As for 
throughput, Fast Paxos cannot outperform Paxos, since the number of mes­
sages sent/received by each acceptor is the same with Paxos with no collision, 
and larger than Paxos when collisions happen.
Several consensus protocols deal with collisions by running Paxos and Fast
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Paxos concurrently. The scheme proposed by Charron-Bost and Schiper achieves 
the minimum latency between Paxos and Fast Paxos only in failure-free run- 
s [25], while Hybrid Paxos [34] and Paxos-MIC [53] have a higher message 
complexity and thus lower throughput than Paxos. Besides, these protocols 
rely on a single leader. The unbalanced communication pattern makes them 
unable to fully utilize the available resources. Yabandeh et al. proposed a pro­
tocol for the special case of three replicas [109]. The basic idea is to use a 
single acceptor and to switch it with another acceptor in the case of failure. The 
message complexity is thus reduced.
Generalized Paxos [66] reduces collisions by allowing the replicated state 
machine to commit commands in different but equivalent orders. Similarly, Men­
cius allows commands x and y to be committed in any order when they are 
commutable [71], which means committing y after x produces the same system 
state as committing x after y. This out-of-order commit is used to reduce the 
extra delay incurred by the delayed commit issue in Mencius.
The authors of Mencius also applied the rotating-leader scheme to Byzantine 
fault tolerance, and proposed RAM [72], a low latency BFT protocol for wide- 
area networks. Similarly, EBAWA [99] is a BFT protocol that adopts the rotating- 
leader design. Different from RAM, EBAWA requires 2 /  +  1, instead of 3 /  +  1, 
replicas to tolerate /  faulty replicas. It uses A2M [29], a trusted component on 
the servers to reduce the number of replicas and communication steps required 
for reaching agreements.
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2.1.2 Defending Against Sybil Attacks in Online Social Net­
works
The initial paper by Douceur [35] on sybil attacks shows that sybil attacks cannot 
be prevented unless special assumptions are made. Bazzi and Konjevod [15] 
assume that an attacker has only one network position, and all the sybil nodes 
created by the attacker have similar network coordinates [79]. However, this 
defense will be broken once an attacker possesses multiple network positions.
One promising way to defend against sybil attacks in social networks is to 
leverage the social network topologies. Yu et al. proposed decentralized algo­
rithms, SybilGuard [112] and SybilLimit [111], to determine whether a suspect 
node is sybil or not. SybilGuard and SybilLimit both rely on the assumption that 
social networks are fast mixing (explained later), and the number of attack edges 
is limited. To identify sybil nodes, the schemes make use of random routes, a 
special kind of random walks in which each node uses a pre-computed random 
permutation as a one-to-one mapping from incoming edges to outgoing edges. 
SybilGurad suffers from high false negatives, as each attack edge may intro­
duce 0 (v n  log n) sybil nodes without being detected. The improved version of 
SybilGuard, SybilLimit, reduces this value to O(logn), which is still larger than 
the proved lower bound ft (1) [111] by a log n factor. Moreover, to detect the 
sybil region with SybilGuard or SybilLimit, all the suspect nodes in the social 
graph need to be tested. By contrast, with our sybil community detection algo­
rithm, the sybil community around a sybil node can be detected in one run of 
the algorithm.
GateKeeper [98] is another decentralized sybil defense scheme that heavily 
relies on the assumption that the social networks are random expander. This is
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a strong assumption which has not been validated by previous research. Our 
evaluation shows that GateKeeper suffers from high false positive and negative 
rates and cannot effectively identify sybil nodes on the real-world asymmetric 
social topologies.
Sybillnfer [33], a centralized sybil defense algorithm, leverages a Bayesian 
inference approach that assigns a sybil probability, indicating the degree of 
certainty, to each node in the network. It achieves low false negatives at the 
cost of high computation overhead. The overall time complexity of Sybillnfer is 
0 (\V \2 log |V|), where V  is the set of vertices in the social graph. In the evalu­
ation Sybillnfer handled networks with up to 30K nodes, which is much smaller 
than the size of regular OSNs. Xu et al. [106] leveraged the edge-betweenness 
based clustering algorithm proposed by Girvan and Newman [42] to detect sybil 
areas. The algorithm calculates the shortest path between every pair of nodes 
within the network in each round, which makes it impractical for even small­
sized social networks. In contrast, SybilDefender only relies on performing a 
limited number of random walks in the social graph, and it is scalable to large 
networks.
Some previous solutions mitigate sybil attacks through the use of computa­
tional puzzles or CAPTCHAs [83,87]. These approaches can limit the rate at 
which sybil identities are introduced into the systems, but they cannot identify 
the existing sybil identities. They can be used in conjunction with the scheme 
proposed in this chapter. Besides this, sybil attacks can also be mitigated by 
limiting social information sharing in physical proximity [97,110].
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2.2 Preserving Privacy in Online Social Networks
The privacy issues of OSNs have also been extensively studied by previous 
research, such as the design of privacy-preserving OSNs [13], privacy risks 
in OSNs [21,60], privacy-enhancing approaches for OSNs [38,48], and users' 
privacy preferences on OSNs [96]. In this dissertation we focus on protecting 
users' location privacy [94], and we propose two scheme. MobiShare is a pri­
vacy management scheme that supports privacy-preserving location-Sharing 
on LBSNs, whose related work are presented in Section 2.2.1. LBSNSim is a 
trace-driven model for generating synthetic LBSN datasets that can be used as 
replacements for original LBSN datasets, whose related work are presented in 
Section 2.2.2.
2.2.1 Privacy-Preserving Location Sharing in Location-based 
Online Social Networks
Techniques to preserve location privacy. The most intuitive way to pro­
tect location privacy is to replace the user identity in the location data with 
an untraceable ID, i.e., a pseudonym [16]. However, previous research has 
shown algorithms that can break pseudonyms and reconstruct tracks based on 
the anonymized location traces from multiple users [46,51,63]. These algo­
rithms use multi-target tracking and fc-means clustering to re-identify individual- 
s from the anonymized traces. Therefore, simply replacing user identities with 
pseudonyms is not enough to guarantee location privacy.
To address this issue a number of stronger techniques have been proposed. 
Gruteser and Grunwald [45] introduced fc-anonymity for location privacy. When
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a user requests a location-based service, the proposed scheme computes a 
cloaking region that contains the requesting user and at least k - 1  other users, 
and uses this region as the user's location to request the service. Along this 
direction a series of work have been done. For instance, Gedik and Liu [41] 
proposed letting users specify their own k values and minimizing the size of 
cloaking regions, while Xu and Cai's work [107,108] considers leveraging the 
historic location samples and allows a user to express his privacy requirement 
by specifying a public region, which the user feels comfortable if the region 
is reported as his location. The weakness of these cloaking schemes is that 
they undermine the accuracy of the responses from the service provider. This 
defeats the location-based applications in which users would like to learn the 
precise location of one another. Also, it has been shown that even with cloaking 
user privacy may still be compromised [43].
Kido et al. [58] proposed protecting location privacy through dummy loca­
tion updates. The basic idea is to append multiple dummy location updates to 
each real location update sent to the service provider. The authors discussed 
the issues including realistic dummy movements and reduction of communica­
tion costs. Compared with the cloaking mechanisms, the advantage of using 
dummy location updates is that the service accuracy is not hurt. In our work 
we leverage both pseudonyms and dummy location updates to protect users' 
location privacy.
Privacy-preserving location-based applications. Smokescreen [32] is 
a privacy management system designed to enable privacy-preserving pres­
ence sharing in location-based social services. The users share their pres­
ence with each other by broadcasting short-range wireless messages. Simi­
larly, SMILE [70] is a location-based social service in which trust among users
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is established solely based on the shared encounters, so called "missed con­
nections". Co-located peers use a wireless link to generate a symmetric key at 
each encounter. Later on they use this key to identify each other and protect 
their communication. Popa et al. proposed PrivStats, a privacy-preserving sys­
tem for computing aggregate statistics over location data without sacrificing ac­
countability [84]. Location privacy and accountability in PrivStats are achieved 
through an aggregate statistics protocol and a zero-knowledge proof of knowl­
edge protocol, respectively. Chen et al. considered a similar problem [26]. The 
authors proposed a scheme for statistical queries over distributed user data 
that provides distributed differential privacy. An honest-but-curious proxy is de­
signed to add noise to query answers such that the querier cannot detect the 
presence or absence of a single user or a set of users. Narayanan et al. present­
ed several protocols that support privacy-preserving proximity testing [77]. In 
their design the problem of private proximity testing is reduced to the underlying 
cryptographic problem of private equality testing (PET), which is considered in 
settings with or without the involvement of a server. In addition, Koi, a privacy- 
preserving location-based matching platform, was proposed in [47]. Koi allows 
applications to specify a location event of interest and notifies the application 
when there is a location match. Privacy is achieved through a design compris­
ing two non-colluding entities that together implement location matching.
As for privacy-preserving location sharing, Puttaswamy and Zhao proposed 
an approach [85] in which a user's location update is first encrypted with a ses­
sion key shared with all his friends, and then stored on an untrusted third-party 
server. In this way only the friends of the user can access and decrypt his loca­
tion data. This scheme, however, is inflexible in that it restricts location sharing 
to existing relations. Moreover, users have no control over how their locations
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are shared with others, i.e., all the friends of a user can access his location in­
formation no matter where he is. Zhong et al. proposed three protocols [115], 
which only support learning friends' whereabouts, and each protocol has its own 
drawbacks. For example, the Louis and the Pierre protocols only allow a user 
to learn the distances between himself and his friends. Additionally, all three 
protocols are computationally intensive and do not apply to mobile devices.
2.2.2 Modeling Location-based Online Social Networks
Previous studies have attempted to investigate the check-in properties of LB- 
SNs. Cheng et al. studied human mobility patterns revealed by check-ins, and 
explored factors that influence mobility [27]. They found that LBSN users fol­
low the "Levy Flight" mobility pattern, which is characterized by a mixture of 
short, random movements with occasional long jumps. Similar findings have 
been observed in previous research based on cellphone call data [44], bank 
note dispersal [18], and GPS traces [86]. Scellato et al. presented a study of 
the socio-spatial properties of LBSNs [90]. They found that about 40% of al- 
I pairs of friends are within 100 km, and that in LBSNs long range social ties 
have a higher probability of occurrence than in other social systems. Brown 
et al. proposed a method to extract place-focused communities from the social 
graph of LBSNs by annotating the edges with check-in information [19]. The 
method can extract group of users connected not only by social ties, but also by 
the common places they visited. User behavior with regard to LBSNs has been 
analyzed by Lindqvist et al. [68]. The authors conducted interviews and sur­
veys to investigate how and why people use LBSNs, and their privacy concerns 
related to the location-sharing functions.
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Researchers have also utilized the social and geographic information of LB­
SNs for location prediction and friendship prediction. Backstrom et al. observed 
that the likelihood of friendship drops monotonically as a function of distance, 
and exploited this relation to infer Facebook users' registered addresses based 
on their friends' addresses [12]. Cho et al. proposed a location prediction model 
built on the idea that human check-ins are based on the movement between two 
latent states "work" and "home". They also considered the influence of social 
network structure on individuals' mobility [28]. To recommend new venues to 
LBSN users, Noulas et al. proposed a recommendation scheme relying on per­
forming personalized random walks on a user-place network, where a user is 
linked to her friends and the venues she has visited before [80]. As for friendship 
prediction, Scellato et al. built a supervised learning framework that exploits the 
features extracted from LBSNs to predict new links between friends-of-friends 
and place-friends, which are the users visiting the same place [91].
Sala et al. explored the feasibility of replacing real social graphs of online 
social networks with synthetic graphs generated from calibrated graph mod­
els [88]. The authors compared six existing graph models. They found that 
two models consistently generate synthetic graphs with common graph metric 
values similar to those of the original graphs, and one produces high fidelity re­
sults in application-level tests. In a followup work the authors investigated how 
to share social network graphs without compromising user privacy [89]. Kim 
and Leskovec presented a multiplicative social-attribute graph model modeling 
the structure of social networks where nodes have attribute information [59]. 
The model considers nodes with categorical attributes and the probability of an 
edge between a pair of nodes as the product of individual attribute link forma­
tion affinities. Pfeiffer et al. proposed a random graph generation model that
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combines the standard Chung-Lu model with edges that are formed through 
transitive closure [54]. The new model's expected degree distribution is equal 
to the degree distribution of the original input social graph.
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Chapter 3
Improving Infrastructure Reliability 
of Online Social Networks
Starting from the infrastructure layer of OSNs, we first consider how to improve 
infrastructure reliability of OSNs. As the reliance of our society on wide-area 
computing services such as OSNs grows, tolerating faults in these services is 
increasingly important. State machine replication [50] is the most general ap­
proach to implementing a highly reliable service. With this approach, a deter­
ministic service is replicated across a set of failure-independent replicas, and 
the replicas consistently change their states by applying commands from an 
agreed sequence. Each command in the sequence is chosen by a consen­
sus instance. State machine replication has been widely explored by previous 
research [23,64,71] and used in real systems [20,52]. In this chapter we con­
sider the problem of building replicated state machines in wide-area networks 
that tolerate crash failures.
It has been proved that under pure asynchronous circumstances, no consen­
sus protocol can ensure both safety and liveness, even when a single replica
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can fail [39]. However, the impossibility result can be circumvented by making 
weak assumptions about the synchrony of the system. The well-known Paxos 
protocol [64] was proposed to build replicated state machines that tolerate crash 
failures in an asynchronous environment, assuming the existence of an even­
tual leader election mechanism. The simplicity of Paxos enables it to achieve 
good throughput during normal execution. However, its performance is limited 
by the single leader. With Paxos, all the client commands need to be first for­
warded to the leader. In a wide-area network where a client is not co-located 
with the leader, this incurs high transmission delay. Moreover, the leader in 
Paxos is responsible for proposing all the client commands. This one-to-many 
communication pattern leads to the fact that when the system is network-bound, 
the throughput of the system is limited by the bandwidth of the links incident up­
on the leader, and the available bandwidth of other links is not fully used. Also, 
since the leader needs to process much more messages than the other repli­
cas, when the system is CPU-bound, the throughput of the system is limited 
by the leader's processing power. The variants of Paxos, like Fast Paxos [67], 
Generalized Paxos [66], and Hybrid Paxos [34], reduce Paxos's latency when 
certain conditions are met, but they still suffer from the weakness that the leader 
is a bottleneck of the system.
To address this problem, Mao et al. proposed Mencius [71], a multi-leader 
state machine replication protocol. Derived from Paxos, Mencius is designed 
to achieve high performance in wide-area networks. The basic idea of Mencius 
is to partition the sequence of consensus instances among all the replicas. By 
doing so, each replica proposes the received client commands using its allot­
ted instances, and the replicas in total can service more commands, compared 
with the single-leader schemes. With Mencius, the network resources are more
23
fully used, and the load of being the leader is amortized among all the replicas. 
Besides, clients can use their local replica to propose commands, and thus the 
latency for clients to receive replies is reduced.
Mencius, however, has its own weakness. As it is stated by the authors: 
"Mencius’s commit latency is limited by the slowest server" [71], where commit 
latency is defined as the interval between when a replica proposes a command 
and when the command is committed by the replica. State machine replication 
requires that a replica commit a command only when it learns the command 
has been chosen in a consensus instance, and it has learned and committed 
the commands chosen in all the previous instances. With Mencius, to commit 
a command chosen in instance i, a replica has to wait for all the other replicas 
to skip, by proposing no-op, or to propose commands in their allotted instances 
smaller than i. In wide-area networks where link delays are typically large and 
unpredictable, it is with high probability that some slow replicas, whose trans­
mission delay is larger than the others, exist in the system. With Mencius, the 
commits of commands at the fast replicas are all delayed by the slowest replica.
This chapter presents Fast Mencius, a multi-leader state machine replication 
protocol that is derived from Mencius. With Fast Mencius, the commit latency 
of fast replicas is not limited by the slowest replica, while the slow replicas can 
still have their proposed commands chosen by the replicated state machine. 
To achieve this, Fast Mencius enhances Mencius with two mechanisms, Ac­
tive Prepare and Multi-instance Propose. In presence of slow replicas, Active 
Prepare ensures that a fast replica does not need to wait for the slow ones to 
skip or to propose commands, and Multi-instance Propose gives the slow repli­
cas opportunities to propose their own commands. We also investigate issues 
including how to dynamically add and remove replicas in state machine repli-
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Figure 3.1: System model
cation systems using Fast Mencius or Mencius. Evaluation results show that 
with Fast Mencius, the commit latency of the non-slow replicas is independent 
of the delay of the links connecting the slowest replica, and the throughput of 
Fast Mencius is significantly larger than that of Paxos even in presence of slow 
replicas.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 presents the 
system model and assumptions. Section 3.2 revisits Paxos and Mencius, from 
which Fast Mencius is derived. The design of Fast Mencius is described in 
detail in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents discussions related to our protocol. 
Section 3.5 evaluates Fast Mencius. In Section 3.6 we conclude the chapter.
3.1 System Model and Assumptions
Like Mencius, we model a system as n sites interconnected by a wide-area net­
work. The link delays of the wide-area network are large and may have high 
variance. Each site contains a state machine replica and a group of clients, 
which communicate through links with high bandwidth and small delay. The n 
replicas communicate to implement a crash fault-tolerant replicated state ma­
chine. Replicas can fail by crashing, and may later recover. They have access 
to stable storage to record their states, which will be used after they recover 
from a failure. The system is asynchronous, with no bound on message trans­
mission delay. As a crash fault-tolerant protocol, Fast Mencius requires 2 /  +  1 
replicas to handle up to /  concurrent faulty replicas, with a quorum size of /  +1. 
Figure 3.1 shows an example system of 3 replicas.
To use the service, clients send commands to their local replica. The replicas 
establish a total order for all the commands by running a sequence of consensus 
instances. Each command is chosen in one instance. Replicas commit the 
commands in the decided order. Once a command is committed, the reply is 
sent from the local replica back to the client generating the command.
The safety requirements of consensus are as follows:
• Nontriviality. Any chosen command must have been proposed.
• Stability: a replica can learn at most one command in a consensus in­
stance.
• Consistency: Two replicas cannot learn different commands in a consen­
sus instance.
The liveness requirement of consensus is as follows:
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• Termination: Every non-faulty replica eventually learns some command in 
a consensus instance.
Fast Mencius shares the same assumption with Mencius that the commu­
nication channels are FIFO, and messages between two correct replicas are 
eventually delivered, but there is no upper-bound on message delivery time. 
In practice, the communication channels can be implemented by UDP with re­
transmission and flow control or TCP. To circumvent the FLP impossibility result, 
which states that no consensus protocol can ensure both safety and liveness 
even when a single replica can fail [39], we assume that each replica has ac­
cess to a failure detector OP, which guarantees eventually all faulty servers and 
only faulty servers are suspected [24]. Like Mencius, the failure detector is only 
used by Fast Mencius to guarantee iiveness. Fast Mencius is safe even if the 
failure detector makes an unlimited number of mistakes.
3.2 Paxos and Mencius revisited
Before we describe how Fast Mencius is derived from Mencius, we first briefly 
review Paxos and Mencius.
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3.2.1 Paxos
Paxos was first proposed in [64], and was further explained in [65]. Each Paxos 
instance consists of one or more rounds, and each round is divided into two 
phases. Paxos assumes a failure detector that provides eventual unique 
leader election functionality. The safety of Paxos is guaranteed even if multiple 
leaders are elected, but a unique leader is required to ensure liveness.
Phase 1, also known as the Prepare Phase, is only run when there is a 
leader change, e.g., the previous leader has crashed. A new leader I starts 
a higher numbered round r  by sending Prepare(r) to all the replicas. If r is 
greater than any other round replica a has heard of, a sends Reply (r, vrnd, vval) 
back to I, where vrnd is the highest-numbered round in which a has accepted 
a command, and vval is the command a accepted in round vrnd. I collects the 
Reply messages from a majority of replicas (including the one from itself). If no 
Reply indicates a previously accepted command, then I is free to propose any 
command in Phase 2. Otherwise, I picks up vval in the Reply messages with 
the highest value of vrnd, and proposes this command in Phase 2. Note that 
Phase 1 can be run concurrently for an unlimited number of future instances, 
and thus its cost is amortized.
Upon receiving a command from a client, a non-leader replica forwards the 
command to I. To propose a command, I starts Phase 2, also known as the 
Propose Phase, by sending Propose(r,val) to all the replicas, where val is the 
command. If replica a has not heard of a round numbered greater than r, it 
accepts the proposal and sends Accept(r,val) to I. After I collects the Accept 
messages from a majority of replicas, it learns that val has been chosen in this 
consensus instance, and sends Learn(val) to all the replicas. Upon receiving
28
Rl(coofdln*tet 
In ttu c t  1,4,7...) 
Rifcoerdlnatcs 
Instance 2£3...) 
Rjtcoordlaates 
l l t t u c t  ) , ^ w)
Prepare
Rj crashes, Ri revokes Instance 3instance 1
Figure 3.3: Message pattern of Mencius
the Learn message, a leams that the outcome of this instance is val. a commits 
val if it has learned and committed the commands chosen in all the previous 
instances. The client generating the command gets the execution result from 
its local replica. In Phase 2, The Learn messages can be omitted by letting 
each replica send its Accept message to all the replicas, instead of only to the 
leader. In this case, a replica leams that a command has been chosen once 
it receives Accept messages from a majority of replicas. This option, however, 
decreases learning latency at the cost of increased message complexity, which 
in turn reduces the system throughput.
By analyzing the protocol, it is easy to see that the leader is a bottleneck in 
Paxos. With Paxos, the leader needs to send, receive, and process many more 
messages than the other replicas. As a result, the throughput of the system is 
limited by the available bandwidth of the network links incident upon the leader 
when the system is network-bound, as well as the pressing power of the leader 
when the system is CPU-bound. Figure 3.2 shows the message pattern of a 
sequence of Paxos instances. Note that instances may overlap in practice.
3.2.2 Mencius
As a multi-leader state machine replication protocol, Mencius [71] is derived 
directly from Paxos. To order the commands, Mencius runs an unbounded se-
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quence of simple consensus instances. Let no-op be a command that leaves 
the replica state unchanged and generates no response. In each simple con­
sensus instance, only one replica, which is called the coordinator, can propose 
any command, while the other replicas can only propose no-op. Simple consen­
sus allows a coordinator to skip its instance with only one communication step: 
other replicas leam that no-op has been chosen in this instance once they re­
ceive a Skip message, which is a Propose message that proposes no-op, from 
the coordinator. The sequence of simple consensus instances is partitioned 
among all the replicas. Each replica is the coordinator (default leader)-of an 
unbounded number of instances. The simplest way to assign instances to repli­
cas is in a round-robin fashion: the i th replica coordinates instance cn+i, where 
c € {0 ,1 ,2 ,...} and n is the number of replicas.
In Mencius, simple consensus is implemented by Coordinated Paxos [71]. 
Coordinated Paxos differs from Paxos in that each Coordinated Paxos instance 
starts from the state in which the coordinator had run the Prepare Phase of 
Paxos for some initial round r. This is safe because in each instance all the 
replicas agree that the coordinator is the default leader.
Mencius is built upon the following rules.
Rule 1: Each replica p maintains I p, the sequence number of the next avail­
able simple consensus instance it coordinates. I v is also called the index of 
p. Upon receiving a command from a local client, p proposes the command in 
instance I p with round r ,  and updates I p to the next instance it coordinates. This 
rule ensures that a replica proposes a command immediately after receiving it 
from a client.
Rule 2: If replica p receives a Propose message in instance i  and i > Ip, be­
fore accepting the proposal, p updates Ip such that the new index I'p =  m in { i ':
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p coordinates instance i' A i ' > i } .  p also executes skip actions, by proposing no- 
op, for each of the instances in range [Ip, / ' )  it coordinates. With this rule, the 
replicas proposing commands less frequently, e.g., fewer clients in their sites 
generate commands, skip their instances.
Rule 3: By accessing the failure detector OP. if replica p suspects replica 
q has failed, and Cq is the smallest instance that is coordinated by q and not 
learned by p, then p revokes all the instances in range [Cq, Ip] that q coordinates. 
Note that revocation is done by running both the Prepare Phase and Propose 
Phase of Paxos, as shown in Figure 3.3. With this rule, a crashed replica cannot 
prevent other replicas from committing their learned commands.
Rule 4: If replica p proposes a command v ±  no-op in instance i, and p learns 
that no-op is eventually chosen in this instance, which means p has been falsely 
suspected and instance i  has been revoked by another replica, then p proposes 
v again in a higher instance it coordinates. This rule allows a falsely suspected 
replica to propose a command multiple times, until false suspicions eventually 
cease.
These four rules guarantee that any client command sent to a correct repli­
ca is eventually committed, and it takes the minimal two communication steps 
(Propose and Accept) for a proposing replica to learn the outcome of a consen­
sus instance. However, the message complexity depends on the rates at which 
the replicas propose client commands: when the replicas propose command- 
s at different rates, they need to execute many skip actions, by sending Skip 
messages. Mencius solves this problem with two optimizations.
Optimization 1: If replica p receives a Propose message from q in instance 
i and i > Ip, p uses the Accept message that replies the Propose to promise 
q that p will not propose any client command in instances smaller than i in the
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future, i.e., no-op has been chosen in these instances. In this case, p does not 
need to send Skip messages to q. p does not send Skip messages to other 
replicas either. Instead, for each of these replicas, p waits for a future Propose 
message sent to that replica, to promise not to propose any client command 
in smaller instances. This optimization is valid since Mencius assumes FIFO 
channel: before a replica receives an Accept or Propose message from p, it 
must have received all the previous Propose messages from p, so it can safely 
infer the instances p skips.
Optimization 2: A replica p propagates Skip messages to another replica q 
if the total number of delayed Skip messages to q is larger than some constant 
a, or the messages have been deferred for more than some time t. This rule is 
used to limit the delay of the propagation of Skip messages due to Optimization 
1 .
Figure 3.3 shows the message flow of Mencius. Compared with Paxos, Men­
cius has a more balanced communication pattern, which better utilizes the avail­
able bandwidth and achieves higher throughput when the system is network- 
bound. The load of being the leader is distributed among all the replicas, which 
eliminates the computational bottleneck in Paxos and enables higher through­
put when the system is CPU-bound. With Mencius, each replica proposes a 
command immediately after receiving it from a client, and leams the command 
is chosen once it receives Accepts from a majority of replicas. This eliminates 
the learning latency incurred by the Forward and Learn messages in Paxos.
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3.3 Fast Mencius
In wide-area networks where the link delays are influenced by the network traffic 
and are highly unpredictable, it is with high probability that the connection speed 
of a replica drops below the other replicas, and becomes a slow one. Mencius 
has high performance in wide-area networks. However, its commit latency is 
limited by the slowest replica. We explain this through an example. Considering 
the scenario in Figure 3.4, the system consists of 3 replicas, among which A 
is a slow replica: the links connecting A have a much larger delay. Assume at 
time 0 each replica proposes its first command: A proposes in instance 1; B 
proposes in instance 2; C proposes in instance 3. With Mencius, at 50 ms B 
and C receive the Propose message from each other, and reply with an Accept 
message. At 100 ms B  and C have collected Accepts from a majority of replicas 
(including the one from themselves), and learn that their proposed command 
has been chosen. However, at this time, B cannot commit its command chosen 
in instance 2, because it does not know the outcome of instance 1. Nor can 
C commit its command chosen in instance 3. At 150 ms, B and C receive 
the Learn message from each other. B learns the outcome of instance 3, and 
C learns the outcome of instance 2. They still cannot commit their proposed 
command, as the result of instance 1 is unknown. At 500 ms, B  and C receive 
the Propose from A, and reply with Accept. At 1000 ms, A leams its command 
is chosen in instance 1, and broadcasts the Learn message. A also commits 
this command. At 1500 ms, B and C receive the Learn message from A and 
learn the outcome of instance 1. Only at this time can B and C commit their 
proposed command. As a result, although it only takes B and C 100 ms to 
leam their command has been chosen, their commit latency is 1500 ms, three
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Figure 3.4: A system with a slow replica
one-way delays of the links incident upon A. Ironically, the slow replica A has 
a smaller commit latency of 1000 ms.
State machine replication requires that a replica commit a command only 
when it learns the command has been chosen in a consensus instance, and it 
has learned and committed the commands chosen in all the previous instances. 
With Mencius, to commit a command v chosen in instance i, a replica p has to 
wait for all the other replicas to propose commands, or to skip, by proposing 
no-op, in their allotted instances smaller than i. Otherwise, there will be gaps in 
the command sequence learned by p, and p cannot commit v.
Fast Mencius addresses this problem with two mechanisms, Active Revoke 
and Multi-instance Propose. With Active Revoke, fast replicas can proceed 
without being delayed by the slowest replica, while Multi-instance Propose en­
ables slow replicas to have their proposed commands chosen by the replicated 
state machine, even in presence of Active Revoke and false failure suspicions.
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Figure 3.5: Instance assignment scheme of Fast Mencius
3.3.1 Active Revoke
The intuition behind this mechanism is that, instead of requiring fast replicas wait 
for the messages, such as Propose, Skip, or Learn, from slow replicas to commit 
their commands, we allow them to actively revoke the instances coordinated by 
slow replicas, as long as their commit of client commands has been delayed for 
a sufficiently long time.
Different from Mencius, an instance number in Fast Mencius is of the form 
counter || id, where id is the identifer of the coordinator of this instance. The 
instance numbers are ordered primarily by counter. For the instance numbers 
with the same counter, they are ordered lexicographically by id. For example, 
the system in Figure 3.5 has three replicas A, B, and C. Then the instance num­
bers will be ordered as l A < IB  < 1C < 2A < 2B < 2C.... This assignment 
scheme enables dynamically adding and removing replicas, which will be ex­
plained in the next section. Besides, given one instance number, all the replicas 
know unambiguously who is the coordinator of this instance.
Active Revoke is triggered if Condition 1 is met:
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Condition 1 The commit of one of replica p's proposed commands has been 
deferred by an unlearned instance for more than some time r, and the failure 
detector indicates the coordinator of the unlearned instance is alive.
If this condition is met, we say p is delayed by the coordinator of the un­
learned instance. To expedite its advancement, p will revoke the instances co­
ordinated by the slow replica that prevent it from committing its commands, by 
running both the Prepare Phase and Propose Phase of Paxos. Note that in 
Mencius, revocation is done only when a replica suspects another has failed. 
In Fast Mencius, revocation is also used to help the fast replicas speed up their 
commits. The problem arises from this design is that if multiple replicas concur­
rently revoke the instances coordinated by a slow replica, there will be compet­
ing Prepare messages: a Prepare with a higher round number will suppress a 
Prepare with a lower round number. As a result, only the sender of the Prepare 
with the highest round number can finish the revocation process, and the work 
done by other replicas is wasted. In fact, when multiple replicas are delayed by 
a slow replica, after one of them finishes revocation, the others can learn the 
outcome of the revocation with the broadcasted Learn message. Therefore, the 
number of concurrently revoking replicas should be limited to save resources. 
This is achieved through the use of Help messages in our design.
Help messages are small status-checkers the replicas use to inquire oth­
er replicas about a particular piece of missing information, and determine the 
appropriateness of sending the following Prepare message. After a replica p 
initiates Active Revoke, it first sends a Help message to all the other replicas, 
which contains the instance numbers of the consensus instances it wants to re­
voke. Upon receiving the Help message, another replica q replies with an Ack 
message, which includes the following information.
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Figure 3.6: Message flow of Active Revoke
1. If q has learned the outcomes of some of the queried instances, then Ack 
includes the learned commands.
2. If q is revoking some of the queried instances, which means it has sen- 
t the Prepare message in these instances, then Ack includes these instance 
numbers.
p collects the Acks from other replicas. Through these replies, p leam- 
s the commands chosen in some queried instances directly if they are in the 
Acks. p also knows which queried instances are currently being revoked by 
other replicas, and p will wait for these replicas to finish revocation and broad­
cast the results. Note that since p only waits for the Acks from a minority of 
replicas, it is rational for p to assume that the senders of these Acks are the 
relatively fast ones, so it can rely on them to do revocation, p revokes only the 
queried instances whose results are still unknown and no Ack indicates they 
are currently being revoked.
3.3.1.1 Protocol
The full Active Revoke mechanism is as follows.
Help. If Condition 1 is met, then p initiates Active Revoke. Assume the co­
ordinator of the unlearned instance is q. Let Cq be the smallest instance coordi­
nated by q and not learned by p, and let Ip be p's index, i.e., the next available
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instance coordinated by p. p sends Help(Cq,C'q) to the other replicas, where 
C'q = max{i : q coordinates instance i A i < Ip}.
Upon receiving the Help message, another replica r  composes a reply as 
Ack(instance entries). The message may include multiple instance entries for 
the instances within the range [Cq, C'q) that q coordinates. If r has learned the re­
sults of some of these instances, then the corresponding entry is ( i, 'l\  v), where 
i is the instance number, and v is the learned command. Else if r is revoking 
some of these instances, then the corresponding entry is (i,V). Otherwise, Ack 
is an empty message.
Revoke, p waits for the Acks from other replicas. Assuming set 5  con­
sists of the sequence numbers of the queried instances whose results are still 
unknown and no Ack indicates they are currently being revoked, p starts revok­
ing the instances in S by running both the Prepare Phase and Propose Phase 
of Paxos, as shown in Figure 3.6, with an optimization. The optimization is, if a 
replica already accepts a command that is not no-op in an instance, and it starts 
revoking this instance, then it broadcasts a special Prepare message. Another 
replica's Reply to this Prepare does not convey the command it has accepted 
in this instance, if any. This optimization reduces the overhead of revocation in 
Fast Mencius. It is valid because by the definition of simple consensus, only the 
coordinator can propose any command in an instance, and the other replicas 
can only propose no-op. Therefore, if any replica accepts a command that is 
not no-op in an instance, it must have been proposed by the coordinator, and 
there is no need to let the Reply contain the command if the revoking replica 
already knows about it.
During Active Revoke, if p learns the results of all the queried instances, 
either from q or from other replicas, then p stops doing Active Revoke immedi­
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ately. Also, p performs Active Revoke for each unlearned instance coordinated 
by q only once.
3.3.1.2 Example
We use an example to illustrate how Active Revoke expedites the advancement 
of the fast replicas. Consider the scenario in Figure 3.5. Assume at time 0 each 
replica proposes its first command: A proposes in instance 1A\ B proposes in 
instance 1B\ C  proposes in instance 1C. At 100 ms B  and C  learn that their 
proposed command has been chosen. However, they cannot commit, because 
they don't known the result of instance 1 A. Let the timeout threshold r  be 100 
ms. Then at 200 ms both B and C  initiate Active Revoke by broadcasting the 
Help message. At 300 ms B and C  receive the Ack from each other. Since 
neither of them knows the outcome of instance 1A or is currently revoking 1A, 
both B and C  decide to revoke 1A and broadcast the Prepare message. Note 
that with Paxos, the round numbers are partitioned among the replicas, e.g., in 
a round-robin fashion, so two replicas will never send Prepare messages with 
the same round number. Assuming the Prepare sent by C  has a higher round 
number than the one sent by B, C's Prepare will suppress S's Prepare, i.e., B 
will respond to C's Prepare, while C  will not respond to B's Prepare. At 400 ms 
C  receives the Reply from B. Since neither B  nor C  has accepted a command 
in instance 1A, C  proposes no-op in instance 1 A. At 500 ms C  receives the 
Accept from B, and learns that no-op is chosen in instance 1 A. C  sends the 
Learn message to all the replicas and commits the command it proposes in 
instance 1C. At 550 ms B receives the Learn message from C, and leams the 
result of instance 1 A, so B  can commit the command it proposes in instance
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IB . As a result, Active Revoke reduces the commit latency of B and C  from 
1500 ms to 550 ms and 500 ms, respectively. This improvement is achieved 
because Active Revoke enables the fast replicas to advance without learning 
from the slow replicas, and thus their commit latency only depends on the delay 
of the links connecting themselves, instead of the delay of the links incident 
upon the slowest replica.
In this simplified example, B and C  concurrently revoke the instances coor­
dinated by A. This is because here B and C  propose client commands at the 
same rate, and the link delay between A and B is identical to that between A 
and C. As a result, B and C initiate Active Revoke simultaneously. In real envi­
ronments where replicas propose commands at varying rates and the network 
conditions are heterogeneous, it is with high probability that replicas enter the 
Active Revoke state at different time, in which case the Help messages will limit 
the number of concurrently revoking replicas. Notice that even when more than 
one replica revokes the instances coordinated by a slow replica, our protocol 
does not have the liveness problem faced by Paxos when it has multiple lead­
ers, since a replica is allowed to do Active Revoke for each unlearned instance 
coordinated by a slow replica only once.
3.3.2 Multi-instance Propose
Active Revoke speeds up the advancement of the fast replicas, by allowing the 
fast replicas to revoke the instances coordinated by the slow replicas. In the 
worst case, however, a slow replica may never be able to commit its proposed 
commands. We explain this using the scenario in Figure 3.5.
Assuming at time 0 each replica proposes its first command, replica A pro­
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poses a command v. With Active Revoke, replica B and C  broadcast their 
Prepare message at 300 ms. When A's Propose message is delivered at B 
and C  at 500 ms, they will not accept this proposal, because they have re­
sponded to a Prepare with a higher round number. As a result, in instance 1A, 
A cannot collect Accepts from a majority of replicas. At 1000 ms, A receives the 
Learn message from C, which informs that no-op has been chosen in instance 
\A. Then A knows that instance 1A has been revoked by C. Following Rule 4 
of Mencius, A proposes v again in the next available instance 2A. However, 
assuming at this time B or C  also proposes a new command, the commit of this 
command will be delayed by A, which triggers Active Revoke again and results 
in instance 2A being revoked. In the worst case, this situation may repeat an 
unbounded number of times, and A can never commit v.
Besides Active Revoke, the instances coordinated by slow replicas may also 
be revoked because of false failure suspicions. Since we assume the failure 
detector is unreliable, it may make mistakes. Compared with fast replicas, the 
slow replicas are more likely to be falsely suspected of having failed. When 
false suspicions happen, following Rule 3 of Mencius, the suspecting replicas 
will revoke the instances coordinated by the suspected slow replicas, which 
prevents the commands proposed by the slow replicas from being chosen and 
committed. Mencius's assumption on the failure detector is that false suspicions 
will eventually cease. However, this may take an unbounded length of time. 
Therefore, the slow replicas will suffer from large and unpredictable commit 
latency if they are falsely suspected.
To ensure the progress of Fast Mencius, i.e., any client command sent to 
a correct replica is eventually committed, and also to limit the commit latency 
of the slow replicas in presence of false suspicions, the slow replicas should
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be given opportunities to have their proposals chosen by the replicated state 
machine, even when other replicas initiate Active Revoke or false suspicions 
happen. This is achieved through our Multi-instance Propose mechanism. The 
intuition behind this mechanism is that instead of letting a slow replica, whose 
instances are being revoked by others, propose its command in one instance at 
a time, we let it propose its command in multiple instances simultaneously. In 
this way, even if other replicas revoke some of these instances, the slow replica 
can still commit its command if it is chosen in at least one of these instances.
3.3.2.1 Protocol
Multi-instance Propose is triggered if the following condition is met:
Condition 2 None of 7  consecutive commands proposed by replica p is cho­
sen by the replicated state machine.
A replica learns that its proposed command is not chosen, by receiving a 
Learn message from another replica that informs no-op has been chosen in 
the instance in which it proposed the command. If replica p finds that none 
of its 7  consecutively proposed commands is chosen, it can deduce that it is 
slow relative to others, and other replicas are revoking its instances. Under this 
circumstance, p initiates Multi-instance Propose to ensure that its commands 
can be successfully committed.
MultiPropose. With Multi-instance Propose, p proposes a command v in a 
block of consensus instances simultaneously, by broadcasting MultiPropose(Ii, 
h , r, v). This message means that p proposes v in all the instances within the 
range [h , / 2] that it coordinates. Since p is the default leader of these instances, 
the round number r is 0. To determine h  and / 2, let Cp be the smallest instance
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among the 7  revoked instances coordinated by p, and I p be p's index. Then 
I i  =  I p, and the number of instances coordinated by p within the rage [ii, J2] is 
equal to the number of instances coordinated by p within the range [Cp, Ip). For 
example, if Cp =  Ip, and I p =  10p, then I x =  10p, and I 2 =  12p. After sending 
out the MultiPropose message, p updates I p to the next available instance it 
coordinates, which is 13p in this case. Following Optimization 1 of Mencius, p 
also uses this MultiPropose message to promise not to propose any client com­
mand in instances smaller than I x in the future. That is, another replica learns 
that the outcomes of all the instances smaller than h  and coordinated by p, in 
which it has not received any proposal from p, are no-op, immediately after it 
receives the MultiPropose message.
MultiAccept. After another replica q receives the MultiPropose message 
from p, if its index I q is smaller than I x, q updates I q such that its new index 
/ '  =  m in{i : q coordinates i A i  > I x}. This is the application of Rule 2 of 
Mencius in our Multi-instance context, q also checks in which instances within 
the range [h,h]  that p coordinates it can accept v, i.e., it has not responded to 
a Prepare message with a higher round number in these instances. If q finds 
that it can accept v in at least one instance coordinated by p within the range 
[h,h\ ,  then q composes a MultiAccept message, which includes the sequence 
numbers of all the instances in which it can accept v, and sends the message 
back to p. Following Optimization 1 of Mencius, q also uses this MultiAccept to 
promise p that it will not propose any client command in instances smaller than 
I i  in the future.
Learn, p waits for the MultiAccepts from a majority of replicas, and broad­
casts Leam(i, v), where i is the smallest instance that appears in all the Mul­
tiAccepts from a majority of replicas. Note that there is at least one instance
43
Replica A MultiPropose, MultiAccept, Learn ,
(slow replica)
Replica B
Replica C — £
Multi-instance Propose 
is triggered at A
Figure 3.7: Multi-instance Propose
that appears in all the MultiAccepts received by p, which is instance / 2. Here is 
an example. Let the number of replicas be 5, with a quorum size of 3. As­
sume A =  10p, h  =  12p, and the first 3 MultiAccepts received by p are 
MultiAccept(10p, 11 p, 12p), MultiAccept(llp, 12p), MultiAccept(12p). Then p 
broadcasts Learn(l2p, v). This Learn message does not mean that v will be 
definitely committed at instance 12p, because the results of instances lOp and 
lip  are still unknown. After sending out Learn(12p, v), if p receives MultiAccept 
(lip , 12p) from another replica, then it broadcasts Learn{llp, v). Otherwise, if p 
receives two MultiAccept(10p, lip, 12p) messages, then it broadcasts Learn(10p, 
v).
Commit. All the replicas will commit v at the smallest possible instance. 
This means that a replica can make the decision to commit v at instance i, 
only after it leams no-op has been chosen in all the instances smaller than i 
in the instance block p uses to propose v. In this case the replica will commit 
no-op at all the other instances in the instance block. Following the previous 
example, a replica decides to commit v at instance 12p only after it receives 
Learn(10p, no-op), Learn(llp, no-op), and Learn{Y2p, v)\ it decides to commit 
v at instance lip  only after it receives Learn(10p, no-op), and Learn{llp, u); it 
decides to commit v at instance 10p immediately after it receives Learn(10p, v). 
Note that the Learn messages that choose no-op come from the replicas who
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are revoking instances coordinated by p. The message flow of Multi-instance 
Propose is shown in Figure 3.7.
It is possible that all the instances in the instance block p uses to propose 
v are revoked by other replicas. If p receives the Learn messages from other 
replicas that indicate no-op has been chosen in all these instances, then p dou­
bles the size of the instance block and proposes v again. By increasing the size 
of the instance block exponentially, p can quickly get an opportunity to have its 
proposal chosen.
A replica initiates Multi-instance Propose once for only one command, i.e., 
p proposes v using Multi-instance Propose, but it proposes the commands af­
ter v still following Mencius, as long as Multi-instance Propose is not triggered 
again. The reasoning is that after successfully proposing a command with Multi­
instance Propose, a slow replica catches up with the advancement of the other 
replicas, and others' revocations will not prevent the commands proposed by the 
slow replica from being chosen, assuming the slow replica's connection speed is 
not dropping even more. Therefore, Multi-instance Propose is designed to pro­
vide a one-time boost to the slow replica, and it will go back to the normal mode 
of operation afterwards. When a replica is in the Multi-instance Propose state, 
it is not allowed to start Active Revoke. This is rational because being in the 
Multi-instance Propose state means this replica is relatively slow, and it should 
not revoke the instances coordinated by others. The replica is allowed to initiate 
Active Revoke only after it decides at which instance to commit the command 
proposed with its MultiPropose message, i.e., when it quits the Multi-instance 
Propose state.
After a replica q receives the MultiPropose message from p, and before it 
decides at which instance to commit v, it does not update its index following
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Rule 2 of Mencius when it receives subsequent Proposes from p. Optimization 
1 of Mencius does not apply here either: q does not use the Accept that replies 
a subsequent Propose from p to promise not to propose any client command in 
a smaller instance. To let p know that this Accept has a different semantics, q 
adds a flag in the message body. This design gives p priority to propose v. the 
other replicas need to revoke all the instances in the instance block step by step 
such as to invalidate the MultiPropose message from p.
3.3.2.2 Example
We use an example to explain how Multi-instance Propose enables a slow repli­
ca to propose its commands. Consider the system in Figure 3.5. Assuming each 
replica proposes a command every 10 ms, replicas A, B, and C propose their 
1st command at time 0, the 2nd command at 10 ms, and so on. In this scenario 
the consensus instances execute concurrently.
At 100 ms B  and C leam that their 1 st command has been chosen in instance 
IB  and 1C, respectively. However, they cannot commit because the result of 
instance 1,4 is unknown. Assume the threshold r  used to trigger Active Revoke 
is 100 ms, and the threshold 7  to trigger Multi-instance Propose is 10. Then at 
200 ms B and C initiate Active Revoke by broadcasting Help(lA, 2 2A). At 500 
ms C finishes revocation and broadcasts the Learn message for instances 1A, 
..., 22,4, informing that no-op has been chosen in these instances. The Learn 
message is delivered at A at 1000 ms, which triggers Multi-instance Propose at 
A, since more than 10 consecutive commands proposed by A are not chosen. 
As the smallest revoked instance is L4, and ,4’s current index is 102,4, A sets 
the size of the instance block to 101 and broadcasts MultiPropose(l02A, 202A,
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0, v) to propose a command v at 1010 ms. The MultiPropose message is 
delivered at B and C  at 1510 ms. At this time B and C  have revoked all the 
instances coordinated by A within the range [1 A, 132A\, following Active Revoke. 
Therefore, B and C  accept v in all the instances coordinated by A within the 
range [133/1, 202/1], and their MultiAccepts are delivered at A at 2010 ms, when 
A learns that v has been chosen in these instances. A receives the Learn 
message from C  at 1880 ms that indicates no-op has been chosen in all the 
instances it coordinates within the range [89/1,110/1], and the Learn message 
from C  at 2100 ms that informs no-op has been chosen in all the instances it 
coordinates within the range [111/1,132/1]. Then A can commit v at instance 
133/1. All the other instances in the instance block A uses to propose v are 
considered no-op. As a result, the commit latency for v is 1090 ms, slightly 
larger than a round-trip delay between A and other replicas.
The commands A proposes after v will not be influenced by other replicas' 
revocations. Following the previous example, C leams it should commit v at 
instance 133/1 when it finishes revoking the instances coordinated by A within 
the range [133/1,154/1] at 1820 ms, and B leams the same result when it re­
ceives the Learn message from C at 1870 ms. After that, when they receive a 
new Propose message from A, they will follow Rule 2 of Mencius to make their 
indices match the instance number of the Propose, and their future revocations 
will not prevent the commands proposed by A from being chosen, as long as the 
network conditions stay the same. This is because when they send out Prepare 
messages to revoke some of A's instances, they already received the proposals 
from A for these instances. As a result, they will propose A’s proposals in these 
instances.
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3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Correctness of Fast Mencius
To revoke the instances of slow replicas, Active Revoke uses the Prepare and 
Propose phases of Paxos, whose correctness has already been proved [64], 
The Help messages are status-checkers that determine when revocation should 
be triggered, and they do not interfere with the revocation mechanism in each 
consensus instance. Besides, a replica is allowed to perform Active Revoke for 
each unlearned instance at most once. Thus, we avoid the liveness problem 
faced by Paxos when it has multiple revoking replicas, in which different replicas 
keep issuing revocation with increasing round numbers.
The correctness of Multi-instance Propose is guaranteed by ensuring that 
all the unfailed replicas will make the same decision at which instance to com­
mit the command proposed by Multi-instance Propose. Fast Mencius runs an 
unbounded sequence of simple consensus instances. Each instance is imple­
mented by Coordinated Paxos [71], which is the same with Paxos except for a 
different starting state, since in each simple consensus instance the coordina­
tor is the default leader. Paxos ensures that in each consensus instance all the 
correct replicas learn the same result, so for each instance in the instance block 
used by a slow replica to propose a command v with Multi-instance Propose, all 
the correct replicas receive the same Learn message. Also, a replica cannot 
commit a command unless it leams the commands chosen in all the previous 
instances. Therefore, all the unfailed replicas will make the same decision at 
which instance to commit v.
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Figure 3.9: Message flow of adding a replica
3.4.2 Dynamically adding and removing replicas
With Mencius or Fast Mencius, each replica is the default leader of an unbound­
ed number of instances. Also, adding and removing replicas involve changing 
the quorum size in the scale of the whole system. These make adding and 
removing replicas in Mencius or Fast Mencius without stalling the system and 
without any extra synchrony assumption a non-trivial problem. In this subsec­
tion we discuss how we solve this problem.
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3.4.2.1 Adding a replica
As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, each instance number in Fast Mencius is of the 
form counter || id. We assume that this strategy is used to assign consensus in­
stances to replicas. Consider the system in Figure 3.8. Assuming a new replica 
D will join the system, D first asks one of the replicas already in the system to 
propose its entrance via a normal Propose message. For example, A proposes 
this request in instance 5A. After collecting the Accepts from a quorum, which 
is 2 in this case, of replicas, A sends the Learn message to all the replicas, in­
cluding D, which informs D's entrance has been chosen in instance 5A Upon 
receiving the Learn message, each replica already in the system leams that D 
joins the system starting from instance 5B, and D's coordinated instances, 5D,
6D have been inserted into the sequence of consensus instances executed
by the replicated state machine. The replica changes the quorum size from 2 to 
3 for each unlearned instance larger than 5A, where "unlearned" means it has 
not received a Learn message of that instance. Also, for each instance larger 
than 5A in which it has sent out a Propose or a Prepare, but has not received e- 
nough replies from a previous quorum, which is 2 , of replicas, the replica sends 
another copy of the ongoing message to D, and D's reply will be counted to 
meet the new quorum requirement.
After D sends the entrance request to A, it buffers all the protocol messages 
from other replicas. Once it receives the Learn message from A that indicates 
its entrance has been chosen in instance 5A, D leams that it should participate 
in the system beginning from instance 5B. The first instance it uses to propose 
a command is 5D. It also replies to all the buffered and future incoming mes­
sages following the protocol, which are all for instances larger than 5A. The
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reason why D  needs to buffer the messages is that it is possible other replicas' 
messages are delivered at D  before A's Learn message. Figure 3.9 shows the 
message flow of adding replica D.
3.4.2.2 Removing a replica
Removing a replica is more straightforward. When a replica p is to leave a sys­
tem, it sends a special message Quit(i) to all the other replicas, where i is its 
current index, i.e., the next available instance coordinated by p. This message 
is simultaneously a promise that p will fully participate in all the unfinished in­
stances smaller than i, as well as a notice that it will not be involved in any 
instance larger than or equal to i. Upon receiving the Quit message from p, all 
the other replicas can safely assume that prior to instance i, the quorum size 
stays the same, and the quorum size is recalculated for all the instances there­
after, with one less replica in the system. Also, the replicas learn that starting 
from instance i, the instances coordinated by p, whose numbers are of the form 
counter || p, are all removed from the sequence of consensus instances execut­
ed by the replicated state machine. For the unfinished instances smaller than 
i, the replicas still send the protocol messages to p, while they will not send any 
message to p for instances larger than or equal to i. p keeps processing the pro­
tocol messages for instances smaller than i, until it has learned the outcomes 
of all these instances, at which time p can be safely removed from the system.
3.4.3 Setting parameters
Our Active Revoke and Multi-instance Propose mechanisms are triggered by 
two conditions using parameters r  and 7 , respectively. Here we discuss how to
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set them.
r  determines when a replica delayed by a slow one should start Active Re­
voke. In Mencius, the maximum extra latency caused by delayed commit, which 
happens when there are concurrent Proposes, is a round trip delay [71]. There­
fore, the minimal value of r  is a round trip delay between the non-slow replicas. 
A replica can estimate the round trip delay between itself and other non-slow 
replicas by measuring the time interval between when it sends out a Propose 
and when it collects Accepts from a majority of replicas. Assuming this delay 
is d, r  can be set to d. Using a larger r  reduces the number of times Active 
Revoke is triggered, while it increases the commit latency. In the evaluation we 
set r to a round trip delay between the non-slow replicas.
7  determines when a slow replica, whose coordinated instances are revoked 
by others, should start Multi-instance Propose. Since being revoked in a se­
quence of consecutive proposed instances happens only when a replica is slow 
relative to others, 7  can be set to the number of commands a replica propos­
es within a short time period. For example, in our evaluation we set 7  to the 
number of commands a replica proposes within 1 0 0  ms.
3.5 Evaluation
In this section we first describe our protocol implementations and experimental 
setup, and then we present the evaluation results.
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Table 3.1: Implementations of three protocols
Protocol Overlog Rules C++ LOC
Paxos 53 871
Mencius 59 1037
Fast Mencius 99 2552
3.5.1 Experimental Setup
We implemented Fast Mencius using BFTSim [95], a simulation framework for 
state machine replication protocols. BFTSim couples a high-level protocol spec­
ification language and execution system based on P2 [69] with a network sim­
ulator built upon ns-2. The declarative networking language used by P2, Over- 
Log, allows protocol designers to capture the salient points of each protocol, 
without diving into the details of particular thread packages, messaging mod­
ules, and so on. Besides, ns-2's network simulation function enables designers 
to explore the performance of their protocols under various network conditions 
that typical testbeds cannot easily address. BFTSim was originally proposed to 
implement and compare the Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) protocols, including 
PBFT [23], Q/U [9], and Zyzzyva [61], and it faithfully predicts the performance 
of the native protocol implementations [95]. Note that the functions needed to 
implement BFT protocols are a superset of the functions needed to implemen- 
t the crash fault-tolerant consensus protocols, since the latter do not use the 
crypto operations required by the former. Therefore, BFTSim can also be used 
to implement and compare the crash fault-tolerant protocols.
For comparison, we also implemented Paxos and Mencius with BFTSim. 
Each implementation consists of OverLog rules and C++ code. The details of 
the three implementations are shown in Table 3.1. To further validate the fi­
delity of BFTSim, we measured the throughput and latency of our Paxos and
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Replica A (slow replica) 
20 Mbps, 475 ms
I
Replica B Replica C
Figure 3.10: Network topology of a three-replica system
Mencius implementations under a range of network conditions, and reproduced 
the published results. For example, evaluation in the original paper shows that 
with a three-replica clique topology, when the payload size of each command 
is 4000 bytes and the total bandwidth is 99 Mbps, the peak throughput of Men­
cius is 1550 operations per sec (ops), and the peak throughput of Paxos is 540 
ops [71]. With our implementations and under the same network condition, the 
peak throughput of Mencius and Paxos is 1550 ops and 550 ops, respectively. 
The results demonstrate that BFTSim is accurate enough to be used in evalu­
ating the performance of the consensus protocols we study.
We simulated a star network topology, where the replicas are connected to 
each other via a hub node. Each link between a replica and the hub node is a 
duplex link, with a bandwidth of 20 Mbps. The one-way delay between a non- 
slow replica and the hub node is 25 ms. This gives an RTT of 100 ms between 
any pair of non-slow replicas. The link between the slow replica and the hub 
node has a much larger delay. A three-replica topology is shown in Figure 3.10.
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3.5.2 Evaluation Results
3.5.2.1 Commit Latency
As stated in the original paper: "Mencius's commit latency is limited by the s-
lowest server." To get this result, we set the one-way delay between the slow
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replica and the hub node to 475 ms, which gives an RTT of 1000 ms between 
the slow replica and any non-slow replica. Each replica proposes commands at 
a rate of 100 ops. The size of payload in each command is 5 bytes. By varying 
the number of replicas, we got the average commit latency of Mencius. For 
comparison, we set r  =  100 ms, 7  =  1 0 , and got the average commit latency 
of Fast Mencius, as shown in Figure 3.11. The results illustrate that the com­
mit latency of Fast Mencius is significantly smaller than that of Mencius. With 
the increase of the number of replicas, the average commit latency of Men­
cius increases, while the average commit latency of Fast Mencius decreases. 
The reason is shown in Figure 3.12. With Mencius, the commit latency of the 
non-slow replicas is about 3 times of the delay of the links connecting the slow 
replica, while the commit latency of the slow replica is 2 times of this delay. With 
Fast Mencius, the non-slow replicas have a much lower commit latency, and the 
commit latency of the slow replica is still about 2  times of the delay of the links 
connecting itself.
We got the commit latency of Mencius and Fast Mencius by varying the delay 
of the links connecting the slow replica, from 300 ms to 1000 ms with an interval 
of 50 ms. The system consists of 5 replicas. Figure 3.13 shows the average
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commit latency of all the replicas and that of the non-slow replicas. The results 
illustrate that when we raise the delay of the links connecting the slow replica, 
the commit latency of Mencius increases considerably faster than Fast Mencius. 
Moreover, with Fast Mencius, the commit latency of the non-slow replicas is not 
influenced by the slow replica. We also measured the commit latency when 
a non-slow replica fails. The commit latency of the remaining replicas is not 
influenced. This is because both Active Revoke and Multi-instance Propose 
only require the participation of /  + 1  replicas.
Within Active Revoke of Fast Mencius, Help messages are status-checkers 
used to limit the number of concurrently revoking replicas. Figure 3.14 shows 
the average commit latency of non-slow replicas without the use of Help mes­
sages, in which case a replica directly revokes the instances coordinated by a 
slow replica through broadcasting Prepare messages, once Condition 1 is met. 
It is shown that without Help messages, the commit latency of non-slow replicas 
is further reduced. However, this design increases the number of concurrently 
revoking replicas, and thus decreases the peak throughput of Fast Mencius.
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3.5.2.2 Throughput
When there is no slow replica in the system, Fast Mencius behaves the same 
as Mencius. Figure 3.15 compares the peak throughput of Paxos, which has 
high throughput due to its simplicity, with that of Fast Mencius, when the delay 
between every replica and the hub node is 25 ms, and the bandwidth of each 
duplex link is 20 Mb. The size of payload in each command is 2000 bytes. The 
results show that, without any slow replica, the peak throughput of Fast Mencius 
is about n times of that of Paxos, where n is the number of replicas. The reason 
is that Fast Mencius, derived from Mencius, utilizes available bandwidth in a 
more balanced way with the rotating-leader design, while the single leader in
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Paxos limits the peak throughput it can achieve.
Figure 3.16 compares the peak throughput of Fast Mencius with that of Pax­
os and Mencius, when there is a slow replica. The delay between the slow repli­
ca and any non-slow replica is 500 ms. The results show that Fast Mencius still 
outperforms Paxos significantly. Also, the throughput difference between Fast 
Mencius and Mencius, which is the overhead incurred by our mechanisms, be­
comes smaller when the number of replicas increases. This is because the 
task of revoking the instances coordinated by the slow replica is done by more 
replicas.
Figure 3.17 compares the peak throughput of Fast Mencius with that of Pax­
os, when there is a slow replica, by varying the bandwidth of links from 5 Mbps 
to 40 Mbps with an interval of 5 Mbps. The delay between the slow replica 
and any non-slow replica is 500 ms. The system consists of 5 replicas. As ex­
pected, the peak throughput of both protocols scales with available bandwidth, 
while the peak throughput of Fast Mencius increases much faster than Paxos. 
Figure 3.17 also shows the peak throughput of Fast Mencius when a non-slow 
replica fails. Compared with the non-failure case, the throughput of Fast Men­
cius drops by around 25%. The reason is that in a 5-replica system with a slow 
one, a failure decreases the available bandwidth of the non-slow replicas by 
25%.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present Fast Mencius, a protocol for state machine replica­
tion that tolerates crash failures. Fast Mencius is derived from Mencius, and 
it enhances Mencius with Active Revoke and Multi-instance Propose. The e-
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valuation shows that in presence of slow replicas, the commit latency of Fast 
Mencius is significantly smaller than that of Mencius.
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Chapter 4
Defending Against Sybil Attacks in 
Online Social Networks
For the function layer of OSNs, we study how to prevent the functioning of OSNs 
from being disturbed by sybil attacks [35]. It is well known that online services 
are vulnerable to sybil attacks, in which an adversary creates many bogus i- 
dentities, called sybil identities, and compromises the running of the system or 
pollutes the system with fake information. The sybil identities can “ suppress" 
the honest identities in a variety of tasks, including online content ranking, DHT 
routing, file sharing, reputation systems, and Byzantine failure defenses.
Sybil attacks can be mitigated by assuming the existence of a trusted au­
thority, which can rate-limit the introduction of fake identities by requiring the 
users to provide some credentials, like social security number, or by requiring 
payment. However, such requirements will prevent users from accepting these 
systems, as they impose additional burdens on users.
Recently, there has been an increasing interest in defending against sybil 
attacks in social networks [33,98,106,111,112]. In a social network, two user
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identities share a link if a relationship is established between them. Each identity 
is represented as a node in the social graph. To prevent the adversary from 
creating many sybil identities, all the previous sybil defense schemes are built 
upon the assumption that the number of links between the sybil nodes and the 
honest nodes, also known as attack edges, is limited. As a result, although an 
adversary can create many sybil nodes and link them in an arbitrary way, there 
will be a small cut between the honest region and the sybil region. The small 
cut consists of all the attack edges and its removal disconnects the sybil nodes 
from the rest of the graph, which is leveraged by previous schemes to identify 
the sybil nodes. Note that the solution to this problem is non-trivial, because 
finding small cuts in a graph is an NP hard problem. To limit the number of attack 
edges, previous schemes assume that all the relationships in social networks 
are trusted and they reflect the trust relationships among those users in the 
real world, and thus an adversary cannot establish many relationships with the 
honest users. However, it has been shown that this assumption does not hold 
in some real-world social networks [17].
In the past few years, online social networks (OSNs) have gained great pop­
ularity and are among the most frequently visited sites on the Web [7]. The large 
sizes of these networks require that any scheme aiming to defend against sybil 
attacks in OSNs should be efficient and scalable. Some previous schemes 
can achieve good performance on a very small network sample ( 2 0 0 0  nodes 
in [106] and 30000 nodes in [33]), but their algorithms are computationally in­
tensive and cannot scale to networks with millions of nodes. For the schemes 
that performed evaluation on million-node samples of OSNs, SybilGuard [112] 
admits 0{y/n log n) sybil nodes per attack edge, where n is the number of hon­
est nodes; SybilLimit [111] improves over SybilGuard by accepting 0(log n) sybil
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nodes per attack edge, but it is still away from the theoretical lower bound by a 
log n factor. Besides, both SybilGuard and SybilLimit identify one sybil node at 
a time, and thus to detect the sybil region all the nodes in the social graph need 
to be examined.
To address the weaknesses of previous work, in this chapter we propose 
SybilDefender, a centralized sybil defense mechanism. It consists of a sybil i- 
dentification algorithm to identify the sybil nodes, a sybil community detection 
algorithm to detect the sybil community surrounding a sybil node, and two ap­
proaches to limiting the number of attack edges in OSNs. Our scheme is based 
on the observation that a sybil node must go through a small cut in the social 
graph to reach the honest region. An honest node, on the contrary, is not re­
stricted. Now if we start from a sybil node to do random walks, the random 
walks tend to stay within the sybil region. The main contributions of this work 
include:
• Based on performing a limited number of random walks within the social 
graphs, our proposed sybil identification and sybil community detection al­
gorithms are more efficient than previous techniques for large social net­
works.
• We evaluate SybilDefender using two large-scale social network samples 
from Orkut and Facebook, respectively. The results show that the per­
formance of our sybil identification algorithm approaches the theoretical 
bound, and it outperforms SybilLimit, the state of the art sybil defense 
mechanism that applies to large social networks, by one to two orders 
of magnitude in both accuracy and running time. In addition, our sybil 
community detection algorithm can effectively detect the sybil community
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around a sybil node with short running time.
• We propose two practical techniques to limit the number of attack edges in 
OSNs, and develop a Facebook application to demonstrate the feasibility 
of one of the techniques.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 4.1 we present 
the system model. In Section 4.2 we present the design of SybilDefender. The 
effectiveness of SybilDefender is shown experimentally in Section 4.3, and in 
Section 4.4 we conclude the chapter.
4.1 System Model
We denote the social network as a graph G consisting of vertices V  and edges 
E. There are n honest users in the social network, each with one identity, de­
noted as an honest node in V. There are also one or more malicious users in 
the social network, each with a number of sybil identities. Each sybil identity is 
denoted as a sybil node in V. A relationship between two identities in the social 
network is represented as an edge connecting the two corresponding nodes in 
G. The edges in G are undirected. We name the edge between a sybil node 
and an honest node an attack edge. The sybil region consists of all the sybil 
nodes, while the honest region consists of all the honest nodes. All the sybil 
nodes are controlled by an adversary. Thus the adversary can create arbitrary 
edges within the sybil region.
SybilDefender is built upon the following assumptions:
The honest region is fast mixing. Fast mixing means a random walk of length 
©(log n) is long enough such that with probability at least 1 -  £, the last traversed
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node is drawn from the node stationary distribution of the graph [112]. Generally 
speaking, random walks in a fast mixing graph converge quickly to the stationary 
distribution. The stationary distribution is a probability distribution T  for V  such 
that w =  TP, where P  is the transition matrix of the random walk process [74].
At each step of the random walk, the transition probability from node i to j  is 
Pij =  where d* is the degree of node i. A{j =  1 if i and j  are connected, 
otherwise Aij =  0. It can be easily proved that Tit the stationary probability of 
node i, is equal to Yu et al. have shown that the real-world social networks 
are fast mixing [111]. The previous sybil defense schemes [33,111,112] are also 
built upon this assumption.
One known honest node. As previous schemes [33,111,112], we assume 
that there is at least one known honest node in the social network. This node is 
the starting point of our sybil identification algorithm.
The administrator knows the social network topology. This means that SybilDe­
fender is a centralized sybil defense mechanism. Considering that all the cur­
rent OSNs are under centralized control, it is natural for the administrators of 
these networks to take charge of mitigating sybil attacks.
The size of the sybil region is not comparable to the size of the honest region. 
Given the large user base of the current OSNs (Facebook (over 500 million), 
Twitter (over 200 million), Orkut (over 120 million)), it is reasonable to assume 
that the adversary cannot create such many sybil identities, especially consid­
ering that signing up a new user account always includes verifying an email 
address, providing some personal information, and solving CAPTCHAs.
The number of attack edges is limited. As a result, when the adversary 
creates many sybil nodes, there will be a disproportionately small cut between 
the honest region and the sybil region. The existence of a small cut disturbs
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the fast-mixing property: the mixing between the honest nodes is fast, while 
the mixing between the honest nodes and the sybil nodes is slow. Previous 
schemes limit the number of attack edges by assuming that the honest users 
only establish links with their real-world friends [33,98,111,112], which has been 
shown to not hold in OSNs. The experiment by Bilge et al. [17] shows that on 
Facebook, the acceptance rate of friendship requests from a bogus account is 
around 20%. If an adversary launches a sybil attack, all the links created in this 
way are attack edges. We will address this problem in Section 4.2.4.
4.2 SybilDefender Design
SybilDefender consists of three components: a sybil identification algorithm, a 
sybil community detection algorithm, and two supporting approaches to limiting 
the number of attack edges. The three components can be used in conjunction 
to best mitigate sybil attacks. The task of the sybil identification algorithm pre­
sented in Section 4.2.1 is to determine whether a suspect node is sybil. Then 
we show how to efficiently detect the sybil community around a sybil node with 
our sybil community detection algorithm presented in Section 4.2.2. The rea­
son why we need the second algorithm is that simply examining all the nodes 
in the social graph to find the sybil community is impractical. In Section 4.2.3, 
we present a Combo algorithm that combines the sybil identification algorith- 
m with the sybil community detection algorithm. Finally, both algorithms are 
built upon the assumption that the number of attack edges is limited. In Section 
4.2.4 we propose two approaches to supporting this assumption in online social 
networks.
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4.2.1 Sybil Identification Algorithm
In this subsection we present a sybil identification algorithm that takes the social 
graph G (V,E), a known honest node h, and a suspect node u as inputs, and 
outputs whether u is sybil or not. Our algorithm is based on random walks. A 
random walk on a graph is defined by the sequence of moves of a particle be­
tween nodes of G. If the particle is at node i with degree dk, then the probability 
that the particle follows the edge ( i , j )  and moves to a neighbor j  is 1/di.
The intuition of our sybil identification algorithm is that, as there is a small cut 
between the honest region and the sybil region, the random walks originating 
from a sybil node tend to get "trapped" into the sybil region. Also, since we 
assume that the size of the sybil region is not comparable to the size of the 
honest region, the number of nodes traversed by the random walks originating 
from an honest node will be larger than the number of nodes traversed by the 
random walks originating from a sybil node, as long as the random walks are 
long enough and we perform the random walks many times. For simplicity, we 
define the number of times one node being traversed by a set of random walks 
as the frequency of that node. Note that one node may be traversed by the 
same random walk multiple times.
The sybil identification algorithm consists of two phases, Algorithm 1 and Al­
gorithm 2. The first phase takes G and h as inputs, and outputs the thresholds 
used by the second phase to identify sybil nodes. It only needs to be invoked 
once for each social network topology. As shown in Algorithm 1, the algorithm 
first performs /  short random walks with length ls =  log n originating from the 
known honest node h. The /  ending nodes are drawn from the node stationary 
distribution of the honest region, since we assume that the honest region is fast
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Algorithm 1 PreProcessing(G, h)
1: J = {h}
2 : for i = 1 to /  do
3: Perform a random walk with length ls =  log n originating from h
4: J =  J U {f/ie ending node o f the random walk}
5: end for 
6. I  — l m in
7: while I < =  lmax do
8 : for i -  J.firstQ  to J.lastQ do
9: Perform R random walks with length I originating from node i
10: Get n{ as the number of nodes with frequency no smaller than t
11: end for
12: output {l,mean({ni : i € J}),stdDeviation({ni : i G J }))
13: 1 =  1 + 100
14: end while
mixing. Following the proof in [113], the ending nodes are all honest nodes with 
high probability. After this the known honest node h and the /  ending nodes 
are treated as judge nodes, from which the algorithm sets up the criterion to 
identify sybil nodes. Note the possibility that sybil nodes may exist in the group 
of the judge nodes does not influence the effectiveness of the algorithm, due to 
their very limited number. Starting from a minimum length lmin to a maximum 
length lmax, with an interval of 1 0 0  hops, for each length I, the algorithm per­
forms R (ranging from 1000 to 2000 in our evaluation) random walks originating 
from every judge node, and counts the number of nodes whose frequency is 
no smaller than a threshold t, which is a small constant (5 in our evaluation). 
The algorithm collects /  +  1 such values for each length I. Then it computes 
the mean and standard deviation of the /  +  1 values and outputs a tuple as 
(/, mean, stdDeviation).
As shown in Algorithm 2, to determine whether a suspect node u is sybil, the 
algorithm first performs R random walks with an initial length I =  l0 originating 
from u. Iq is larger than or equal to lmin used in Algorithm 1. The algorithm
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Algorithm 2 Sybilldentification((2, u, tuples from  Alg. 1)____________________
1: I = k
2: while I  < =  l m a x  do
3: Perform R random walks with length I originating from u
4: m -  the number of nodes whose frequency is no smaller than t
5: Let the tuple corresponding to length I in the outputs of Algorithm 1 be
(I, mean, stdDeviation)
6: if mean — m >  stdDeviation * a then
7: output u is sybil
8: end the algorithm
9: end if
10: 1 =  1 * 2
11: end while 
12: output u is honest
then compares the number of nodes whose frequency is no smaller than t with 
the mean value in tuple (I, mean, stdDeviation) outputted by Algorithm 1, If the 
former is smaller than the latter by an amount larger than stdDeviation * a (a = 
20  in our evaluation), we consider u is sybil and end the algorithm. Otherwise, 
the algorithm doubles I and repeats the process, until I is larger than /max. If 
u is still not identified as sybil when the value of I reaches lmax, we consider it 
honest and end the algorithm.
Given a social graph G(V, E ) and a known honest node h, lmax, the maximum 
random walk length that decides when to end the algorithm, can be determined 
as follows. We do R random walks originating from h with length lmax. The 
number of nodes with frequency no smaller than t should be larger than m / 2 . 
Given that we assume the sybil region is smaller than the honest region, lmax 
determined in this way is large enough for R random walks originating from a 
sybil node to cover the sybil region, so as to exhibit the difference between the 
random walks originating from an honest node and from a sybil node. Our algo­
rithm adaptively tests the suspect node while doubling the random walk length
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Table 4.1: Notations used in the analysis
G(V, E) social graph, V is the set of nodes, E  is the set of edges
P transition matrix of the random walk process
n number of honest nodes in G
A initial state vector of the random walk process
7T stationary distribution of G
I random walk length
Qi accumulated probability distribution of the nodes being 
traversed by a random walk with length I
t threshold frequency used in the sybil identification 
algorithm
R number of random walks originating from a given node
V{d) number of nodes with degree d
each time. This guarantees that the algorithm can identify the sybil nodes in 
differently sized sybil regions: for small sybil regions short random walks are al­
ready enough, while for large regions long random walks need to be performed, 
since the footprint of short random walks in a large sybil region may be similar 
to that in the honest region.
4.2.1.1 Analysis of the Sybil Identification Algorithm
In this subsection we investigate the validity of our sybil identification algorithm 
with theoretical analysis. For the ease of analysis we list the used notations 
in Table 4.1. A random walk with length I on an undirected graph G can be 
modeled as a Markov Chain process. The starting state of the random walk is 
described as A, the initial state vector of V. Xv =  1 if v is the starting node of the 
random walk, otherwise A„ =  0. As defined in Section 4.1, P is the transition 
matrix of the random walk process. Therefore, the probability distribution of the 
nodes being visited by the i th hop of the random walk is AP*. Based on our 
fast-mixing assumption, APi converges to the stationary distribution w of G with
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Figure 4.2: Pre-processing results and theoretical approximate results
i >  ©(log n). The accumulated probability distribution of nodes being traversed 
by a random walk with length l \s Qt =  £ j =0 and (Qi)j, the j th element in 
vector Qi, is the expected number of times node j  being traversed by a random 
walk with length I. Therefore, R • (Qt)j is the expected number of times node 
j  being traversed by R random walks with length I originating from the same 
honest node, i.e., the expected frequency of j .
The pre-processing phase of our sybil identification algorithm sets up the 
criterion to identify sybil nodes by performing R random walks originating from 
each judge node with every length value I e {ImmJmin +  1 0 0 , i} ,  respec­
tively, and records the mean and the standard deviation of the number of tra-
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versed nodes with frequency no smaller than t. Define set St as {j \R • (Qi)j > t }, 
then 15,1 =  |{j| Y?i=oR ' 0M *)j ^  0 1  is the expected number of nodes whose 
frequency is no smaller than t with R /-hop random walks. With a randomly cho­
sen source node and R =  2000, based on our Facebook data set, we calculate 
| Si | for different lengths and draw the calculated expectation curve in Figure 4.1. 
To demonstrate the validity of our sybil identification algorithm, we set the num­
ber of judge nodes to be 1 0  and draw the pre-processing results curve based 
on the mean value outputs of the pre-processing phase in the same figure. It 
shows that even with a small number of judge nodes, the two curves match well 
when the random walk length is smaller than 10000 hops. As the random walk 
length increases there shows some horizontal segments in the calculated ex­
pectation curve. This is because in a fast-mixing network, (AP’)y converges to 
with i >  ©(log n), where dj is the degree of node j  and E  is the set of edges. 
This means that with I >  ©(log n) the value of X)J=0 (AP*)j f ° r the nodes with 
the same degree increases by the same amount when I increases by 1 , and 
thus their expected frequency, £ - =0 R ■ will reach the threshold t at the 
same random walk length, which leads to the jumps in the calculated expecta­
tion curve. Note that although the calculated expectation curve is divided into 
horizontal segments when the random walk length is large, its inflection points 
still match well with the pre-processing results curve. Figure 4.1 illustrates that 
with a small number of judge nodes and limited R, the results derived from the 
pre-processing phase of the sybil identification algorithm are already accurate 
enough to match with the expectation values.
Moreover, we will show that the results derived from the pre-processing 
phase starting from a random honest node are generic enough to serve as the 
criterion to identify sybil nodes. Since the network is fast mixing, given a random
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starting node, i.e., a random initial state vector A, we have
i
Q, = £ Api
i= 0
«  A +  AP 4 -... +  APe l^ogn)_1 +  7f +  ... +  7f
Nl v
I — © (logn)+ l
~  In.
Besides, wj — then we have (Q*)j «  Z ^ .  Recall that R • (Qj), is the 
expected frequency of node j .  To make this value no smaller than t, we have
fl • W i), * -R • ' p j  > *  =*• (4.1)
Define^' =  {j\d j >  ^ } .  Then |5/| is the approximate number of nodes whose 
frequency is no smaller than t with R Z-hop random walks. Let V(d) be the 
number of nodes with degree d. Then
max
|s ;i=  £  V(d). (4.2)
< - ( ¥ l
Following Equation 4.2 we draw the theoretical approximation curve in Figure
4.2 based on our Facebook data set, and we compare it with the pre-processing 
results curve identical to that in Figure 4.1. Note that Equation 4.2 is irrelevant 
to the initial state vector A, so the shape of the theoretical approximation curve 
does not rely on the starting node. Figure 4.2 shows that the pre-processing 
results also match well with the theoretical approximate results. Similar to the 
caculated expectation curve, there are horizonal segments in the theoretical 
approximation curve. This is because node degrees are integers and Z needs to 
increase by a certain amount such that the value of ^  reaches the next integer.
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Nevertheless, the middle point of each horizonal segment still matches with 
the pre-processing results curve. Figure 4.2 illustrates that the pre-processing 
results drawn from a random honest node can be effectively used as the criterion 
to identify sybil nodes.
To gain an understanding of the difference between the footprint of random 
walks originating from an honest node and from a sybil node, assume <p is the 
expected number of hops for the random walks starting from a sybil node to 
enter the honest region. If we draw the curve for the number of nodes with 
frequency no smaller than t based on the random walks starting from that sybil 
node, it is approximately like moving the pre-processing results curve in Figures
4.1 and 4.2 to the right by ip and then raising it by the size of the sybil region. 
In the evaluation we will show that this difference is large enough to identify the 
sybil nodes.
4.2.2 Sybil Community Detection Algorithm
After one sybil node is identified, our sybil community detection algorithm can 
be used to detect the sybil community surrounding it. The sybil community 
detection algorithm takes the social graph G{V, E) and a known sybil node s 
as inputs, and outputs the sybil community around s. The sybil node s can 
be identified by our sybil identification algorithm or any previous scheme. We 
define a sybil community as a subgraph of G consisting of only sybil nodes, and 
there is no small cut in this subgraph. The reason why we make this definition 
is that if a small cut does divide the sybil region into two parts Si and S2, and the 
known sybil node s is in Si, then, from the point of view of s, the honest region 
and S2 are similar, since there is already a small cut between Si and the honest
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Algorithm 3 WalkLengthEstimation(G, s)
1: l - l o / 2
2 : deadWalkRatio = 0 
3: while deadWalkRatio <  do 
4: 1 - 1 * 2
5: deadWalkNum -  0
6 : for i  = 1 to R do
7: Perform a partial random walk originating from s with length I
8 : if the partial random walk is dead before it reaches I hops then
9: deadWalkNum++
10: end if
11: end for
12: deadW alkRatio = deadW al kNum / R
13: end while 
14: output I
region and also a small cut between Si and S2. When there is a small cut in the 
sybil region, our algorithm can detect the sybil community s belongs to.
Our algorithm relies on performing partial random walks originating from s. 
Each partial random walk behaves the same as the standard random walks 
used in the previous subsection, except that it does not traverse the same node 
more than once. Therefore, when a partial random walk reaches a node with all 
the neighbors traversed by itself, this partial random walk is "dead" and cannot 
proceed. This property makes a partial random walk originating from a sybil 
node less likely to leave the sybil region, compared with a standard random 
walk, since many such walks "die" when they hit the border of the sybil region. 
Similar to the sybil identification algorithm, the intuition behind this algorithm is 
that the partial random walks originating from a sybil node tend to be trapped 
within the sybil region, and thus we can detect the sybil community by examining 
the nodes traversed by the partial random walks.
The sybil community detection algorithm consists of two phases, Algorithm
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3 and Algorithm 4. The task of Algorithm 3 is to estimate the needed length 
of the partial random walks used in Algorithm 4. Starting from an initial length 
l0, the algorithm performs R partial random walks originating from s and counts 
the ratio of dead walks, which are the walks that cannot proceed before they 
reach the required length. If this ratio is smaller than p, a threshold close to 1 
(0.95 in our evaluation), the algorithm doubles the current length and performs 
the partial random walks again. This process is repeated until the dead walk 
ratio is no smaller than p. Then the algorithm outputs the current random walk 
length I. The reasoning is that the number of untraversed sybil nodes is very 
small (often equals to 0  in our evaluation) when the dead walk ratio is close to 
1 and with a relatively large R (2000 in our evaluation).
Algorithm 4 takes G, s, and the estimated length I as inputs and outputs the 
sybil community surrounding s. The reason why we need Algorithm 4 is that not 
all the nodes traversed by the partial random random walks in Algorithm 3 are 
sybil nodes, as some walks pass the small cut and enter the honest region, and 
we need an algorithm to select the sybil nodes from the set of traversed nodes. 
To achieve this, Algorithm 4 leverages a metric called conductance [57], defined 
as follows. Let d be the sum of the degrees of all the nodes in set S, and a be 
the number of edges with one endpoint in S and one endpoint in S. Then the 
conductance of S is a/d. The conductance of a set S measures the quality of 
the cut between S and 5: the smaller the conductance is, the smaller the cut is. 
Since we assume that there is a small cut between the honest region and the 
sybil region, using conductance as the objective of the greedy algorithm fits the 
problem well. In this algorithm we let the conductance of an empty set be 1.
Algorithm 4 runs by first performing R partial random walks originating from 
the known sybil node s, with the length decided by Algorithm 3. Then the al-
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Algorithm 4 SybilRegionDetection(G, s, I from  Alg.3)
1 Set the frequency of all the nodes to be 0
2 for i = 1 to R  do
3 Perform a partial random walk originating from node s with length I
4 s. frequency++
5 for j  = 1 to I do
6 Let the j th hop of the partial random walk be node k
7 k.frequency++
8 end for
9 end for
10 traversedList = Sort the traversed nodes by their frequency in decreasing 
order
11 counter = 0
12 5  = 0
13 do
14 counter = conductance(5)
15 for i  =  traversedL is t.firs tQ  to traversedList.lastQ  do
16 If node i e S then
17 continue
18 end if
19 If conductance^'} u S) <= conductance^) then
20 5  = {*} U 5
21 end if
22 end for
23 while (counter >  conductance(5))
24 output 5
gorithm sorts all the traversed nodes by their frequency in decreasing order. 
Starting from the first node, which is always s, the algorithm iterates the sorted 
list and adds the encountered node to set 5  if doing so does not increase the 
conductance of 5. After all the nodes in the sorted list are examined, the algo­
rithm records the current conductance value, starts a new iteration from the top 
of the list and examines each node that is not in 5. This process is repeated until 
the conductance value stays the same at the end of two consecutive iterations. 
Then the algorithm outputs 5  as the detected sybil community. The intuition is 
that by performing the partial random walks originating from a sybil node with
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suitable length many times, the sybil community surrounding the sybil node is 
covered by the partial random walks. Also, the sybil nodes tend to be in front of 
the honest nodes in the sorted list, since a large number of partial random walks 
cannot enter the honest region, due to the existence of the small cut between 
the honest region and the sybil region. As a result, the greedy algorithm will first 
try to add the nodes that are more likely sybil to S. This algorithm only relies on 
performing R partial random walks originating from a sybil node, which makes 
it very efficient and scalable to large-sized social networks.
4.2.3 Combine Sybil Identification with Sybil Community De­
tection
Our sybil identification algorithm takes as input a suspect node, and outputs if 
the suspect node is sybil. In comparison, our sybil community detection algo­
rithm takes as input a sybil node, and outputs the sybil community surrounding 
the sybil node. Each algorithm consists of a preparation phase and a detection 
phase. In this subsection we consider how to efficiently combine the two al­
gorithms, such that by running the Combo algorithm once, the administrator is 
able to leam if the suspect node is sybil, and if it is, the sybil community around 
it.
The Combo algorithm consists of two phases, Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 5. 
Algorithm 1 only needs to be run once for each target social graph. Algorithm 
5 takes as input a suspect node u, the tuples from Algorithm 1, and the social 
graph G, and it outputs u's identity (sybil or honest) as well as the sybil com­
munity surrounding u (if sybil). The intuition of the Combo algorithm is that, if 
we find a sybil node, instead of performing partial random walks as in Section
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Algorithm 5 Combo(G, u, tuples from, Alg. 1)
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20 
21 
22
23
24
l = lo
while I  < =  lm a x  do
Perform R random walks with length I originating from u
m = the number of nodes whose frequency is no smaller than t
Let the tuple corresponding to length I in the outputs of Algorithm 1 be
(I, mean, stdDeviation) 
if mean — m > stdDeviation * a then 
output u is sybil
traversedList = Sort the traversed nodes by their frequency in decreas­
ing order
counter -  0 
5  =  0 
do
counter = conductance^)
for i  = traversedList. f irs tQ  to traversedList.lastQ  do 
if node i  e S then 
continue
if conductance^*} u S ) < =  conductance^) then 
5 = {i}U5 
while (counter >  conductance(S)) 
output S
end the algorithm
end if
1 =  1 * 2  
end while 
output u is honest
4.2.2 to detect the surrounding sybil community, we directly analyze the simple 
random walks derived in the identification method. The analysis is based on 
the conductance measure. We sort the nodes by their frequency, the number 
of times being traversed by the simple random walks, in decreasing order, and 
iteratively add nodes to the detected sybil set, until the conductance value stays 
the same at the end of two consecutive iterations.
It is easy to see that the Combo algorithm behaves the same as the sybil 
identification algorithm (Section 4.2.1) when identifying sybil nodes, while it di­
verges from the sybil community detection algorithm (Section 4.2.2) in that it
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reuses the simple random walks performed in the identification phase to search 
for the sybil community. The advantage is that it avoids estimating the partial 
random walk length (Algorithm 3) and performing partial random walks (Algo­
rithm 4), and thus incurs much smaller computation overhead. However, com­
pared with partial random walks, the simple random walks originating from a 
sybil node are more likely to escape the sybil region. Our evaluation in Sec­
tion 4.3 shows that replacing partial random walks with simple random walks 
slightly impact detection accuracy, while it significantly reduces running time of 
the algorithm. Therefore, the Combo algorithm provides a tradeoff between effi­
ciency and accuracy: to detect sybil nodes, users can use the Combo algorithm 
if running time is a concern. Otherwise, they can use the stand-alone sybil i- 
dentification and sybil community detection algorithms if detection accuracy is 
more important.
4.2.4 Limiting the Number of Attack Edges
Our algorithms rely on the assumption that the number of attack edges is limited. 
However, it has been shown that not all the relationships in OSNs are trusted 
[17]. In this subsection we propose two approaches to limiting the number of 
attack edges in OSNs.
4.2.4.1 Relationship Rating
One approach to limiting the number of attack edges in these networks is to 
allow the users to rate their relationships. To demonstrate this we develop a 
Facebook application named Rate Your Relationships, as shown in Figure 4.3. 
The users of the application can rate each of their relations on Facebook either
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Figure 4.3: Our Facebook application: Rate Your Relationships
as "Friend" or "Stranger", where "Stranger" means the user hardly has any 
impression about this relation. In this way, the user's relations are classified into 
two categories. The number of attack edges can be limited by removing the 
relationships rated as stranger from the social graph when applying the sybil 
defense schemes. The rationale is that even if an adversary can create many 
links between the sybil identities and the honest identities, it is hard for him to 
convince the honest users that those sybil identities are their acquaintances.
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4.2.4.2 Activity Network
We can also use the concept of activity network [30,100,104] to limit the number 
of attack edges. Activity network is a network graph that is based on the interac­
tion between users, rather than mere relationship. It contains all the nodes from 
its social network counterpart, but only a subset of edges. Two nodes share an 
edge in an activity network if and only if they have interacted directly through 
the communication mechanisms or applications provided by the corresponding 
social network. In other words, a social network is transformed into an activity 
network by removing the weak connections with no user activity. If the sybil 
defense schemes leverage the topologies of the activity networks, the number 
of attack edges an adversary can create can be further limited.
4.3 Evaluation
4.3.1 Data Sets and Experiment Setup
In this section we evaluate the effectiveness of SybilDefender using two data 
sets [73,104] from Orkut and Facebook, respectively. The Orkut data set con­
sists of 3,072,441 nodes and 117,185,083 edges, with an average degree of 
76.28, while the Facebook data set consists of 3,097,165 nodes and 28,377,481 
edges, with an average degree of 18.32. To the best of our knowledge, these 
are the largest data sets that have ever been used in evaluating the sybil de­
fense schemes that leverage social network topologies. The reason why the 
average degree of the Facebook data set is much smaller than that of the Orkut 
data set is that the Orkut data set is a breadth-first sample of the Orkut social 
graph, which maintains the topological properties of Orkut like average degree;
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on the other hand, the Facebook data set is a regional network in Facebook. 
Two nodes share an edge in this data set if and only if both of them are mem­
bers of the same regional network, and they are Facebook friends with each 
other. By evaluating the performance of SybilDefender on these two data sets, 
we show that SybilDefender applies to social networks with different topological 
properties.
In the experiments we use two models to construct the sybil regions respec­
tively: the preferential attachment (PA) model [11] and the Erdfls-R6 nyi (ER) 
model [37]. Both models are widely used in network analysis. The network- 
s constructed with the PA model are scale free, which means their node de­
grees follow a power-law distribution, a well accepted property of social net­
works [10,73,88,104]. The PA model has been used in previous research to 
build the sybil regions [33,101]. The topologies built through the ER model, 
on the other hand, are random networks with no particular bias, which emulate 
the arbitrary structures of the sybil regions. In our experiments, to build a sybil 
region and connect it to a real-world social network sample, we follow the sug­
gestion by Yu et al. [112] that the most effective way for an adversary to launch 
a sybil attack is to first compromise a small number of existing nodes, so as to 
quickly increase the number of attack edges. We first randomly select nodes 
from the data set to be compromised nodes, until the number of edges between 
the compromised nodes and the other nodes is gQ, which is the number of attack 
edges. The compromised nodes are all sybil nodes. They introduce 7  addition­
al sybil nodes, and establish a connected scale-free topology through the PA 
model, or a connected random topology through the ER model among all the 
sybil nodes. We label all the other nodes in the data set as honest nodes. The 
average degree of the sybil region built with the PA model is set to be equal to
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Figure 4.4: Difference between the coverage of random walks originating from 
honest nodes and from sybil nodes
the average degree of the corresponding data set, while the average degree 
of the sybil region built with the ER model ranges from 8  to 11, representing a 
sparse topology compared with the realistic social networks. Note that in the 
evaluation of some previous schemes, the social network samples are first pre- 
processed by removing the nodes with small degrees [33,111], to prevent such 
nodes from degrading the effectiveness of these schemes. Instead, we do not 
make any modification on the published data sets.
4.3.2 Evaluation of the Sybil Identification Algorithm
Yu et al. [111] proved that for all the sybil defense mechanisms that leverage 
the fast-mixing property, the number of admitted sybil nodes per attack edge is 
lower bounded by f2(l). The rationale is that the fasting mixing property of the 
network is not disrupted if each attack edge introduces few sybil nodes. In this 
subsection we will show that the performance of our sybil identification algorithm 
approaches this theoretical bound, and our algorithm outperforms SybilLimit by 
one to two orders of magnitude in both accuracy and running time.
Honest — 
Sybil ■■■■»
Honest
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Table 4.2: 10 sybil nodes per attack edge (10000 sybil nodes) false positive and
negative rates______________________________________________________
Orkut Facebook
PA Model ER Model PA Model ER Model
F+ F~ F+ F~ F+ F~ F+ F~
1000RWS 0 0 0 0 .1 1 % 0 0.07% 0 .1 % 0.16%
1500RWs 0 0 .0 1 % 0 0 .1 1% 0.4% 0.08% 0 .2 % 0 .1 %
2000RWS 0 0 0 0.04% 0.3% 0 .1 % 0.5% 0 .1 %
The intuition of our sybil identification algorithm is that, because of the ex­
istence of a small cut between the honest region and the sybil region, there is 
a difference between the coverage of random walks originating from an honest 
node and from a sybil node. Figure 4.4 illustrates this difference. Here, we use 
the PA model to construct the sybil region. We set the size of the sybil region 
to be 10000 nodes, and the number of attack edges to be 1000. In the experi­
ments we perform 1 0 0 0  random walks originating from each randomly selected 
source node. The upper curve in Figure 4.4 is the number of nodes traversed 
by random walks originating from an honest node no smaller than 5 times, while 
the lower curve is the number of nodes traversed by random walks originating 
from a sybil node no smaller than 5 times. Each point in the curves represents 
the mean value of 20 experiments. It is easy to see that the difference is larger 
than 200,000 nodes when the random walk length reaches 10000 hops. As de­
scribed in Algorithm 2, we use r  =  mean - a *  stdDeviation as the threshold to 
identify sybil nodes. In our experiments we observe that stdDeviation <  1500, 
so the sybil nodes can be identified even with a relatively large a, to limit the 
number of falsely identified honest nodes.
To evaluate our sybil identification algorithm, the parameters we used in the 
experiments are as follows: lmin =  100,1^  =  10000, Z0 =  1000, t =  5, a =  20, 
ls =  20, /  =  100, R e {1000,1500,2000}. When building the sybil regions, we set
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Table 4.3: 5 sybil nodes per attack edge (5000 sybil nodes) false positive and
negative rates______________________________________________________
Orkut Facebook
PA Model ER Model PA Model ER Model
F+ F~ F+ F~ F + F~ F+ F~
1000RWS 0 0 .0 2 % 0 0.28% 0 0 .2 2 % 0 .1 % 0.54%
1500RWs 0 0 .0 2 % 0 0.32% 0.3% 0 .1 2 % 0 .2 % 0.44%
2000RWS 0 0 0 0 .2 2 % 0.5% 0.04% 0.5% 0.4%
the number of attack edges to be 1000. We define the false positive rate as the 
percentage of the honest nodes identified to be sybil, and the false negative rate 
as the percentage of the sybil nodes identified to be honest. In the experiments 
we obtain the false positive and negative rates of our algorithm. As we use large- 
scale topologies in the experiments, it is infeasible to examine all the honest 
nodes to get the exact false positive rate. To estimate the false positive rate of 
the algorithm, in each experiment we randomly select 1 0 0 0  honest nodes as 
suspects and use our sybil identification algorithm to test them. To get the false 
negative rate, in each experiment we use our algorithm to test every sybil node. 
In the experiments we vary the number of sybil nodes per attack edge. For each 
value we evaluate the algorithm on two real-world topologies, using two sybil 
region construction models, and with three values of R, the number of random 
walks performed in the algorithm, respectively.
Table 4.2 shows the results when each attack edge introduces 10 sybil n- 
odes. It is easy to see that our algorithm achieves very low false positive and 
negative rates in all the cases. We find that all the sybil nodes that cannot be 
correctly identified are compromised nodes, as they are on the small cut be­
tween the honest region and the sybil region. Similarly, all the falsely identified 
honest nodes are close to the small cut.
Table 4.3 shows the results when each attack edge introduces 5 sybil nodes.
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Table 4.4: 1 sybil node per attack edge false positive and negative rates
Orkut Facebook
PA Model PA Model
F + F~ F+ F~
1000RWS 0 0 .6 % 0% 6 .2 %
1500RWS 0 0.7% 0.4% 4.4%
2000RWS 0 0 .2 % 0 % 1.4%
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Figure 4.5: Comparison between the false positive and negative rates of 
SybilDefender and those of SybilLimit
The results are similar to those in Table 4.2. We observe that with the increase of 
the number of random walks performed in the algorithm, the false positive rate 
raises, while the false negative rate decreases. The reason is that the more 
random walks are performed, the smaller the standard deviation of the number 
of nodes whose frequency, the number of times being traversed, is no smaller 
than t is. As a result, the threshold r  increases when more random walks are 
performed, which makes it less likely for a sybil node to be identified as honest, 
and vice verse for honest nodes.
Table 4.4 shows the results when each attack edge introduces only one sybil 
node. The false negative rate for the Facebook data set is higher than the results 
shown in Table 4.3. This is because the difference between the coverage of the 
random walks originating from an honest node and from a sybil node becomes 
smaller compared with the cases when each attack edge introduces more sybil
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Table 4.5: 10 sybil nodes per attack edge (100000 sybil nodes) false positive
Orkut Facebook
PA Model ER Model PA Model ER Model
F+ F~ F+ F~ F+ F~ F+ F~
1000RWS 0 0.06% 0 0.13% 0.4% 0.76% 0.4% 0.78%
1500RWS 0 0.03% 0 0 .1 2 % 0 .6 % 0.67% 0.4% 0 .6 8 %
2000RWS 0 0.03% 0 0 .1 2 % 0.7% 0.62% 0.7% 0 .6 6 %
Table 4.6: 5 sybil nodes per attack edge (50000 sybil nodes) false positive and
Orkut Facebook
PA Model ER Model PA Model ER Model
F+ F~ F+ F~ F + F~ F + F~
1000RWs 0 0.14% 0 0.23% 0.3% 1.40% 0 .2 % 1.31%
1500RWS 0 0 .1 1 % 0 0 .2 2 % 0.4% 1.31% 0.5% 1.07%
2000RWS 0 0.04% 0 0 .2 1 % 0.5% 1.09% 0.5% 0.97%
nodes. The experimental results show that our sybil identification algorithm can 
identify nearly all the sybil nodes when each attack edge introduces 10 or 5 
sybil nodes, and an overwhelming majority of sybil nodes when each attack 
edge introduces 1 sybil node, both with very low false positive rate.
To investigate the performance of our sybil identification algorithm when 
more sybil nodes are controlled by the adversary, we raise the number of attack 
edges to 10000 and repeat the experiments. Following the approach mentioned
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Table 4.7: False rates of SybilLimit on the Facebook data set
PA Model ER Model
F+ F~ F + F~
1 0 0 0 0  sybils 1.5% 8.55% 0 .6 % 15.35%
5000 sybils 1 .2 % 15.16% 1.4% 32.62%
1 0 0 0  sybils 1.4% 61.3% 0 .8 % 85.3%
above, creating 1 0 0 0 0  attack edges means that on average the adversary need- 
s to compromise 131 honest nodes in the Orkut data set, or 546 honest nodes 
in the Facebook data set. Table 4.5 lists the experimental results when each 
attack edge introduces 1 0  sybil nodes, which leads to a sybil region consisting 
of 100000 sybil nodes; Table 4.6 lists the results when each attack edge intro­
duces 5 sybil nodes. It is easy to see that our algorithm still achieves low false 
positive and negative rates in these scenarios.
4.3.2.1 Comparison with existing schemes
We fully implemented SybilLimit and evaluated it using our Facebook data set. 
We didn't evaluate SybilLimit on the Orkut data set as the running time is ap­
proximately 4 times longer, since the average degree of the Orkut data set is 
about 4 times of the average degree of the Facebook data set. Following the 
method in [111], we found the optimal parameters for SybilLimit on the Face­
book data set. We set w, the length of random routes, to be 20 hops, and r, the 
number of instances of the random route generation protocol, to be 10000. Ta­
ble 4.7 lists SybilLimit's false positive and negative rates when each attack edge 
introduces 10 sybil nodes, 5 sybil nodes, and 1 sybil node, respectively. The 
results show that with each attack edge introducing 10 sybil nodes, SybilLimit 
accepts 8.55% of the sybil nodes when the sybil region is constructed by the 
PA model, and 15.35% of the sybil nodes when the sybil region is constructed
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by the ER model. In comparison, SybilDefender only accepts 0.1% of the sybil 
nodes in both cases when R =  2000. With the decrease of the number of sybil 
nodes introduced by each attack edge, the false positive and negative rates of 
SybilLimit raise significantly. When each attack edge introduces one sybil node, 
SybilLimit accepts the majority of the sybil nodes.
Figure 4.5 compares the false positive and negative rates of SybilDefender 
with those of SybilLimit, when the sybil region is built with the PA model. It is 
easy to see that in all the three cases the false positive rate of SybilDefender 
is lower than that of SybilLimit, and the false negative rate of SybilDefender is 
lower than that of SybilLimit by one to two orders of magnitude. The reason 
is SybilLimit assumes that almost all the short random routes originating from 
an honest node will stay within the honest region, and it bounds the number of 
admitted sybil nodes by the number of attack edges and random route length. 
When each attack edge introduces few sybil nodes, SybilLimit cannot effectively 
identify the sybil nodes. On the other hand, SybilDefender interprets the small 
cut between the honest region and the sybil region as a bias in the coverage 
of the random walks originating from an honest node and from a sybil node. It 
can effectively identify the sybil nodes even when the number of sybil nodes 
introduced by each attack edge approaches the theoretical lower bound.
Figure 4.6 compares the average running time to test one node on one core 
of an Intel Xeon 2.93GHz processor by SybilDefender with that by SybilLimit. 
The results show that SybilDefender is faster than SybilLimit by more than 10 
times. The reason is that SybilLimit invokes a large number (r  =  10000 for our 
Facebook data set) of instances of the random route generation protocol [111]. 
Within each instance a random routing table is generated for every node in the 
social graph. After all the instances are finished, SybilLimit verifies if the inter­
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section condition and the balance condition are satisfied to determine whether 
to accept each suspect node. By contrast, SybilDefender only relies on per­
forming a limited number of random walks, which can be done in a short time 
even on large-scale network graphs.
Viswanath et al. proposed using a community detection algorithm [101] as 
the ranking algorithm to investigate the similarity between different sybil defense 
schemes. We evaluated their algorithm using our two data sets, and found that 
the algorithm alone cannot be used to identify the sybil nodes. The reason is 
that the algorithm starts from an honest node and iteratively adds nodes that 
improves the normalized conductance at each step. In our evaluation the nor­
malized conductance always reaches the first inflection point after adding only 
several honest nodes. As a result, their algorithm cannot distinguish the sybil 
nodes from the honest nodes without providing a cutoff point.
We also evaluated Gatekeeper [98] using our data sets, which heavily relies 
on the assumption that the social networks are random expander. This assump­
tion is stronger than our fast-mixing assumption and has not been validated in 
previous research, which makes Gatekeeper suffer from high false positive and 
negative rates on the real-world social topologies that exhibit asymmetries. For 
example, on our Facebook data set with a 10000-node sybil region built through 
the PA model, the average false positive rate of Gatekeeper is 11.7%, and the 
average false negative rate is 17.2%. When the sybil region is built with the ER 
model, the average false positive rate is 11.7%, and the average false negative 
rate is 14.7%. In the evaluation we used the parameters (m =  100, fadmit =  0.2) 
recommended by [98] and repeated each experiment 20 times.
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Table 4.8: False rates of the sybil identification algorithm on a weighted social 
network________________________________________________________
1 0 0 0 0  sybils 5000 sybils
PA Model ER Model PA Model ER Model
p+ F~ F+ F~ F~ F + F~
0.7% 0.15% 0.5% 0 .2 1 % 0.7% 0.20% 0.7% 0.56%
4.3.2.2 Evaluation of the Sybil Identification Algorithm on a Weighted So­
cial Network
As mentioned in Section 4.2.4, activity network is a social network model that 
takes the activities between users into account. Similarly, given the user activ­
ity information, a social network can be transformed into a weighted graph, by 
assigning a weight to each edge based on the number of interactions between 
the two endnodes. There are also other forms of weighted social networks, 
e.g., the trust networks whose edge weights denote the level of trust [8 ], and 
the networks of co-authorship where an edge weight is the number of papers 
co-authored by the two endusers [78].
To investigate the performance of our sybil identification algorithm on such 
weighted social networks, we use the data set provided by Wilson et al. [104]. 
The data set is an undirected, weighted graph. It has the same set of nodes 
and the same topology as the Facebook data set used in previous evaluations. 
However, each edge in the graph is assigned a weight, based on the number of 
interactions (wall posts and photo comments) between the two endnodes. For 
example, assuming user i and user j  are friends in the date set, if the number of 
interactions between i and j  is 10, then the weight of edge J] is 10. Otherwise, 
if there is no interaction between i and j  ever, then the weight is 0. In total, 
this weighted graph records 17,644,327 interactions between 3,097,165 users,
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which means that on average each user takes part in 11.4 interactions.
In our sybil identification algorithm, at each step of a random walk, the tran­
sition probability from node i to j  is Ptj -  where dt is the degree of node 
i. Aij =  1 if i  and j  are connected, otherwise A{j =  0. In other words, at 
each intermediate node of a random walk, when selecting the next hop, all its 
neighbors are treated equally. To apply this algorithm on the weighted social 
networks, we take the edge weights into account when choosing the next hop, 
and define weighted random walks. At each step of a weighted random walk, 
the transition probability from node i to j  is P^ =  . where is the
weight of edge Tj, di is the degree of node i, and tu* is the sum of weights of 
all the edges connecting node i. =  1 if i  and j  are connected, otherwise
=  0. As a result, the higher weight an edge has, with higher possibility the 
weighted random walk will traverse that edge. The modified sybil identification 
algorithm runs by performing weighted random walks.
Table 4.8 shows the false rates of the modified sybil identification algorithm 
on the weighted social network sample. The number of attack edges is 1000, 
R =  2000, and the parameters in the algorithm are the same with the ones used 
in previous evaluations. When constructing the sybil regions, we randomly as­
sign weights to the edges connecting sybil nodes, such that the average weight 
is equal to the average weight of our data set. The results illustrate that our 
algorithm achieves similar performance on the weighted graph: both false posi­
tive and negative rates remain low. It is our ongoing work to investigate whether 
we can derive new algorithms that can further improve the performance.
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Table 4.9: False rates of the sybil identification algorithm operating with trust- 
driven random walks___________________________________________
lazy 
random walk
similarity-based 
random walk
# of sybils 10000 5000 1000 10000 5000 1000
F+ 0 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5%
F~ 0.13% 0.34% 2.6% 0.17% 0.42% 1.7%
4.3.2.3 Evaluation of Trust-driven Random Walks
Mohaisen et al. proposed several designs of random walks that incorporate 
trust between nodes in social graphs [75], and studied their impact on the per­
formance of SybilLimit. Their findings suggest that these modified and biased 
random walks model trust and influence SybilLimit's performance differently. In 
this subsection we evaluate the performance of our sybil identification algorith- 
m operating with these trust-driven random walks on our Facebook dataset. In 
the experiments the number of attack edges is fixed at 1000, R =  2000, and the 
sybil region is built with the PA model.
For lazy random walks, the transition probability form node i to node j  is 
ijj2 if j  is a neighbour of i, a  if i =  j ,  and 0 otherwise, where a  is a parameter 
characterizing the trust level, and di is the degree of node i. The false rates of 
the sybil identification algorithm over lazy random walks (a  =  0.2) is shown in 
Table 4.9, which are similar to the results of simple random walks presented in 
Table 4.2. The reason is that by capturing the random walk in the current node 
with probability a, the laziness actually reduces the effective length of random 
walks by a, which does not degrade performance given a small a.
At each step of an originator-biased random walk, the transition probability 
from the current node to the originator of the random walk is a, and with proba­
bility 1 -  a the next hop is chosen uniformly among the neighbours of the current
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node. In the experiments we found that when operating with originator-biased 
random walks, our sybil identification algorithm cannot effectively identify sybil 
nodes. The coverage of the originator-biased random walks are severely lim­
ited by their inherent "discontinuity": at each step the random walk is moving 
back to the originator with probability a. Since our sybil identification algorith- 
m is built upon the intuition that the coverage of random walks starting from 
an honest node is larger than the random walks starting from a sybil node, the 
originator-biased random walks do not fit our algorithm.
For two nodes i and j  and their sets of neighbours Ni and Nj, the similarity 
between i and j  is defined as At each step of a similarity-based
random walk, the transition probability from node i to one of its neighbours j  
is z J N^ s]k+i) ■ie  - the more similar two adjacent nodes are, with higher pos­
sibility a similarity-based random walk will traverse the link connecting the two 
nodes. Table 4.9 shows the false rates of the sybil identification algorithm oper­
ating with similarity-based random walks. The results are comparable to those 
obtained over the weighted social network (Table 4.8). This is because like the 
weighted random walks are biased based on link weights, the similarity-based 
random walks are biased according to the similarity between each pair of adja­
cent nodes.
4.3.3 Evaluation of the Sybil Community Detection Algorith- 
m
To evaluate our sybil community detection algorithm, the parameters we used 
in the experiments are as follows: lQ =  100, /3 =  0.95, R =  2000. We test the 
algorithm on two social topologies, with the sybil region built through two mod-
95
Table 4.10: Performance of the sybil community detection algorithm (1000 at­
tack edges)__________________________________________________
10 sybil nodes per attack edge (10000 sybils)
Perce 
found s
ntage of 
/bil nodes
Number of falsely 
detected honest nodes
Orkut Facebook Orkut Facebook
PA model 99.91% 99.82% 0.3 0.3
ER model 99.85% 99.84% 0 0.7
5 sybil nodes per attack edge (50<30 sybils)
Perce 
found s
ntage of 
/bil nodes
Number of falsely 
detected honest nodes
Orkut Facebook Orkut Facebook
PA model 99.86% 99.66% 0.1 0.8
ER model 99.74% 99.66% 0.1 0.2
1 S'/bil node per attack edge (100 0 sybils)
Perce 
found s
ntage of 
/bil nodes
Number of falsely 
detected honest nodes
Orkut Facebook Orkut Facebook
PA model 99.4% 98.4% 0.1 1.1
ER model 98.7% 98.3% 0.1 0.3
els, respectively. The number of attack edges is 1000, and the size of the sybil 
region depends on how many sybil nodes are introduced by each attack edge. 
As the goal of our sybil community detection algorithm is to detect the sybil 
community surrounding a known sybil node, when running each experiment we 
randomly select a sybil node as the starting node of our algorithm, and we get 
the percentage of the sybil nodes that can be detected, as well as the number 
of the honest nodes that are falsely detected. We repeat each experiment 20 
times and calculate the mean value.
Tables 4.10 show the results when each attack edge introduces 10 sybil n- 
odes, 5 sybil nodes, and 1 sybil node, respectively. It is easy to see that our 
algorithm can detect an overwhelming majority of the sybil region in all the ex­
periments, and the numbers of falsely detected honest nodes are very small:
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Table 4.11: Performance of the sybil community detection algorithm (10000 at­
tack edges)__________________________________________________
10 sybil nodes per attack edge (100000 sybils)
Percentage of 
found sybil nodes
Number of falsely 
detected honest nodes
Orkut Facebook Orkut Facebook
PA model 99.77% 99.85% 0.2 3.7
ER model 99.90% 99.89% 0.1 3.0
5 sy bil nodes per attack edg e (50000 sybils)
Percentage of 
found sybil nodes
Number of falsely 
detected honest nodes
Orkut Facebook Orkut Facebook
PA model 99.67% 99.69% 0.4 3.6
ER model 99.79% 99.66% 0.2 3.5
1 sybil node per attack edge (100130 sybils)
Percentage of 
found sybil nodes
Number of falsely 
detected honest nodes
Orkut Facebook Orkut Facebook
PA model 99.28% 98.68% 0.4 4.3
ER model 98.88% 98.38% 0.1 3.7
Table 4.12: Performance of the sybil community detection algorithm on a 
weighted social network
Percentage of 
found sybil nodes
Number of falsely 
detected honest nodes
# of sybils 10000 5000 1000 10000 5000 1000
PA Model 99.79% 99.66% 98.6% 0.4 0.5 0.6
ER Model 99.83% 99.68% 98.4% 0.5 0.8 0.7
on average less than 1 honest node is falsely detected in each experiment. 
The undetected sybil nodes are all compromised nodes, the sybil nodes direct­
ly connecting to the honest nodes through attack edges. Our sybil community 
detection algorithm achieves high accuracy with short running time. For ex­
ample, on one core of an Intel Xeon 2.93GHz processor, the time to detect a 
10000-node sybil region connecting to the Facebook data set is 16 seconds, 
when the sybil region is constructed with the PA model, and 20 seconds when
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Table 4.13: Accuracy of the Combo algorithm
Perce 
found S'
ntage of 
/bil nodes
Number of falsely 
detected honest nodes
Orkut Facebook Orkut Facebook
10000 sybils 99.82% 99.64% 0 0.4
5000 sybils 99.68% 99.40% 0.2 1.0
1000 sybils 98.4% 96.5% 0.2 1.2
the sybil region is constructed with the ER model.
To investigate the scalability of our algorithm, we raise the number of attack 
edges to 10000 and repeat the experiments. All the parameters used in the 
algorithm stay the same. The results are shown in Table 4.11, which illustrates 
that with the size of the sybil region increasing by 10 times, our algorithm still 
achieves similar performance.
We also evaluated the performance of the sybil community detection algo­
rithm on the weighted social network sample used in Section 4.3.2.3. The mod­
ified algorithm runs by performing weighted partial random walks. Each weight­
ed partial random walk behaves the same as the partial random walks, i.e., it 
does not traverse the same node more than once. However, at each intermedi­
ate node, the next hop is chosen by considering edge weights, as described in 
Section 4.3.2.3. When building the sybil regions, we randomly assign weights to 
the edges connecting sybil nodes, such that the average weight is equal to the 
average weight of our data set. The results in Table 4.12 show that the number 
of both undetected sybil nodes and falsely detected honest nodes is very small.
4.3.4 Evaluation of the Combo Algorithm
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the Combo algorithm pre­
sented in Section 4.2.3. Since the Combo algorithm behaves the same as the
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sybil identification algorithm when identifying sybil nodes, we measure the run­
ning time and accuracy of the Combo algorithm after a sybil node has been 
found and the algorithm is used to detect the sybil community surrounding the 
sybil node, and compare it with our sybil community detection algorithm.
In the experiments we fixed the number of attack edges at 1000, and eval­
uated the Combo algorithm when the number of sybil nodes in the sybil region 
is 10000, 5000, and 1000, respectively. The sybil region is constructed with the 
PA model. As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, the advantage of the Combo algorith- 
m over the stand-alone sybil community detection algorithm is that the former 
reuses the simple random walks performed in the identification method, and 
thus avoids estimating partial random walk length and performing partial ran­
dom walks, which significantly reduces computation overhead. For instance, 
on a single core of an Intel Xeon 2.93GHz processor, the running time for the 
Combo algorithm to detect a 100000-node sybil region constructed with the PA 
model and connecting to the Orkut graph is 91 seconds, while for the stand­
alone sybil community detection algorithm it is 257 seconds, almost three times 
longer. Table 4.13 shows the accuracy of the Combo algorithm for sybil com­
munity detection. All the results are averaged over 20 runs. Compared with the 
accuracy of the sybil community detection algorithm in Table 4.10, the detection 
rate is slightly lower. This is because the Combo algorithm detects the sybil 
community by analyzing simple random walks originating from a sybil node, in­
stead of partial random walks that are more likely to be trapped within the sybil 
region.
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4.4 Conclusion
We present SybilDefender, a scheme that leverages the network topologies to 
defend against sybil attacks in large social networks. SybilDefender consists 
of a sybil identification algorithm, a sybil community detection algorithm, and 
two approaches to limiting the number of attack edges in OSNs. Our evaluation 
on two large-scale real-world social network samples shows that SybilDefender 
can correctly identify the sybil nodes, even when the number of sybil nodes 
introduced by each attack edge approaches the theoretically detectable lower 
bound, and that it can effectively detect the sybil community surrounding a sybil 
node with different sizes and structures.
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Chapter 5
Privacy-Preserving Location 
Sharing in Location-based Online 
Social Networks
Fast Mencius and SybilDefender improve security of the infrastructure layer and 
the function layer of OSNs, respectively. Starting from this chapter, we investi­
gate how to protect user privacy on OSNs. In the past few years, online social 
networks (OSNs) have gained great popularity and are among the most fre­
quently visited sites on the Web [7]. Through the services provided by OSNs, 
users establish and strengthen connections by sharing thoughts, activities, pho­
tos, and other personal information. At the same time, the popularity of mobile 
devices such as cell phones and tablets is exploding, and these mobile devices 
are becoming smarter. Most cell phones sold today are capable of access­
ing the Internet over WiFi or cellular networks, and determining their location 
through GPS or cellular geolocation. As a result, it is not surprising to see the 
rapid fusion of OSNs with mobile computing, that is, a new paradigm called
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location-based online social networks (LBSNs).
LBSNs can be classified into two types. The first type consists of the exist­
ing OSNs that turn mobile, like Facebook and Twitter. They tail the contents 
and access mechanisms for mobile users, and allow access from mobile de­
vices. Facebook has announced that among the 1 billion active users, more 
than 500 million accessed Facebook through their mobile devices [6]. The sec­
ond type is the newly emerging OSNs that are dedicated to mobile users, such 
as Foursquare. These new LBSNs are designed to explicitly take advantage 
of the location information provided by the mobile devices. Compared with tra­
ditional OSNs, both of these categories of LBSNs take a step further in that 
they provide location-based services, which are a missing link between the re­
al world and OSNs. For example, users can use the "friend locator" feature 
provided by LBSNs to leam their friends' whereabouts. Instead of explicitly in­
putting their locations, the recent smartphone platforms that support various 
localization technologies make it much easier for the users to access and share 
their locations with each other.
While these location-based features make LBSNs more popular, they also 
raise significant privacy concerns. Users' locations may reveal sensitive private 
information, such as interests, habits, and health conditions, especially when 
they are in the hands of the adversaries. Mobile users may also be harmed by 
stalkers who track users with their location information [92,93]. The threat is 
more serious with regard to LBSNs, because users' physical locations are now 
being correlated with their profile information. Considering that all the current 
LBSNs are under centralized control, users' location privacy will be compro­
mised if the location data collected by the LBSNs are abused, inadvertently 
leaked, or under the control of hackers. Without a guarantee of privacy, users
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may be hesitant to share locations through LBSNs [14,68].
Given the popularity of LBSNs and the sensitivity of the location data users 
place in them, it is critical to limit the privacy risks posed by today's LBSNs while 
retaining their functionality. As indicated in previous research [62], location and 
presence are two sources of privacy leakage introduced by LBSNs. Smoke- 
Screen [32] considers the problem of how to flexibly share presence with both 
friends and strangers while preserving user privacy. However, until now no 
scheme has been proposed to address the same problem for location sharing 
in LBSNs. Previous work [85,115] discussed sharing locations between estab­
lished relations in a privacy-preserving way. Nevertheless, restricting location 
sharing to established social relations makes a large class of location-based 
social applications, such as Serendipity [36], impossible. In an LBSN, users 
may want to see the locations of both friends and strangers within some range, 
while at the same time they should be able to control how their own location in­
formation is accessed by others. To protect users' location privacy, the system 
should work in such a way that an adversary controlling the LBSN cannot obtain 
users' location information. Unfortunately, no scheme proposed so far meets 
these requirements.
In this chapter, we present a privacy management system called MobiShare, 
which provides flexible privacy-preserving location sharing in LBSNs. Our sys­
tem is flexible in that it supports the features of location sharing in real-world 
LBSNs, including sharing locations between both trusted social relations and 
untrusted strangers, querying locations within a certain range, and user-defined 
access control. MobiShare leverages the existing OSNs and requires no change 
to their architectures, but these OSNs are not trusted to access users' loca­
tion information. In MobiShare, the social network server stores users' identity-
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related information, while an untrusted third-party location server stores users' 
anonymized location updates that are mixed with dummy location updates. The 
adversary cannot link a precise location to an identified user, unless he controls 
both entities. A user’s location information is not leaked to the malicious user- 
s who are unauthorized to access his locations either, even if these malicious 
users collude with the social network server or the location server. To investi­
gate the feasibility of MobiShare, we have implemented an experimental sys­
tem. The evaluation results show that MobiShare only consumes a very limited 
amount of the battery power and system resources of the mobile devices, and 
the deployment overhead it imposes on the cellular towers is small.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.1, we describe 
MobiShare's system architecture, trust and threat model, and system goals. 
In Section 5.2, we present the design of MobiShare. The security analysis of 
MobiShare is presented in Section 5.3. The feasibility of MobiShare is shown 
experimentally in Section 5.4, and in Section 5.5 we conclude the chapter.
5.1 System Architecture and Threat Model
5.1.1 System Model
To protect users' location privacy, MobiShare stores users' identity-related in­
formation and anonymized location updates at two separate entities, the social 
network server and the location server. Figure 5.1 shows the system archi­
tecture of MobiShare, which consists of four components: the social network 
server, the location server, the cellular towers, and the clients. The social net­
work server can be a server of any existing OSN that would like to implement
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Social Network Server
Cellular Tower
Location Server
Figure 5.1: System architecture
the location-sharing service. The motivation for an OSN to provide a privacy- 
preserving service is to alleviate users' concerns about the abuse of their private 
information, and convince them to share their locations. Like today's OSNs, the 
social network server manages users' identity-related information, e.g., their 
profiles and friend lists. The location server is an untrusted third-party server 
that stores the users' anonymized location updates. For example, a company 
may implement the location server so as to profit from the OSNs or the users. 
Also, some privacy advocacy organization, like the Electronic Frontier Founda­
tion (EFF), may provide the location server to help protect user privacy. The 
tasks of the location server can also be offloaded to cloud computing providers 
such as Amazon EC2 [2]. Given that all the current smartphones are equipped 
with the function to access the Internet with wireless techniques like 3G/LTE, it 
is reasonable to assume that users can communicate with the servers through 
cellular networks.
We assume that each user has a unique identifier at the social network serv­
er. For instance, on Facebook the user identifier is the large integer shown in 
the URL of each user's profile page. This identifier is used as his identity in
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MobiShare. Each user generates by himself a public-private key pair and a 
symmetric session key, and shares the session key with all his social network 
friends. Each cellular tower has a unique identifier and generates by itself a 
symmetric secret key, and shares them with the location server. The secret 
key is used to prevent the social network server from prying the contents of the 
replies sent form the location server. The location server also shares one sym­
metric secret key with all the cellular towers. The servers and the cellular towers 
are connected by high-speed secure links, and the social network server cannot 
identify the communicating cellular towers by observing the IP addresses in the 
connections. This can be achieved by using proxies provided by the cellular 
carriers.
5.1.2 Trust and Threat Model
The social network server and the location server are not trusted to access user­
s' location information. We assume that either the social network server or the 
location server can be compromised and controlled by an adversary seeking 
to link users' identities to their locations, but the adversary cannot control both 
entities. This model is rational in that many security breach cases usually in­
volve the hack of databases or logs in a single system, or dishonest insiders 
within a system trying to fetch sensitive information [4]. It is unlikely that two 
servers operated by independent organizations can be controlled by the same 
adversary. In addition, some users may also be malicious and seek to obtain the 
location information they are unauthorized to access. The social network server 
or the location server may collude with these malicious users. For example, an 
employee of the social network company may register for the location-sharing
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service, and collude with the server to extract other users' location information.
This work does not investigate how to improve location privacy within the 
cellular networks. The wireless Enhanced 9-1-1 rules [5] of the Federal Com­
munications Commission (FCC) require that the cellular earners can locate the 
subscribed cell phones with an accuracy of 50 to 300 meters, depending on 
the type of technology used. Also, for each subscribed cell phone the cellular 
carrier generally knows the owner’s name and address. Therefore, we make 
no attempt to conceal the devices' locations from the cellular networks, i.e., the 
cellular towers are trusted. In MobiShare, location anonymization is done by the 
cellular towers. To avoid interfering with the real-time and prioritized telephony 
services on cellular towers, the functions required by MobiShare can also be 
offloaded to trusted machines connecting the cellular towers, which are admin­
istrated by cellular carriers.
5.1.3 System Goals
MobiShare is designed to achieve the following goals.
Privacy. When using the service, users' location information should not be 
leaked to the social network server, the location server, or unauthorized users, 
even if the social network server or the location server colludes with malicious 
users.
Flexible. Our design should support the features of location sharing in real- 
world LBSNs, which means that the users should be able to share locations 
between both trusted social relations and untrusted strangers, query the loca­
tions of other users within a certain range, and retain control over how their own 
location information is accessed by others.
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rable 5.1: Summary of notations
i d a User A's social network identifier, used as 
his identity
F ID a User A's fake ID
Pub Key a User A's public key
PrivKeyA User A's private key
SessKeyA User A's session key, shared with all his 
friends
dfA User A's friend-case threshold distance
dsA User A's stranger-case threshold distance
CIDc Cellular tower C's identifier
SecKeyc Cellular tower C's secret key, shared with 
the location server
SecKeyLoc Location server's secret key, shared with 
the cellular towers
Mobile device friendly. Considering the limited resources on the mobile 
devices, our client should incur small computation and storage overhead, as 
well as low power consumption.
5.2 System Design
In this section we describe how we achieve our design goals. We separate 
the problem of privacy-preserving location sharing into two cases, sharing loca­
tions between friends and between strangers, and solve them separately. The 
intuition behind our design is that the users' identity-related information and 
anonymized location updates are stored and processed at two separate enti­
ties, and no single entity can accumulate enough information to breach user­
s' location privacy. MobiShare's messaging protocol consists of the following 
components: (1) registering for the location-sharing service; (2) establishing an 
authenticated communication link between a user and a cellular tower; (3) up­
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dating locations; (4) querying friends' locations within a certain range; (5) query­
ing nearby strangers' locations within a certain range. They will be described in 
detail in the following subsections. A summary of the notations used is given in 
Table 5.1.
5.2.1 Service Registration
Before using the location-sharing service, each user needs to register for the 
service at the social network server. During registration, user A shares his pub­
lic key PubKeyA with the social network server, and defines his access con­
trol settings, which consist of two threshold distances, dfA and dsA. dfA is the 
threshold distance within which A is willing to share his location with his so­
cial network friends. If the distances between A and some of his friends are 
larger than dfA, they cannot access A's current location. Similarly, dsA is the 
threshold distance within which A agrees to share his location with arbitrary 
users. In our implementation, users can select their threshold distances from 
two drop-down lists. If a user does not want to share his location, he can simply 
choose 0 as the threshold distance. After registration, A keeps a record of his 
social network identifier ID A, while the social network server stores an entry 
( ID A, PubKeyA, dfA, dsA) in its subscriber table, where the user identity is the 
primary key.
5.2.2 Authentication
Figure 5.2 shows the messages involved in the authentication process. Af­
ter user A's handset connects to cellular tower C, an encrypted data transmis­
sion link is established based on mobile telecommunication techniques such
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Social Network Server Cellular Tower C User A
(ID  a. ts. Sib J ID a. ts))
,  (IDA, ts, SigA(IDA, ts))
L ___ ‘•V u y »iH w <v  / / ___________
(IDA, dfA, dSA) t
(ID  A, dfA, dsa)
,  OK
Figure 5.2: Authentication
as 3G/LTE. To let the cellular tower authenticate his identity, A sends an au­
thentication request (ID A, ts, SigA(ID A, ts)) to the cellular tower, where ID A is 
A's social network identifier, and ts is a timestamp used to prevent replay at­
tack. The message is signed by A's private key. The cellular tower forwards 
this message to the social network server. Upon receiving the message, the so­
cial network server searches its subscriber table for A's registration information, 
including A's public key PubKeyA and the threshold distances dfA and dsA.
The social network server first uses PubKeyA to verify A's signature. If the 
verification succeeds, it sends a reply (ID A,dfA,dsA) to the cellular tower. The 
cellular tower forwards this message to A. A checks if ID A, dfA, and dsA are 
correct. If so, A sends an OK  message to the cellular tower. On the reception 
of the OK  message, the cellular tower stores an entry (ID A,dfA, dsA) in its user 
info table, where the user identity is the primary key. After this an authenticated 
communication link is established between A and the cellular tower, and A's 
identity is attached to this link.
5.2.3 Location Updates
When the users upload their location updates, the task of the cellular towers is to 
perform anonymization such that the user identities cannot be inferred from the 
anonymized location updates. This is achieved by leveraging both pseudonyms
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Figure 5.3: Location update
and dummy location updates. We assume that each cellular tower periodically 
generates fake IDs, and saves them in a fake ID pool. The size of the pool de­
pends on the number of users connecting to this cellular tower and their location 
update frequency. Each location update from a user consumes k fake IDs. The 
fake IDs can be efficiently generated using a cryptographic hash function and a 
random salt value as follows: fake ID { =  SHA(fake /  A - i  © salt).
Figure 5.3 shows the messages involved in the location update process. 
User A periodically gets his current location through techniques such as GPS 
or cellular geolocation. To update his location, A sends a message (ID A, (x, y), 
SessA(x, y)) to the cellular tower, where (x, y) is A's current location, and SessA 
(x, y) is the location encrypted with A's session key. This session key is shared 
with all his social network friends. Upon receiving the location update from A, 
the cellular tower performs coarse location verification by checking if (x, y) is 
within its working range. If so, the cellular tower keeps a record of A's current 
location in its user info table. Then the cellular tower picks k fake IDs from its 
fake ID pool. One of the k fake IDs is used to replace A's identity in the real 
location update. Let this fake ID be F ID A. The other k -  1 fake IDs are used 
by the cellular tower to construct dummy location updates. The cellular tower 
stores F ID a at A's entry in the user info table, and sends the mapping between 
A's identity and the k fake IDs to the social network server, which stores an entry
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( ID A,F ID A,F ID u .. . ,F ID lt_i) in its fake ID table, where the user identity is 
the primary key. With this table the social network server knows, given any 
user identity, the fake ID used in the latest real location update and the fake IDs 
used in the latest dummy location updates.
To anonymize the location update from A, the cellular tower sends k location 
updates to the location server. Only one location update contains A's real loca­
tion, while the other k -  1 are dummies. The real location update is of the form 
(F ID a, (x, y), SessA(x, y), dfA, dsA). It consists of A's fake ID, plaintext and en­
crypted locations, and the threshold distances. To construct the dummy location 
updates, the cellular tower follows the method proposed by Kido et al. [58] and 
generates k -  1 dummy locations within its coverage. The i th dummy location 
update is of the form (F ID h {xi,yi),strh dfh dsj. F ID i  is one of the k fake IDs 
extracted from the fake ID pool; (x*, yi) is one of the dummy locations generat­
ed by the cellular tower; sir* is a random string imitating the encrypted location; 
dfi and ds{ are the threshold distances of a random user whose information is 
stored in the cellular tower's user info table. Note that for the dummy location 
updates, the cellular tower does not need to encrypt the locations. It only needs 
to generate arbitrary strings with the length of an encrypted location. Like gen­
erating fake IDs, these strings can be created efficiently using a hash function 
and a salt value.
The cellular tower sends the k location updates to the location server in a ran­
dom order with random temporal intervals following the exponential distribution. 
The location server stores them in its location update database. The database 
consists of a number of tables. Each table represents a geographic region. Up­
dates of locations within a region are stored in the corresponding table, where 
the fake ID is the primary key. Organizing the location update database in this
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Figure 5.4: Querying friends' locations
way improves search efficiency. For instance, given one location, to find all the 
fake IDs within a range, instead of checking all the stored location updates, the 
location server only needs to check the tables of the regions that overlap the 
queried circular area. The entries in the location update database expire after 
a certain period of time.
The rationale behind this design is that the users' location updates are sepa­
rated into two parts: user identities and locations. The mappings between user 
identities and pseudonyms are presented to the social network server, while the 
anonymized location updates are sent to the location server. No single entity is 
able to link users' identities to their locations.
5.2.4 Querying Friends' Locations
Figure 5.4 shows the messages involved in querying friends' locations. To 
query the locations of his friends within a certain range, say 1 mile, user A 
sends query(IDAt 'f, '1mir) to the cellular tower. The cellular tower append- 
s its identifier and a sequence number to this message, which are encrypted 
by the location server’s shared secret key, and forwards query(IDA, T, '1mi', 
SecKeyLoc(C lDc ,seq)) to the social network server. The cellular identifier will 
be used by the location server to find the secret key shared by this cellular tower 
so as to encrypt the reply. The sequence number is added such that the social 
network server cannot infer that two queries of different users come from the
((W tS en /X M I)...)
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same cellular tower, since for the same CIDc , SecKeyLoc(CIDc ,seq) veries 
with seq.
Upon receiving the query, the social network server looks up the currently 
used fake IDs of A and all ,4's friends in its fake ID table. Let F ID lis t  be a 
list consisting of the fake IDs of all A's friends in random order, including the 
fake IDs used in each friend's latest real location update and the fake IDs used 
in each friend's latest dummy location updates. Assume A has /  friends, then 
the size of F ID lis t  is kf. The social network server replaces A's identity with 
F ID a, which is the fake ID used in A's latest real location update, and sends 
query(FIDA, T, FIDlist, '1mi', SecKeyLoc(CIDC) seq)) to the location server. On 
the reception of the query, the location server checks which fake IDs in FID lis t  
are within 1 mile of F ID A. For each of these nearby fake IDs, the location server 
enforces access control based on that fake ID's friend-case threshold distance 
stored in the location update database. For example, if one fake ID is 0.7 miles 
away from F ID A, but its friend-case threshold distance is 0.5 miles, the location 
server will not send the location of this fake ID to A, even though it is within the 
queried range.
After finishing distance computation and access control enforcement, the 
location server sends a reply SecKeyc ((FIDi, Sessi(xi t yi))..., seq) to the social 
network server. To prevent the social network server from prying the contents, 
this message is encrypted with the cellular tower's shared secret key. The reply 
may contain multiple location entries. Each entry is of the form (F ID h Sessifa, y*)), 
where F ID t is a fake ID in FID lis t  that is within the queried range and has 
passed access control enforcement, and 5essi(a:i,yi) is F ID i 's  encrypted lo­
cation stored in the location update database. As mentioned in the previous 
subsection, if F ID i  is a fake ID used in the latest real location update of a us-
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er, then Sessi(xh yi) is FIDO's location encrypted with this user's session key 
shared with all his friends, including A. Otherwise, if F ID i  is a fake ID used 
in one of the dummy location updates, then Sessi{xi,yi) is an arbitrary string 
with the length of an encrypted location. To process the friend-case query, the 
location server uses the stored plaintext locations to compute distances, while 
it sends the encrypted locations back to the querier. The purpose of this design 
is to defend against the social network server colluding with malicious users, 
which will be explained in Section 5.3.
Upon receiving the reply, the social network server appends a mapping entry 
for each of A's friends to the message, and forwards the reply to the cellular 
tower. Each mapping entry is of the form (F ID j , ID j ), where F ID j  is the fake 
ID used in friend j's  latest real location update, and ID ,  is friend j's  identity. 
Note that the social network server does not provide the mapping entries for the 
fake IDs used in the dummy location updates. Assume A has /  friends, then /  
mapping entries are appended to the reply. The reply received by the cellular 
tower consists of the encrypted location entries and the mapping entries. The 
cellular tower first uses its secret key shared with the location server to decrypt 
the location entries. Then for each location entry that has a matching mapping 
entry with the same fake ID, it replaces the fake ID in the location entry with the 
user identity. The location entries that do not have a matching mapping entry, 
which are from the dummy location updates, are all discarded by the cellular 
tower. Until now each remaining location entry has the form (ID U Sessi(xi, &)), 
which includes both the user identity and the encrypted location. The cellular 
tower sends these entries to A. Since we assume that all of A's friends have 
shared their session keys with A, A can decrypt and get the plaintext locations 
of the nearby friends.
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Figure 5.5: Querying strangers' locations
5.2.5 Querying Strangers' Locations
Figure 5.5 shows the messages involved in querying strangers' locations. To 
query the locations of arbitrary users within a certain range, say 1 mile, A sends 
query(IDA, 's', '1mi') to the cellular tower. The cellular tower keeps a record of 
the queried range at A's entry in the user info table. Then it removes ID A, and 
appends F ID A, which is the fake ID used in A’s latest real location update, the 
cellular tower identifier, and a sequence number to the message, all of which are 
encrypted by the location server's secret key. The cellular tower sends query( 's', 
'1mi', SecKeyLoc(F ID A, C ID c , seq)) to the social network server, which directly 
forwards the query to the location server.
On the reception of the query, the location server looks up the fake IDs that 
are within 1 mile away from F ID A. For each of these fake IDs, the location 
server enforces access control based on its stranger-case threshold distance. 
Assuming there are n nearby fake IDs that pass access control enforcement, the 
location server randomly picks another recently received (k -  l)n  fake IDs from 
the location update database. These fake IDs are mixed with the n nearby fake 
IDs in the reply to achieve fc-anonymity. The reply sent from the location server 
to the social network server is of the form (SecKeyc ((F ID i, (xi ,yi))...,seq),FID 
list). This message includes n location entries, each of which contains a nearby 
fake ID and its plaintext location. All these location entries are encrypted with 
the cellular tower’s secret key. FID lis t  consists of the n nearby fake IDs mixed
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with the (k -  l)n randomly selected fake IDs. On the reception of the reply, the 
social network server cannot pry the contents of the encrypted location entries, 
nor can it learn which fake IDs in FID lis t  are currently close to A, since it cannot 
distinguish the n nearby fake IDs from the (k -  1 )n padded fake IDs.
As mentioned in Section 5.2.3, to anonymize each location update from a 
user, the cellular tower generates k -  1 dummy location updates and sends 
all the k updates to the location server. Therefore, approximately (k -  1 )/k  of 
the kn fake IDs in FID lis t  come from dummy location updates. The social 
network server filters out all these fake IDs based on its fake ID table. For each 
of the remaining fake IDs, which are the fake IDs that have been used in the real 
location updates, the social network server appends to the reply a mapping entry 
(F ID j, ID j,ds j), where ID j  is user j ’s identity, and dsj is user j's  stranger-case 
threshold distance. Then it sends (SecKeyc((FIDi, (xi,yi))..., seq), mapping 
entries) to the cellular tower.
Upon receiving the reply, the cellular tower first uses its secret key to de­
crypt the location entries. To defend against the location server colluding with a 
malicious user, the cellular tower randomly selects one location entry that has 
a matching mapping entry in the reply, and checks if the distance between the 
location in this entry and A's current location stored in the user info table is s- 
maller than both the queried range and the stranger-case threshold distance 
in the mapping entry. If the check fails, the reply is discarded and the location 
server is suspected of behaving maliciously. Otherwise, for each location entry 
that has a matching mapping entry, the cellular tower replaces the fake ID with 
the user identity. The resulting location entry is ( I D i} (xi,yi)). The cellular tower 
sends all these entries to A. Until now A learns both the identities and locations 
of the nearby users who are willing to share their whereabouts.
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The maximum stranger-case query range is limited in MobiShare. For exam­
ple, in our implementation, a user is allowed to query the locations of arbitrary 
users within at most 2 miles. Without such limit, a malicious user can launch a 
DoS attack on the location server by querying the locations of strangers within 
a very large range.
5.3 Security Analysis
In this section we present the intuition behind the privacy guarantee provided by 
MobiShare. We discuss the security of MobiShare after an adversary compro­
mises either the social network server or the location server, or controls some 
malicious users. We also consider the collusion between either of the servers 
and the malicious users.
Compromised social network server. The adversary succeeds in breach­
ing a user's location privacy if he can associate the user's identity with a loca­
tion. By controlling the social network server, the adversary can access all the 
records in the subscriber table and the fake ID table, as well as observe and 
tamper with the users' queries and the corresponding replies.
Entries in the subscriber table are of the form (ID A, PubKeyA, dfA, dsA), and 
entries in the fake ID table are of the form (ID A,F ID A,F ID x ,.. . ,F ID k- i ). It is 
easy to see that these two tables only store users’ identity-related information. 
By accessing them the adversary cannot obtain any location information. The 
adversary may observe users' queries. However, the friend-case query only 
contains the querier's identity in plaintext. Since we assume that the social net­
work server cannot identify the communicating cellular towers by observing the 
IP addresses in the connections, it cannot infer which cellular tower the querier
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currently connects to. By observing the stranger-case queries the adversary 
learns even less, because the querier's fake ID is encrypted. The adversary 
may observe the replies sent from the location server. However, in both the 
friend case and the stranger case, the location entries in a reply are encrypted 
by the secret key of the cellular tower from which the query was sent, and the 
adversary cannot pry the contents.
The adversary may compromise the social network server and make it not 
follow our protocol. For example, upon receiving a friend-case query the social 
network server may replace the querier's identity with an incorrect fake ID, or it 
may append incorrect mapping entries to a reply sent from the location server. 
These disruptive behaviors, however, do not help the adversary to learn users' 
locations, and they significantly increase the risk of being detected.
Compromised location server. If the adversary controls the location serv­
er, he can access all the stored location updates. However, these location up­
dates are all anonymized, from which the adversary cannot infer user identities. 
In our design, pseudonyms are used to replace users' identities in the location 
updates. For each location update from a user, ft - 1  dummy location updates 
are generated and uploaded to the location server. This makes the adversary 
unable to distinguish the real location data so as to identify the users.
Malicious users. Malicious users may seek to fetch other users' location 
information they are unauthorized to access. In MobiShare, to leam the loca­
tions of others, a user simply sends out a query and waits for the reply, and he 
has no control over how the query is processed. A user cannot get the location 
of another if the distance between them is larger than the queried range or the 
threshold distance defined by the latter. Therefore, the only way for a malicious 
user to fetch the location information he should not know is to falsify his current
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location. However, this is forbidden in our design, because the cellular towers 
perform location verification when they receive location updates from the user- 
s. If the verification fails, the location update will be discarded and the sender 
will be suspected. Our current design requires that the cellular towers perform 
coarse verification. That is, each cellular tower checks if the reported location is 
within its working range. If this is not enough, the cellular towers can also per­
form precise verification, by comparing the updated location with the location of 
the sender’s mobile device known by the cellular network. Only if the difference 
is smaller than a threshold will the update be accepted.
Collusion between the social network server and malicious users. The 
social network server and some malicious users may collude to compromise 
other users' location privacy. Since in our design the problem of privacy-preserving 
location sharing has been separated into two cases, sharing between friends 
and between strangers, we will discuss our privacy guarantee under this threat 
in both cases.
The social network server controlled by the adversary can distinguish the 
colluding users' friend-case queries from the other queries by observing the 
user identity field in the received queries. On the reception of a friend-case 
query from a colluding user, the social network server can put arbitrary users' 
fake IDs into the fake ID list sent to the location server, instead of the fake 
IDs of the querier’s friends. In this way, the reply from the location server may 
contain some of these users' locations, depending on the distance between 
each user and the querier. However, neither the social network server nor the 
malicious user can see the locations, because each of these locations in the 
reply is encrypted by the corresponding user's session key shared only with his 
friends.
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On the other hand, upon receiving a stranger-case query from a colluding us­
er, the social network server can do nothing, because the cellular tower already 
replaces the querier's identity with the fake ID used in his latest real location up­
date, and encrypts the fake ID with the location server's secret key. When the 
social network server receives the reply sent from the location server, it does 
not help the colluding user if the social network server appends arbitrary users' 
mapping entries to the reply, since the reply only contains the location entries 
of the nearby users.
Collusion between the location server and malicious users. The loca­
tion server and the malicious users controlled by the same adversary may col­
lude to breach user privacy. Again, we will discuss this threat in both the friend 
case and the stranger case.
The location server controlled by the adversary can identify the queries from 
colluding users by matching the location of the querier with the location of a 
malicious user. Upon receiving a friend-case query from a colluding user, the 
location server may put the encrypted locations of all the friends of the colluding 
user into the reply, without calculating distances or enforcing access control. In 
this way, the colluding user can learn the current locations of all his friends, even 
if some friends are outside the queried range or their locations should not be 
shared with the colluding user based on their friend-case threshold distances. 
However, we assume that in an LBSN users are cautious when establishing new 
friendships, especially when they know that their friends can see their where­
abouts. Thus, it is unlikely that a malicious user can make friends with many 
honest users, and the location privacy breach is very limited. Even if this as­
sumption does not hold in some LBSNs, the attack can be defended against by 
letting the cellular towers sign both the plaintext and encrypted locations when
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they receive a location update. The signature guarantees that the plaintext lo­
cation is linked to the encrypted location, and they cannot be modified. When 
the location server sends back the reply, each entry contains the signed plain­
text and encrypted locations. The social network server appends each friend's 
friend-case threshold distance to the reply. After the cellular tower receives the 
reply, it randomly selects one location entry and checks its validity, by verify­
ing the signature and examining if the distance between the plaintext location 
and the location of the querier is smaller than both the queried range and the 
threshold distance. The reply is discarded if the check fails.
On the reception of a stranger-case query from a colluding user, the location 
server controlled by the adversary may put arbitrary fake IDs' locations into the 
reply, for the purpose that their identities can be learned by the colluding user 
when he gets the reply. However, as described in Section 5.2.5, before the 
colluding user receives the reply, the cellular tower checks the validity of the re­
turned location entries, based on the colluding user's location and the stranger- 
case threshold distance of the fake ID in the randomly selected location entry, 
so this attack can be easily detected.
5.4 Evaluation
In this section we first describe the implementation of our system, and then we 
present the experimental results.
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5.4.1 System Implementation
We have implemented an experimental system based on the design presented 
in Section 5.2. Our system consists of four components: the client, the cellular 
tower, the social network server, and the location server. The client is imple­
mented in JAVA on top of the Android 2.2 platform. We run the client on a 
MOTOROLA DROID 2 Global smartphone, which is equipped with an ARM7 
1.2GHz processor and 512MB RAM. The device can access the Internet and 
communicate with the laptop emulating the cellular tower through Verizon's 3G 
data service or WLAN, and get its current location with network-based triangu­
lation, GPS, or Assisted GPS (A-GPS). Among them A-GPS is the preferred 
service, as it consumes less battery power and provides enhanced localization 
performance, compared with standalone GPS.
In the experiments we set up a laptop to emulate the cellular tower. A ser­
vice written in Java running on the laptop processes the location updates and 
queries from the clients, as well as the replies from the social network server. 
The laptop communicates with the two servers through our campus's wireless 
network. In MobiShare, the social network server and the location server are 
supposed to be managed by two separate organizations, so we cannot assume 
that they are connected by local-area networks. To evaluate the performance of 
MobiShare in wide-area networks, in our implementation we deploy the social 
network server and the location server on two third-party cloud hosting services 
provided by JoyentCloud and Linode, respectively. Both servers are written in 
Java and use MySQL 5.0 to manage their local tables. The servers maintain 
two copies for each table. The in-memory heap tables are added to speed up 
search operations.
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Figure 5.6: Client interface
In a separate research project we implemented and deployed a Facebook 
application [103]. Through this application we collected the friend lists of 386 
Facebook users with their permission. The resulting data set consists of the 
Facebook identifiers of 48,014 users, as well as the social network topology 
among them. We use this data set as a social network sample in our exper­
iments, and store it at the social network server. For each of these users we 
generate a location update, which includes a fake ID, a random location within 
20 miles of our department building, the location encrypted by a symmetric key, 
and randomly selected threshold distances. All the location updates are stored 
at the location server. In the experiments, an author with 132 friends in our data 
set used the smartphone to update his location and send queries. We set k, the 
anonymity level, to be 5, and we use 128-bit AES for symmetric key encryption 
and decryption.
The size of our client executable is 252KB, which is almost negligible com­
pared with the 8GB storage space of our smartphone. When running, the client 
has a memory footprint of 12MB, 2.3% of the smartphone's main memory. Fig-
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Figure 5.7: Power consumption of the client
ure 5.6 shows the client interface. It consists of three pages. The Control page 
allows the user to start and stop using the location-sharing service, find friends 
or strangers within certain ranges, and define the friend-case and stranger-case 
threshold distances. The Users page lists the identities of the nearby friends 
or strangers, depending on the type of the query. The Map page shows the 
locations of the nearby friends or strangers on Google Map. Each user is rep­
resented as a needle. By tapping on a needle the corresponding user's identity 
is shown as a toast notification on the screen.
5.4.2 Experimental Results
Power consumption o f the client. We run experiments on the smartphone to 
investigate the power consumption of our client. When the client is running, we 
measure the battery level of the smartphone every 5 minutes during a period of 
2 hours. In comparison, when the client is not running, we measure the battery 
level every 5 minutes during the same length of time. In all the experiments, we 
start with a fully charged battery after charging for the same amount of time. The 
screen and the 3G module of the smartphone are always kept on. To estimate
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the power consumption of the client in the real environment, we let the client 
communicate with the laptop emulating the cellular tower through Verizon's 3G 
data service, and get its current location with A-GPS.
In MobiShare, each client periodically updates its current location, and oc­
casionally queries the locations of friends or nearby strangers. To investigate 
how the location update frequency and the query frequency influence power 
consumption, in the experiments we define a "normal" client as a client that 
updates its location every 1 minute, and queries the locations of friends or n- 
earby strangers every 5 minutes. We also define an "aggressive" client as a 
client that updates its location every 30 seconds, and queries the locations of 
friends or nearby strangers every 1 minute. Figure 5.7 compares the power 
consumption when the client is not running with the power consumption when 
the normal client or the aggressive client is running. As shown in the figure, 
when the client is not running, the battery level of the smartphone drops to 81% 
after 2 hours with the screen and the 3G module kept on. In comparison, when 
the normal client is running, the battery level drops slightly faster. After 2 hours 
the remaining battery level is 78%. This means that each hour our client only 
consumes 1.5% of the battery power. Considering that the battery capacity of 
our smartphone is 1390 mAh, this corresponds to 20.85 mAh per hour. When 
the aggressive client is running, the battery level drops to 75% after 2 hours, 
which indicates that each hour the more frequent location updates and queries 
consume another 1.5% of the battery power. The results show that the power 
consumption of our client is small, and the location update frequency and the 
query frequency have a limited impact on the battery life.
CPU utilization o f the client We also measure the CPU utilization of the 
client. During 2 hours of continuous running, the normal client consumes 24
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seconds of CPU time, with average CPU utilization of 0.3%, while the aggres­
sive client consumes 38 seconds of CPU time, with average CPU utilization of 
0.5%. This shows that the computation overhead incurred by the client is small, 
since in MobiShare the tasks of clients do not involve intensive computations.
Response time. We measure the temporal interval between the time when 
the client sends out a friend-case query, whose queried range is 5 miles, and 
the time when it receives the reply. We repeat the experiment 50 times and 
compute the mean and standard deviation of the response time. The average 
response time is 386 milliseconds, with a standard deviation of 56 milliseconds. 
Users can hardly sense the delay. In the experiments we observed that the 
response time is influenced by the traffic on the wide-area networks connecting 
the servers and the cellular towers.
Deployment overhead on the cellular towers. MobiShare requires that 
the cellular towers take part in the messaging protocol. The cellular carrier- 
s can recover their deployment cost by charging the LBSNs or the users. To 
prevent interfering with existing services, however, the additional overhead im­
posed by MobiShare on the cellular towers must be small. In the experiments 
we use a laptop to emulate the cellular tower, which is equipped with an Intel 
Core Duo T8100 2.1GHz processor and 2 GB main memory. To investigate the 
overhead incurred by our scheme, we create a large number of dummy user- 
s on another laptop, and connect those users to the emulated cellular tower. 
Each user updates a randomly generated location every 1 minute, and sends a 
query, either friend-case or stranger-case, every 5 minutes.
Figure 5.8 shows the average CPU utilization of the cellular tower service 
with different numbers of connecting users. Figure 5.9 shows the corresponding 
memory usage. When there are 1000 users, the cellular tower service only
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uses 4.1 % of the CPU power and 91 MB memory. The results demonstrate that 
our scheme consumes a very limited amount of system resources on cellular 
towers.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present MobiShare, a privacy management system that pro­
vides flexible privacy-preserving location sharing in LBSNs. MobiShare sup­
ports sharing locations between both trusted social relations and untrusted s- 
trangers. With MobiShare, users can find their friends or strangers within a 
certain range, and control how their location information is accessed by others. 
By separating user identities and anonymized location updates at two entities,
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users' location privacy is protected if either entity is compromised by the ad­
versary. Our evaluation on an experimental system shows that MobiShare is 
mobile-device friendly, and it imposes a small additional overhead on the cellu­
lar towers.
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Chapter 6
Modeling Location-based Online 
Social Networks
Besides hiding the location information from LBSNs, as we have done in Mo­
biShare, another way to preserve users' location privacy on LBSNs is to pro­
tect the location data collected by LBSNs from being leaked to adversaries. 
Users of LBSNs can check-in at different venues (e.g., airports, restaurants) 
and notify their friends, sharing with friends information about the places they 
visited. These check-ins, combined with the online friendship connections re­
vealed through the LBSNs, provide an unprecedented opportunity to study hu­
man socio-spatial behaviors based on large-scale voluntarily contributed data. 
This in turn facilitates a variety of services, such as urban planning, friendship 
recommendation, place of interest recommendation, traffic forecasting, market­
ing campaigns, and epidemiological modeling.
However, it is difficult to perform direct measurements of existing LBSNs, 
which usually take approaches to defend against automated crawlers. For ex­
ample, Foursquare, the most popular LBSN, requires user authorization to col­
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lect personal information, and it has limited the access rate. As a result, a direct 
measurement typically incurs high time and resource costs [27,28]. To circum­
vent this difficulty, researchers have resorted to the publicly available datasets. 
Nevertheless, the number of LBSN datasets available to the community is very 
limited. This is mainly due to the concerns of compromising user privacy and 
the high costs of distributing large datasets. Users' locations may reveal highly 
sensitive private information, such as interests, habits, and health conditions, 
especially when they are in the hands of adversaries. The threat is more serious 
with regard to LBSNs, because users' physical locations are now being corre­
lated with their profile information. Even if the datasets are anonymized before 
being published, users' identities can still be recovered from the anonymized 
location traces and social graphs [63,76]. Therefore, these privacy concerns 
strongly discourage sharing LBSN datasets. Given the soaring adoption of LB­
SNs, the lack of available datasets has significantly impeded the research in 
this area.
An attractive alternative to shared original datasets is the synthetic datasets 
generated by measurement-calibrated models. There are three advantages of 
using synthetic datasets as replacements for real datasets. First, the synthetic 
datasets are randomly generated, and thus they do not compromise any user 
privacy. Second, compared with sharing the large datasets, the cost of sharing 
the models is negligible. Third, LBSN datasets with different properties can 
be generated on demand, which can help researchers improve the statistical 
confidence in their experimental results. Previous work investigated the graph 
models that produce synthetic social graphs of online social networks [54,59, 
88,89]. Given all these advantages of the model-generated LBSN datasets, 
however, no LBSN model has been proposed in literature.
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In this chapter, we propose LBSNSim, a trace-driven model for generating 
synthetic LBSN datasets that capture the characteristics of the real dataset- 
s. We first analyze the data from three LBSNs: Foursquare, Gowalla, and 
Brightkite. Our findings suggest that the LBSNs share many universal social 
and spatial properties. For example, the user check-in numbers follow an ex­
ponentially truncated power law distribution. The displacements between con­
secutive check-ins made by each user follow a two-segment distribution, whose 
transition point has a clear meaning. Similarly, the temporal intervals between 
consecutive check-ins also follow a two-segment distribution. Additionally, the 
friend distances follow a truncated Weibull distribution. Previous work only show 
that some measurements of LBSNs, such as the check-in numbers and dis­
placements, exhibit a heavy-tail pattern [27,81]. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first time that specific distributions have been found and explained for 
a wide range of statistical features of LBSNs.
Based on our findings we develop LBSNSim, which takes as input a set of 
known venues and model parameters, and outputs the check-in history of all the 
synthetic users and their friendship graph. Our model consists of three compo­
nents: generating the initial location of each user, building the friendship graph 
by considering both social and spatial factors, and generating all the check-ins 
of each user.
We evaluate the fidelity of LBSNSim by comparing the properties of the real 
LBSN datasets with their synthetic model-generated counterparts. The results 
demonstrate that LBSNSim provides an accurate representation of the target 
LBSNs: it generates synthetic datasets that accurately capture the statistical 
features of the original datasets. Besides, our application-level test shows that 
the application results obtained by using the model-generated datasets closely
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Table 6.1: Statistics of the datasets
Dataset Users Edges Check-ins Venues
Gowalla 196,591 950,327 3,674,591 675,483
Brightkite 58,228 214,078 2,920,919 476,744
Foursquare 93,115 NA 7,956,679 428,343
match those obtained by using the original datasets, which validates the feasi­
bility of substituting real datasets with synthetic datasets. As the first generative 
model of LBSNs, LBSNSim has wide applications for the research community 
and in guiding the design of the systems and applications centered on LBSNs.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1 describes the 
datasets of the three LBSNs we analyze. The detailed analysis of the original 
datasets is presented in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents the design of LB­
SNSim, which is evaluated in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter.
6.1 Datasets
Our datasets are from three LBSNs: Gowalla, Brightkite, and Foursquare. We 
consider the check-ins whose location has latitude between 24°N and 50°N, 
and longitude between 64°W and 126°W. This includes the mainland of the 
USA, where the three LBSNs have the majority of check-ins.
Gowalla is an LBSN that was founded in 2007. The dataset was collected 
by Cho et al. [28] over the period between Feb. 2009 and Oct. 2010, which 
consists of 3.7 million check-ins from 196,591 users, as well as the friendship 
edges between those users.
Brightkite is an LBSN launched in 2007. The dataset was collected by Cho 
et al. [28] between Apr. 2008 and Oct. 2010, which consists of 2.9 million check­
ins from 58,228 users. Since the original friendships in Brightkite are directed,
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the authors constructed an undirected friendship network by only considering 
bi-directional edges.
Foursquare was created in 2009 and it is now the most popular LBSN with 
over 30 million users and 3 billion check-ins as of Jan. 2013 [1]. The dataset 
was collected by Cheng et al. [27] between Sep. 2010 and Jan. 2011, which 
consists of 8.0 million check-ins from 93,115 users. Since Foursquare does not 
allow unauthorized access to users’ friend lists, this dataset does not contain 
the friendship graph.
The statistics of the three datasets are shown in Table 6.1. Each check-in 
in the datasets is stored as a tuple {userID, time, latitude, longitude, venuelD), 
while each friendship edge is stored as a tuple (user I  Da , user I D B). Note that 
check-ins at the same venue have the same GPS coordinates, provided by the 
corresponding LBSN.
6.2 Data Analysis
In this section, we investigate the statistical characteristics of the original dataset- 
s. We extract and analyze the following data: the number of check-ins of each 
user, the spatial displacement of consecutive check-ins, the temporal interval 
of consecutive check-ins, distance between friends, the number of friends of 
each user, and the number of check-ins at each venue. Our findings suggest 
that the datasets share many universal features, which guides the design and 
evaluation of LBSNSim.
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Figure 6.1: Exponentially truncated power law distribution of check-in numbers.
6.2.1 Number of check-ins
We begin with an investigation of the number of check-ins made by each user. 
We plot in Figure 6.1 the log-log CCDF (complementary cumulative distribution 
function) of the number of check-ins made by each user in the three dataset- 
s, as the CCDF plot is known to show the tail pattern of a distribution better 
than the PDF (probability density function) plot. All the plots exhibit a sizable 
downward curvature, which cannot be fitted with a straight line, indicating a sig­
nificant deviation from a power law distribution, instead, by analyzing the data, 
we find that they can be well fitted with an exponentially truncated power law 
distribution [31], whose probability density function is
p(x) a  x~ae~Xx, (6.1)
where a  and A are two parameters to be estimated for each dataset. Regard­
ing this density function, we first give a property (Lemma 1) that will be used 
when we formally define the distribution (Lemma 2) and estimate the parame­
ters (Lemma 3).
Lemma 1. D e f in e
p + o o
Fx(a, A) = J  t~ae~xtdt.
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Then
Fx(a, A) =  AQ-1r ( l  — a, Ax), 
where r (a ,  x ) is the incomplete gamma function defined as
r+ o o
T (a, x) = / ta~le~idt.
J X
Proof. Substituting At in Fx(a, A) by s, we have
r + o o  i
Fx(a, A ) =  J ' ( - ) ~ ae-a ■-ds.
Rearranging the terms proves the lemma. □
In practice, there exists a lower bound x min and an upper bound x max of the 
feasible x. Taking this into account, we derive the probability density function.
Lemma 2. The probability density function for variable x e [xmin, xmax] satisfying 
equation (6.1) is as follows.
\ l - O t
T}( =  ............................................................................................................
J r ( l  — a, Axmin) — T(1 — a, Axmax)
Proof. Note that
f X  max r + o o  r+ o o
/  x~ae~Xxdx =  I  x~ae~Xxdx -  /  x~ae~Xxdx
** x min %* x min »'2max
=  A) “  A) ‘
Thus,/a^ p (x )d x  =  i. □
To estimate the parameters a  and A, there are generally two methods, max-
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imum likelihood estimation (MLE) and the moment method. We implemented 
both methods and found that they give similar results, while the moment method 
converges much faster. The underlying idea of the moment method is to equate 
the population moments with the sample moments, and solve the resulting e- 
quations. We only use the first and the second moments, since there are two 
parameters to be determined. The two population moments are stated in the 
following lemma.
Lemma 3. For the distribution defined in Lemma 2, we have
r(2 —  O ', A:rm|n) — r(2 — Ot, A ^ m a x )E[x\ =
A(f (1 — Oi, Axmjn) — T(1 — Q:, Axmax))
and
cir 2i ^*(3 — ° i,  A^min) — r ( 3  — Oi, A x max)
r j [ X  ~~ A2( r ( l  — ex, Aa:min) — r ( l  — a, A x max) )
Proof. We only give the derivation for E[x\. The derivation for E[x2} is similar.
p x  max
E[x] =  x • p(x)dx
* *  X m in'  ^ i
f x  max ^ l - a t g - a t g - X x
— I £. , ... dx
Jxmin ^(1 —  Oi, Axm|n) — r ( l  — a, Axmax)
A l - Q f * n «  x - ( a - l ) e - A x d a .
_ _  ^ m ln
r ( l  — oc, Aa:mjn) — r ( l  — a ,  Aa:max)
  r (2  —  Ol, A x mjn) — r (2  — Q;, A x max)
A ( r ( l  — Oi, Axmin) —  r ( l  — Oi, Axmax))
where the last equality can be obtained by Lemma 1 and the proof of Lemma 2.
□
Suppose di is user i's check-in number. With the moment method, the esti-
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Figure 6.3: Two-segment distribution of displacements (km).
mated two parameters a  and A are the solution to the system of equations
E[x) = j i E i di 
E[x2] =  ^ i <%.
(6.2)
Based on the parameters estimated with the moment method, we plot the 
CCDF of the fitting distributions in Figure 6.1. The figure shows that the expo­
nentially truncated power law distribution fits the data well. To further investigate 
the goodness-of-fit, we use the coefficient of determination of the data fit, also 
known as R2, as an indicator of fitting errors. The closer R2 is to 1, the better 
the distribution fits the data. As shown in Figure 6.1, the R2 value is close to 1 
for all the three datasets, indicating a good fit.
We have also tried to fit the data with other distributions. However, none of 
them fits the data better than the exponentially truncated power law distribution.
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For example, as shown in Figure 6.2, the R2 values of the three fits on the 
Foursquare dataset are all lower than the R2 value of the exponentially truncated 
power law fit.
All the CCDF plots in Figure 6.1 show truncations of check-in numbers larger 
than several hundred, whose effects are sharp drops in the frequency of very 
large check-in numbers. One possible explanation of the exponential trunca­
tions is that the set of candidate venues a user can check-in is geographical­
ly constrained by factors like boundaries and physical obstructions. Further­
more, previous research has shown a check-in fatigue after prolonged use of 
LBSNs [68]. As a result, the frequency of very large check-in numbers in the 
datasets is lower than what would be in a power law distribution, whose CCDF 
is a straight line in the log-log scale.
6.2.2 Displacement of consecutive check-ins
In this subsection we study the spatial displacement of consecutive check-ins. 
We measure the distances between all the pairs of consecutive check-ins made 
by each user in the three datasets, and plot the log-log CCDF in Figure 6.3. It 
is easy to see that all the three plots consist of two segments with different 
curvature shapes that meet at a transition point. By analyzing the data we find 
that user displacements can be well fitted with an exponentially truncated power 
law distribution in the body, and a lognormal distribution in the tail. How to find 
the optimal transition point is shown as follows.
Definition 1. Denote byx0 a transition point. An exponentially truncated power 
law distribution with lognormal in the tail is defined by the following probability
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density function
p(x) =  < T ( l — O jA lm in ) — r ( l — q ,A i o )
i fx  <  xq
(1 - / 3)
—(In(g—xn)—n)2
! 2^  l f x > x  0 ,
where /? is the probability that x <  xQ. Denote by px- (x) the probability density 
forx <  x0, andpx+{x) the probability density for x >  xQ.
The transition point x0 is estimated with MLE. Denote by di ,d2, . . .  ,dn the 
displacement data. Then, for any given xQ, the likelihood L(x0) can be computed 
as
l (*o) = n  p x ~ ( d i )  ■ n  p x + { d i ) ,
d i < x o  d i > x  o
where parameters a, A in p -  are estimated by our previous method on set |
X q
di < x0}, parameters a,p  in px+ are estimated by the standard routine on set
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{di - x 0 \ d i >  z0}. and parameter 0 is simply the ratio The estimated
x0 is the one that maximizes L(x0).
The estimated transition points of the Gowalla, Brightkite, and Foursquare 
datasets are shown in Figure 6.3, which match closely and are similar to the 
reach of an ordinary US city. The results indicate that user inter-checkin dis­
placements exhibit two different behaviors: Displacements within the reach of 
the borders of a city correspond to the daily short movements, and a vast major­
ity of all the user displacements belong to this type, while displacements beyond 
the reach of the borders of a city correspond to the occasional long trips, and 
only a small fraction of the displacements fall into this category. Based on the 
estimated parameters, we plot the CCDF of the fitting distributions in Figure 6.3, 
which shows that the two-segment distribution is a good fit to the data. We al­
so plot several other fits over the Foursquare displacement data in Figure 6.4. 
None of those distributions fits the data better than the two-segment distribution.
6.2.3 Temporal interval of consecutive check-ins
Next we study the temporal interval of consecutive check-ins. We plot in Figure 
6.5 the CCDF of the temporal intervals between all the pairs of consecutive 
check-ins made by each user in the three datasets. Again, the plots exhibit a 
two-segment pattern. We find that small temporal intervals can be well fitted with 
an exponentially truncated power law distribution, while large temporal intervals 
can be well fitted with a Weibull distribution, which meet at a transition point.
We use the technique described in the previous subsection to estimate the 
optimal transition point. The results are shown in Figure 6.5. The transition 
points of all the three datasets match well, and they are close to the temporal
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length of a week in seconds (604,800s). This is a strong indicator that user 
check-in intervals exhibit two different patterns: the check-in intervals shorter 
than one week follow some weekly temporal rhythms, as shown in previous 
research [27,81]. On the other hand, the check-in intervals longer than a week 
tend to arise from the more random check-ins made by users, e.g., when a user 
visits a new venue. We plot the CCDF of the fitting distributions based on the 
estimated parameters in Figure 6.5, which shows good fits to the original data 
with high R2 values.
6.2.4 Distance between friends
In this subsection we study the geographic distance between friends in LBSNs. 
We consider two cases. One is we measure the distance between each pair of 
friends' first check-ins, i.e., their initial locations, and the other is we measure the
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Figure 6.8: Power law distribution of venue popularity.
distance between each pair of friends' average locations over all their check-ins. 
We plot in Figure 6.6 the CCDF for both cases. Note that since the Foursquare 
dataset does not contain friendship information, we only plot the CCDF figure 
of the Gowalla and Brightkite datasets. Figure 6.6 shows that for both datasets 
the initial location curve and the average location curve match closely, indicating 
that there is no significant difference between these two measurements.
The downward CCDF curves can be well fitted by a truncated Weibull dis­
tribution, which is obtained by restricting the random variable of Weibull distri­
bution within the range (0,xmai], and normalizing the probability density func­
tion accordingly. Based on the parameters estimated with MLE, we plot the 
CCDF of the fitting distributions in Figure 6.6. The high R2 values indicate a 
good fit. For comparison, we measure the distances between randomly se­
lected 1,000,000 pairs of arbitrary users (strangers). The average distance be­
tween friends (1,040 km) is much smaller than the average distance between 
strangers (2,021 km), indicating that friendship tends to be established between 
geographically close users in LBSNs.
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6.2.5 Number of friends
The degree (number of friends) distributions of the Gowalla and Brightkite dataset- 
s are reported in Figure 6.7. The CCDF is approximately a straight line in the 
log-log scale, which illustrates that user degrees follow a power law distribution. 
This result is consistent with the previous findings on online social network- 
s [88,104]: the majority of users have small degrees, while a small number of 
users have significantly larger degrees, which are the "hub" nodes in the social 
graph.
6.2.6 Venue popularity
We define the popularity of a venue as the number of check-ins made at this 
venue. To investigate the difference in popularity across all the venues, we plot 
in Figure 6.8 the CCDF of the number of check-ins at each venue in the three 
datasets. Again, the CCDF can be approximately fitted with a straight line in 
the log-log scale, indicating a power law distribution. The heavy tail of power 
law implies that only a few the most popular venues receive a large number of 
check-ins.
6.3 Modeling LBSNs
Based on our findings, in this section we build LBSNSim, a trace-driven model 
that generates synthetic LBSN datasets capturing the statistical features of the 
original datasets. We assume that the locations of a set of venues are known, 
which will be used as the input to our algorithm. The synthetic users' check­
ins will adhere to these venues in the generated datasets. We believe that
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Figure 6.9: The number of users versus the number of venues in each cell.
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Figure 6.10: Power-law venue popularity based on the first check-in of each 
user in the Foursquare dataset.
this is a rational assumption, because releasing the venue information does not 
compromise any user privacy. Also, the information is readily available, which 
can be extracted from the published datasets.
The development of our model consists of three steps: (1) generating the 
initial location of each synthetic user; (2) building the friendship graph consid­
ering both social and geographic factors; (3) generating the check-ins of each 
user such that the displacements and temporal intervals between consecutive 
check-ins follow the found distributions.
6.3.1 Generating the initial location
To generate the initial location, i.e., the location of the first check-in, of each 
user in the synthetic dataset, our algorithm relies on the hypothesis that the us­
er density is proportional to the venue density in a given area. To verify this
hypothesis, we discretize the mainland of the USA into 0.1° latitude by 0.1° lon­
gitude cells, and plot in Figure 6.9 the number of venues in each cell versus the 
number of users whose first check-in is in that cell, based on our Foursquare 
dataset. The figure signals a significant linear correlation (the correlation coef­
ficient is 0.9324) between venue density and user density, and thus verifies our 
hypothesis. The other two datasets both exhibit a similar pattern. Our algorithm 
runs as follows.
Assume the set of venues in cell{i,j) is Vy, and the total number of synthetic 
users is n. Starting from the first to the nth user, for each user, based on our 
finding, the probability that her initial location is in cell{i,j) is • Suppose 
cell(p,q) is selected. The probability of choosing venue v e Vpg as her initial 
location is proportional to nv +  e, i.e., ^ i . where nv is the number2-v€Vp, v Ip? I
of users who have chosen v as their initial location, and e is a small constant. 
The plus-e operation guarantees that the venues which have not been selected 
before still have an opportunity of being chosen.
This generation process implies the richer-get-richer property: the larger 
number of users that have chosen a venue as their initial location, the high­
er probability that the next user will select this venue as her initial location. This 
is consistent with the power law distribution of the number of users that have 
chosen each venue as their initial location in the original dataset, as shown in 
Figure 6.10.
6.3.2 Building the friendship graph
The second step is to build the friendship graph. As shown in the previous sec­
tion, in the real datasets user degrees follow a power law distribution, while the
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Figure 6.11: Ring area to search for the destination node, 
distances between friends follow a truncated Weibull distribution. The generat­
ed friendship graph should preserve both properties.
We use an extended preferential attachment process, similar to the one pro­
posed by Capocci et al. [22], to reproduce the power law degree distribution.
Assume the total number of friendship edges to create is e. Each user in 
a social graph is represented as a node. The process starts with an initial set 
of irt/Q nodes with ttiq  ^  c/ h , where t i  is  the total number of synthetic users* A 
clique topology is generated among those m0 nodes, i.e., each node is linked 
to the other m0 -  1 nodes. These are the startup nodes in the social graph. For 
example, they may be the administrators of the LBSN.
Starting from the (m0 -I-1)*'1 user to the nth user, at each step, a new node 
and e/n new edges are introduced into the social graph. For each new edge, 
with probability p, the edge connects the new node with an existing node. With 
probability 1 -  p, the edge originates from an existing node and ends at another 
existing node, and the probability of choosing an existing node i as the source 
node is proportional to i's degree, i.e., In both cases, how to select the 
destination node is explained below.
Given a source node, to choose the destination node of a friendship edge,
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we first randomly sample a distance v from the truncated Weibull fitting distribu­
tion of the distances between friends' initial locations, which is acquired in the 
previous section. If v >  t ,  we draw a circular ring area on the map centered at 
the initial location of the source node, whose inner radius is (1 -  S)v, and outer 
radius is (1 +  6)v, where 6 is a tunable parameter, as shown in Figure 6.11. All 
the nodes whose initial location is within this ring area (the grey area) are treated 
as candidate nodes, from which the destination node will be chosen. Otherwise, 
if v < r, all the nodes whose initial location falls into the circular area centered 
at the initial location of the source node and with radius v are considered as 
candidate nodes. Here, r  is a small threshold distance, which is set to 0.5 km 
in our experiments. Assume the set of candidate nodes is C. The probability 
of choosing Cit the i th node in C, as the destination node is proportional to its 
degree, i.e., if \c\ =  0, we sample a new distance and repeat the
process.
6.3.3 Generating the check-ins
The last step of our model is to generate all the check-ins of each user. Note 
that the location of each user's first check-in has already been generated in the 
first step.
As mentioned in the previous section, each check-in is composed of the 
location information, represented as a venue ID, and a timestamp. Our task is 
to generate both pieces of information for each check-in, such that the synthetic 
check-in traces capture the properties of the original traces.
Our algorithm runs by first assigning a check-in number to each user. For 
each user, we randomly sample a check-in number from the exponentially trun­
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cated power law fitting distribution of user check-in numbers acquired in the 
previous section. To assign timestamps to these check-ins, we first need to 
generate the timestamp of each user's first check-in. To achieve this we sorted 
the timestamps of all the users' first check-ins in the real dataset in increasing 
order, and found that the CCDF of the temporal intervals between consecutive 
timestamps in this sorted list can be approximated by a power law distribution. 
Given the timestamp of the first user's first check-in, with the power-law param­
eters estimated by MLE, we are able to generate a sequence of timestamps of 
the other users' first check-ins, such that the temporal intervals follow the power 
law distribution.
Assume the timestamp of user i's first check-in is tCl, and her check-in num­
ber is n*. To generate the timestamps of i's following check-ins, we randomly 
sample rii -  1 temporal intervals vi, ..., vnj- i  from the two-segment fitting distri­
bution of the temporal intervals between consecutive check-ins made by users, 
which is acquired in the previous section. The timestamp of the j th check-in 
made by user i is thus: tCj =  tci +  XTi=l Vk-
Now we have generated the timestamps of all the check-ins, and our next 
task is to generate the location of each check-in, i.e., to determine which venue 
the check-in adheres to. We achieve this by first sorting all the check-ins by 
their timestamps in increasing order. Starting from the first check-in to the last 
check-in, for each encountered check-in c, we check if c is its creator u's first 
check-in. If so, then c's location is the same as it’s initial location. Otherwise, 
we randomly sample a displacement v from the two-segment fitting distribution 
of the displacements between consecutive check-ins made by users. Assume c 
is it's %th check-in, where i > 1. If v >  r, we draw a circular ring area on the map 
centered at the location of it’s (i -  l ) th check-in, whose inner radius is (1 -  S)v,
149
and outer radius is (1 +  6)v. All the venues falling into this ring area are treated 
as candidate venues that c may adhere to. If v <  r, we consider all the venues 
falling into the circular area centered at the location of u's (i -  l ) th check-in and 
with radius v as candidate venues.
Assume the set of candidate venues is V. We consider two cases when de­
termining c's venue. Let Vf  be the set of venues in V  that have been previously 
checked-in by some of u's friends, and Va =  V  -  Vf . If both Vf and V, are not 
empty, then with probability p1, c adheres to a venue in Vf . The probability that 
c adheres to venue i in Vf  is proportional to the number of times that u's friends 
have previously checked-in at this venue, i.e., With probability 1 -  p\
c adheres to a venue in V3. The probability that c adheres to venue i in Vs is 
proportional to e plus the number of times that the non-friend users (strangers) 
have previously checked-in at this venue, i.e., £  6V^ + j '^ - The plus-e opera­
tion guarantees that the venues which have not been checked-in by any user 
before still have an opportunity of being chosen. By introducing the parameter 
p’, we take into account the difference between check-ins made by friends and 
by strangers. This captures the social influence on users' check-in behavior, 
which was found in previous research [28,40]. If either Vf  or Vs is empty, then 
we only consider the venues in the non-empty set. If both Vf  and Vs are empty, 
then we sample a new distance and repeat the process.
Note that in the original datasets we do not observe obvious correlation 
between the displacement and the temporal interval of consecutive check-ins. 
The correlation coefficients of the Gowalla, Brightkite, and Foursquare datasets 
are 0.1306, 0.0972, and 0.1256, respectively. This finding is rational because 
check-in is a spontaneous user behavior, which is different from continuous lo­
cation sensing. It may take a long time for a user to make two check-ins, while
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the displacement between them may be very small. Therefore, when building 
the model we do not consider this correlation. Instead, we only filter out the gen­
erated consecutive check-ins which imply an unrealistically high transit speed.
6.4 Model Verification
In this section, we evaluate the fidelity of LBSNSim by verifying whether LB- 
SNSim can generate synthetic LBSN datasets that capture the statistical fea­
tures observed in the original datasets.
6.4.1 Experimental Setup
In the evaluation we use the Gowalla dataset as the target dataset. The pa­
rameters of the distributions used in our model are estimated based on this 
dataset. The number of users in the model-generated datasets is 100,000, the 
number of friendship edges is 500,000, and the total number of check-ins is 
5,000,000. The other parameters used in the model are experimentally set as: 
m0 =  20,p =  0.4,p' =  0.8,6 =  0.25,c =  l , r  =  0.5 km. We use the venues ex­
tracted from the Gowalla dataset as the input to our algorithm. Note that using 
LBSNSim, researchers can generate LBSN datasets with different scales and 
properties by tuning the parameters in the model, and experiment with these 
datasets to produce statistically confident results.
6.4.2 Evaluation Results
In this section we test a wide range of statistical features, including distance 
between friends, radius of gyration (explained later), temporal intervals consid-
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Figure 6.12: Friend distances (km) based on average locations.
ering all the check-ins, node degrees, venue popularity, and social influence 
on check-ins. We do not test the features that are explicitly modeled by LB­
SNSim, including the truncated power law check-in number distribution, and the 
two-segment distributions of the temporal intervals and displacements between 
consecutive check-ins made by each user. In the experiments we generate 50 
realizations of our model and we observe no significant difference among them 
in the statistical features we evaluate, so for each feature we compare the target 
dataset with a randomly selected model-generated dataset. In the application- 
level test, we run an LBSN-based application with both the target dataset and 
the synthetic datasets as input, and compare their results to quantify the fidelity 
of LBSNSim.
Distance between friends. In the previous section, we use distance as a 
constraint on friendship generation, by sampling a distance v from the truncated 
Weibull fitting distribution of the distances between friends' initial locations each 
time when a new friendship edge is created, and using it to search for the des­
tination node of the edge. However, the resulting distance between the source 
node and the destination node is only an approximation of v, as the destination 
node is chosen from all the nodes falling into the ring area with inner radius 
(1 -  8)v and outer radius (1 +  S)v. As shown in Figure 6.12, even with this ap-
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Figure 6.13: Radius of gyration (km).
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Figure 6.14: Inter-checkin time (seconds) of all the check-ins, rescaled by di­
viding by the average time interval.
proximation, the distribution of the distances between friends' average locations 
in the model-generated dataset still matches well with that in the target dataset.
Radius o f gyration. The radius of gyration of a user is defined as the root 
mean square distance of a user's check-ins from their center of mass:
where n* is user i ’s check-in number, Cj is the location of the j th check-in, and 
ca is the average location over all the check-ins. Radius of gyration measures 
the "spread" of a user's check-ins: the larger radius of gyration is, the more 
widely a user’s check-ins are dispersed. Figure 6.13 compares the distribution 
of radius of gyration in the model-produced dataset with that extracted from the 
target dataset, which shows that the two distributions match well.
1 . \
— ^2(distance(cj, ca))2 
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Figure 6.15: Number of friends of each user, rescaled by dividing by the average 
friend number.
Inter-checkin time o f all the check-ins. To measure the distribution of the 
inter-checkin time considering all the check-ins, we sort all the user check-ins 
by their timestamps in increasing order. Figure 6.14 plots the distribution of 
the temporal interval between every pair of consecutive check-ins in this sorted 
list, for both the synthetic dataset and the target dataset. The CCDFs of both 
distributions can be approximated by a straight line in the log-log scale, which 
indicates a power law distribution, and they also match closely. Note that this 
distribution is different from the distribution of the temporal intervals between 
consecutive check-ins made by each user, which is studied in the data analysis 
section.
Number o f friends. Figure 6.15 compares the distribution of the friend num­
bers in the model-produced dataset with that in the target dataset. Both CCDF 
curves are approximately a straight line in the log-log scale with similar slope. 
This validates the correctness of our extended preferential attachment process 
used to generate the friendship graph.
Venue popularity. In Figure 6.16 we plot the distribution of venue popularity, 
defined as the number of check-ins at each venue, in the generated dataset and 
in the target dataset. The distributions are rescaled by dividing by the average 
venue popularity. The figure illustrates that our check-in generation method
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Figure 6.16: Venue popularity, rescaled by dividing by the average venue pop­
ularity.
Table 6.2: False positive and negative rates of SybilDe
Orig inal Synthetic
F + F~ F+ F~
2000 sybil nodes 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2%
1000 sybil nodes 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.5%
500 sybil nodes 0.2% 0.6% 0.2% 0.8%
:ender
captures the power-law venue popularity found in the original datasets.
Social Influence on check-ins. To quantify the social influence on users' 
check-in behavior, we measure the probability that two friends have checked- 
in at the same venue, and compare it with the probability that two strangers 
have checked-in at the same venue. The probability is measured by randomly 
selecting 100,000 pairs of users and counting the number of pairs that have 
checked-in at at least one common venue. All the results are averaged over 
50 runs. The friend-case probability and the stranger-case probability for the 
Gowalla dataset are 16.29% and 0.39%, respectively. For the model-generated 
dataset they are 14.50% and 0.59%, respectively. The results demonstrate that 
similar to the real datasets, the model-generated datasets exhibit strong social 
influence on users' check-in behavior, i.e., people are more likely to visit places 
that their friends visited in the past.
Application-level test In this subsection, we compare the results of an
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LBSN-based application obtained by using the target dataset with those ob­
tained by using the synthetic datasets. SybilDefender was proposed in previous 
research to defend against sybil attacks in social networks [102], when an at­
tacker creates many bogus identities to compromise the running of the system. 
To extend SybilDefender to LBSNs, we augment the sybil identification algorith- 
m by considering edge weights, which are defined as the number of venues that 
have been checked-in by both ending nodes of a friendship edge. The algorithm 
runs by performing weighted random walks in the friendship graph. At each step 
of a weighted random walk, edge weights are considered when choosing the 
next hop. The weighted sybil identification algorithm takes the target dataset 
and the synthetic datasets as input. In each experiment we randomly create 
sybil nodes forming a connected scale-free topology, with a small number of 
edges linking to the largest connected component of the friendship graph. The 
results are averaged over 50 runs.
Table 6.2 shows the average false positive and negative rates of the weight­
ed sybil identification algorithm, when running on the target dataset and on the 
synthetic datasets. It demonstrates that the application-level results obtained by 
using the synthetic datasets closely match those obtained by using the original 
dataset.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyze the statistical features extracted from the data of 
three LBSNs, and propose LBSNSim, a trace-driven model for generating syn­
thetic LBSN datasets that capture the properties of the original datasets. E- 
valuation shows that the synthetic datasets generated by LBSNSim are suffi­
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ciently representative of real-world LBSN datasets in a wide range of statisti­
cal features, and that high fidelity results can be produced using the synthetic 
datasets in the application-level test. This verifies the feasibility of using the 
model-generated datasets as replacements for real LBSN datasets.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
With OSNs central to so many peoples's lives, it is critical to address the rising 
tension between the value of participation and the security and privacy threats to 
OSN users. On the one hand, through OSNs users can establish and strength­
en social connections, communicate with one another, and maintain personal 
data. On the other hand, users' privacy and security will be compromised if 
their personal data are leaked or they are targeted by various attacks on OSNs. 
To improve security and privacy in OSNs, in this dissertation, we address four 
challenging issues of OSNs. First, we propose Fast Mencius, a crash-fault tol­
erant state machine replication protocol that has low commit latency and higK 
throughput in wide-area networks. Second, we propose SybilDefender, a sybil 
defense mechanism that leverages the social network topologies to detect sybil 
nodes. Third, we propose MobiShare, a privacy-preserving location-sharing 
scheme that supports sharing locations between both friends and strangers 
without compromising user privacy. Fourth, we propose LBSNSim, a trace- 
driven LBSN model for generating synthetic LBSN datasets that can be used in 
place of the real LBSN datasets.
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Correspondingly, we have made four main contributions in this dissertation. 
First, we have improved the infrastructure reliability of OSNs with our crash- 
fault tolerant state machine replication protocol. Our protocol enhances the s- 
tate of the art with mechanisms that allow fast replicas to proceed without being 
delayed by the slowest replica, and thus achieves much smaller commit laten­
cy. Second, we have strengthened the security of OSNs against sybil attacks 
with our sybil defense mechanism. Compared with previous work, our sybil de­
fense mechanism is significantly more efficient and effective in detecting sybil 
nodes by creatively leveraging the coverage difference between random walk- 
s in the honest region and in the sybil region. Third, we have contributed to 
protecting user privacy on OSNs with our privacy-preserving location-sharing 
scheme. With this scheme, we show a new direction to preserve OSN users' 
location privacy by separating location data from user identities, which address­
es the weaknesses of previous encryption and cloaking schemes. Finally, we 
have mitigated the risk of privacy leakage from releasing original LBSN dataset- 
s with our LBSN model, which can generate synthetic LBSN datasets. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first time that detailed distributions have been 
found and explained for a wide range of LBSN features, and this is also the 
first time that an evolution model has been proposed for LBSNs. Overall, we 
have addressed a representative security/privacy issue for each of the OSN 
components, and combining our work serves to build more secure and privacy- 
preserving OSNs.
During our studies we have gained experience that is helpful to the general 
advancement of research in this area. First, we find that a multi-leader de­
sign is advantageous to improving performance when solving consensus prob­
lems. The reason is that the multi-leader design eliminates the performance
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bottleneck incurred by a single leader, and it can fully utilize the available band­
width and computation power of all the servers. Second, we find that social 
graph topologies are valuable resources that can be used to address security 
issues related to social connections, since these topologies exhibit the struc­
tured relationships between human beings. Besides the sybil attack we have 
studied before, other examples of such security issues include fishing attack, 
de-anonymization attack, spam, and false recommendations/reviews. Third, 
we find that the separation approach is a promising way to address privacy 
issues in OSNs. The basic idea is to separately store and process users' sen­
sitive information and their identities, such that the adversaries cannot link user 
identities to the protected data.
As for future work, we believe that how to improve the infrastructure reliability 
and how to prevent the functioning of OSNs from being disturbed by malicious 
behaviors remain hot research topics, and there is still plenty of room for im­
provement. For the infrastructure layer of OSNs, the infrastructure reliability 
may be compromised not only by crash failures, but also by Byzantine failures, 
in which the servers hosting OSNs are controlled by adversaries and behave 
arbitrarily [23]. Byzantine failures are harder to handle than crash failures, since 
the faulty servers can be arbitrarily malicious. We intend to investigate how to 
tolerate Byzantine failures in state machine replication systems with a rotating- 
leader design, which has the potential of achieving higher throughput than the 
single-leader schemes. For the function layer of OSNs, an unsolved attack that 
seriously threatens the security of OSN users is the spoofing attack, in which an 
attacker masquerades as another user and gains an illegitimate advantage [17]. 
Because of the hardness to verify user identities, spoofing attacks can be easi­
ly launched on OSNs without being detected. Our next step is to study how to
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defend against this attack on OSNs. Finally, for the user data stored on OSNs, 
one problem we have not considered in this dissertation is how to ensure that 
the data provided by users have high quality. It has been found that the users' 
check-in data on OSNs can be faked [49], which will compromise the operation 
of all the location-based features provided by OSNs. Although some preliminary 
attempts have been made to address this issue [114], no concrete solution has 
been proposed so far. To preserve authenticity of the check-in data collected 
by OSNs, we plan to investigate how to detect the fake check-ins generated by 
malicious users.
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